


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METTERNICH



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PRINCE METTERNICH
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METTERNICH

George Melius
BY
Crawshaw
G. A. C. SANDEMAN

WITH TEN ILLUSTRATIONS

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PREFACE

THE writer of a short biography of Metternich must inevitably fall between two stools. As in the case of most statesmen, whose triumphs have been diplomatic rather than parliamentary, and whose activities have been exerted in the sphere of foreign rather than domestic affairs, the real interest of his career to the student of history is diplomatic. Yet the period covered by his life is so important and so long, that volumes would be required adequately to observe how Metternich directed Austrian policy in the various phases and crises of European politics. An attempt to achieve this end in a short biography would result in a dry and congested bundle of facts, the compiler of which would be dubbed by the general reader an intolerable bore. On the other hand, a book like the present, which, without pretending to produce any new facts or to expound any original theories, seeks in a comparatively brief space to give a trustworthy outline of Metternich's life from the domestic as well as from the official side, will find little favour with the serious historical student.

In a sense the life of Metternich is written in the

archives of European Governments. For the general history of the time in which he lived, the bibliographies contained in the volumes of the "Cambridge Modern History" dealing with his period will supply adequate information.

Of books specially dealing with Metternich's career the following will be found useful. There is, of course, the *Autobiography*. It is valuable as illustrating the standpoint of Austria in the diplomatic situations of the period, the character of Metternich, and, to a certain extent, his domestic life. As an authority it must be used upon the principle that when it conflicts with other authorities, the latter are probably correct.

There is no adequate English biography of Metternich. The volume by G. B. Malleson in the "Statesmen Series" does not profess to be more than a text-book. There are, of course, innumerable books in English dealing with general European history, which contain the landmarks of Metternich's career. The drawback of these, even in the case of so admirable a work as Mr Alison Phillips's "Modern Europe," is that, not from inaccuracy but from want of space, which forbids details, they nearly all convey an impression of Metternich which can only be described as Machiavellian.

Of German books there are a considerable number. Dr Wilhelm Binder's "Fürst Clemens Metternich und sein Zeitalter" was published during the Chancellor's

lifetime ; Schmidt-Wessenfels' " Fürst Metternich " in 1862. Both biographers, therefore, while giving accurate accounts of his career, perhaps lived too near the period dealt with to be able to deliver trustworthy judgments. Hormayr's " Kaiser Franz und Metternich " and Strobl von Ravelsberg's " Metternich und seine Zeit, 1773-1859," are interesting as presenting the Chancellor in the light of not too favourable criticism. For Metternich's foreign policy Fedor von Deme-litsch's " Metternich und seine auswärtige Politik " is invaluable, and examines every phase of Austrian policy during Metternich's period in the minutest detail.

For the internal condition of the Austrian Empire, and the causes which led up to the Revolution of 1848, there are, apart from numerous German publications, some adequate works in English, such as Stile's " Austria, 1848-49," and Maurice's " Revolution of 1848-49." There is also an excellent appreciation of the domestic policy of the Austrian Government in " The Genesis of the Austrian Revolution," translated and published at the end of Coxe's " House of Austria " (Bohn's Edition).

Personal details concerning Metternich and side-lights on his policy may be found scattered amongst the numerous Memoirs of contemporary statesmen, Talleyrand, Gentz, Wellington, Castlereagh, etc., but the above authorities, short of the direct study of

Government archives, will be adequate for an appreciation of the main phases and details of Metternich's career.

In regard to the illustrations, I am much indebted to my friend the Hon. F. G. Agar-Robartes, of the British Embassy, Vienna, for his kindness in ascertaining the whereabouts of the various portraits and obtaining the two small views of Metternich's residences in Vienna.

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IMPORTANT DATES IN METTERNICH'S CAREER

Born at Coblenz	May 15th,	1773
Goes to Strasburg University		1788
Attends Coronation of the Emperor Leopold and thence goes to the University of Mainz		1790
Attends Coronation of the Emperor Francis and after- wards goes to Brussels University		1792
Appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to the Emperor at the Hague		1794
Marries Princess Kaunitz	Sept. 27th,	1795
Secretary at Austrian Embassy in St Petersburg		1802
Austrian Ambassador at Dresden		1803
Austrian Ambassador at Berlin		1805
Austrian Ambassador at Paris		1806
Raised to the dignity of a Prince of the Empire		1813
Death of his first wife	March 19th,	1825
Marries Antonia von Leykam	March 3rd,	1827
Death of his second wife	Jan. 17th,	1829
Marries Princess Mélanie Zichy	January,	1831
Flies from Vienna to exile in England		1848
Returns to Vienna		1851
Death	June 11th,	1859

IMPORTANT DATES IN EUROPEAN HISTORY CONNECTED WITH METTERNICH'S CAREER

Battle of Austerlitz and Peace of Pressburg . . .	1805
Battle of Wagram and Peace of Vienna . . .	1809
Marriage of Napoleon to Marie-Louise . . .	1810
Austria declares war on Napoleon . . . August,	1813
The first Peace of Paris	1814
The Congress of Vienna	1814-15
Signing of the Holy Alliance . . . September,	1815
The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle	1818
The Carlsbad Decrees	1820
The Congresses of Troppau and Laibach . . .	1820-21
The Congress of Verona	1822
Summoning of the Hungarian Diet	1825
Battle of Navarino October 25th,	1827
The July Revolution in France	1830
The February Revolution in France	1848

METTERNICH



METTERNICH

CHAPTER I

THE METTERNICH FAMILY

Fanciful theories of the origin of the name Metternich—Real origin of the Metternich family—Career of Dietrich von Metternich—The various branches of the family rapidly extend their possessions—The Chursdorf branch change from ardent Reformers to staunch Catholics—Ecclesiastical importance of the Metternichs—Career of Lothar von Metternich—His nepotism renders him unpopular—The family continue to hold high offices in the Church—All branches of the family are raised to the rank of Counts—Tendency of the family gradually to migrate from west to east, and round off their Bohemian possessions—The descendants of Philip Emmerich—Career of Francis George von Metternich—His formidable list of titles—He falls under a cloud in later years—His success is due rather to favour in high places than to natural ability—He is raised to the rank of Prince—His extravagance—His wife and family

A VARIETY of fanciful origins have been invented for the name Metternich, chiefly by novelists, who have been followed in some cases by sober biographers. Two may suffice as examples. One well-known author,¹ a contemporary of Prince Metternich, anxious to flatter the patron who had befriended him, weaved the following tale, which he enshrined in a novel. Amongst the followers of the ill-fated Emperor Henry II. on his expedition to Rome was a certain captain named Metter. During the march

¹ Christian Heinrich Spiess.

this warrior turned aside with his troop from the line of march in order to capture a strong fortress lying off the main road. Not only his enemies, but the army as a whole concluded that he was a traitor to his emperor and had deserted. But Metter proved successful in his enterprise, and when on his return to the camp the news of his exploit became known, the whole army raised a shout of "Metter! nicht!" (Metter could never have proved false), with the result that his name was altered for all time to Metternich. The other version is supplied by an old Rhenish chronicle. The last Emperor of the Saxons, Henry the Holy, had as captain of his bodyguard a certain Metter, whom he held in high esteem. Jealous courtiers hatched a plot against him. A forged letter was handed to the Emperor accusing Metter of treason. But the Emperor tore it up, exclaiming, "O Metter nicht!" (Metter would never have done such a thing), and when Metter shortly afterwards approached, the Court took up the cry. Henceforth his name was Metternich.¹

But the real origin of the name is far simpler. It was taken from the town of Metternich in Switzerland. The family was one of the oldest in Germany. It probably originated in a Roman family which settled during the period of the later Emperors round Colonia Agrippina and Trevirensis, the modern Cologne and Treves. From this stock sprang the family of Alfster, famous in the days of the Pipins and Merovings. After 1166 the descendants of the Alfsters appear, under the name of Hemmerich or Hemberg, as here-

¹ Schmidt Weissenfels, "Fürst Metternich," vol. i., pp. 2 and 3. Prague, 1862.

ditary chamberlains of the see of Cologne. Somewhere about 1300 a branch of this famous old family took the name of Metternich, a town lying close to Hemmerich itself, while retaining the Hemmerich arms (three black shells on a silver field). In 1320 the lord Heinrich von Metternich's name appears as one of the arbitrators in a dispute between the Bishop and burghers of Cologne. At the beginning of the fifteenth century the family split into numerous branches, the members of which, thanks to lucky marriages, acquired large possessions throughout the Rhineland.

The most important of these, and the one to which the hero of this biography belonged, was the family of Wolf-Metternich, originating in 1440 in the marriage of Sibilla Metternich with Gotthard Wolf of Gudensberg. From this line broke off a branch, Metternich-Chursdorf, which is interesting because its members pursued a policy which was entirely at variance with that of the remainder of the family. This line originated in a certain Dietrich von Metternich, who emigrated to Brandenburg, sold his possessions on the Rhine, and went over to the Reformed Church. He rose to considerable fame, and at the time of his death held many high offices. He had three sons, the youngest of whom was raised in 1696 to the rank of Count of the Empire, and rendered important services to Prussia as Ambassador at Regensburg and in Switzerland. In 1707 he cleverly acquired Neufchatel for Prussia, and died in 1727, full of honours. On his deathbed he was persuaded by the Jesuits to recant, and both he and his wife and children returned to the Catholic

religion. It is a proof of his importance that his conversion was regarded as a great triumph over the heretics, and commemorated in a host of pamphlets and verses in honour of the deceased proselyte. It was also a turning-point in the history of the Metternich-Chursdorf branch. Its members are no longer found in the service of Prussia, and from ardent supporters of the Reformed Church they became, like all true Metternichs, staunch Catholics.

While the Chursdorf line were pursuing their career in Prussia, the main part of the family continued to spread in large numbers along the banks of the Rhine, and were numerous in Cologne, in Bonn, in Mainz and in Trier. They gradually attained great influence in ecclesiastical affairs; held posts in the Church, and, since in those days the Church was wont to supply the State with its officers, they became a power in politics. The commencement of their political importance is marked by the election of Lothar von Metternich in 1599 to the Electorship of Trier.

Lothar is an interesting figure in the history of Germany, and is the most famous of the Metternichs before the hero of our biography. He was a born statesman, enlightened, energetic, clever. Ambitious, and endowed with talents to satisfy his ambition, he was yet an ardent Catholic, and unselfishly championed the Catholic cause in Germany. Educated during the commotion caused by the spread of the Reformation doctrines, he alone foresaw the real danger to Catholicism from the new faith and the probable imminence of war. He was a sort of German Machiavelli, determined to forward Catholic ideals on political principles, and exerting an influence, as for

instance during the progress of the Thirty Years' War, far wider than his apparent sphere of action. He staunchly supported Austria, for he saw that she was the only Catholic power strong enough to form a nucleus for the elements of resistance to Protestantism. He therefore took a great part in thwarting the scheme of Henry IV. of France for combining with the Protestant princes of Germany to overwhelm Austria. The incapacity of the Emperor forced Lothar into prominence, and it was he who originated the idea of a defence league amongst the Rhenish electors, which ultimately culminated in the Catholic League of 1609. Schemes for the humbling of Austria and Catholicism in Germany did not die with Henry IV., but the efforts of Lothar strengthened the hands of the Catholics, and in 1619 he took a prominent part in overcoming the Protestant resistance to the election of Ferdinand II. to the Imperial throne.

In domestic affairs Lothar proved himself an equally able administrator. During the first three years of his Electorship he adjusted the finances of Trier, and broke the power of his Diet in order to give himself a free hand. He then introduced a sound system of justice—and, wonderful achievement for that age—a creditable military organization. Nor did he fail to find time for the encouragement of building, arts and science, and, not least, the superintendence of Church affairs.

Yet with all these virtues Lothar was not popular with his people. Nepotism, curse of the age, was perhaps his only fault, but it clouded all his achievements in the eyes of his subjects. He raised his relations to offices of State whenever it was possible ;

uncles and nephews and cousins received lucrative bishoprics and princely revenues. Not least, he ousted the Canons of Florence from their dwelling in the Kranzplatz at Coblenz, in order to build the stately mansion afterwards called the "Metternich Palace." Consequently, when he died in 1623, after devoting the last years of his life to religious practices, his subjects, who had mistaken his motives and hated his nepotism, refused to elect as his successor his nephew Carl von Metternich, to whom latterly Lothar had handed over much of the work of government.

Still, so great was the influence of the family in the Rhenish districts, that three more Metternichs held the electoral dignity. Lothar Friedrich, Count Bishop of Speyer, and later of Worms, who became Elector of Mainz, is only remarkable for the mass of manifestoes on Church discipline which he issued, and the others were even less important.

Two other Metternichs, less famous than Lothar, served the Catholic cause in the Thirty Years' War. Colonel Henry von Metternich (stout warrior and companion of John of Worth) was governor of Heidelberg for the Elector of Bavaria, and a John Reinhardt von Metternich was employed by the Saxon Court as Ambassador to Count Tilly when that general was ordered to lay down his arms.

In consequence of the great services performed by the Metternichs for the cause of German Catholicism, all branches of the family were at the end of the seventeenth century raised to the rank of Counts. Their territories had enormously increased, and the Winneburg branch especially had vast possessions on the Rhine.

In 1630 William von Metternich bought the lordships of Königswart and Königsberg in Bohemia, ultimately becoming Burggraf of Eger, and by settling in Austrian territory increased that close dependence of the family upon Austrian and Imperial interests which continued for more than two centuries. The Rhine possessions, it is true, still remained, but the policy of the Metternich family was to round off their Bohemian possessions and concentrate their influence in the East. William's son, Philip Emmerich, was the first to hold the office of hereditary chamberlain to the See of Mainz, an office which from that date, 1673, remained in the Metternich family. Philip Emmerich also became an Imperial Count in 1679, and by virtue of his lordship of Winneburg and Beilstein got a seat and vote in the Westphalian College of Counts. No Metternich did much of importance for the next half century. The name occurs again during the War of the Spanish Succession in connection with a dispute about the appointment of a Bishop of Münster. The Dutch selected Count Metternich, Bishop of Paderborn. The Emperor put forward another candidate. The matter was finally adjusted by Marlborough in favour of Count Metternich.

But it is with the descendants of Philip Emmerich that we have chiefly to deal. He had six children, of whom Francis Ferdinand carried on the principal line. He resided chiefly at Königswart, and had one son, Philip Adolf, a most eccentric person, who, however, made some addition to the family possessions. In 1726 he purchased Königsberg and enlarged the lordship of Königswart by the purchase of Ammons-

grau and Maremgrau in 1710. Of his nine children, John Hugo Francis continued the line, and his son, Francis George, was the father of Prince Clement.

Francis George von Metternich was born in 1746, and lost his father at the age of nine. He was not a man of great ability or brilliant gifts, and rose to prominence more through the position of the Metternich family than from merit. In 1768 he was appointed Ambassador of the Electorate of Trier to Vienna, and by 1769 his titles formed a lengthy list. Among them were those of Hereditary Chamberlain to the Archbishop of Mainz, Acting Chamberlain to the Elector of Trier, Secret Counsellor and Plenipotentiary Minister at the Imperial Court, and Chamberlain to the Elector of Mainz.

In 1771 he married the Countess von Kagenneck, who was then eighteen years of age. Their first child was the Countess Pauline Metternich. Then followed two sons, Clement Wenceslas and Joseph, both born at Coblenz. Immediately after the birth of Clement, Count Francis George repaired to his possessions on the Rhine on Austrian State service, and in 1775 he served as Imperial Ambassador to the Rhenish electorates. In 1790 he was second Bohemian electoral Ambassador for the election of the Emperor. In 1791 fortune gave him the opportunity of earning further honours. When acting as Commissioner at Liège he succeeded by clever negotiations in quelling a somewhat serious revolt. In recognition of his services there he was appointed Imperial Minister Plenipotentiary for the general government of the Netherlands. But here he had a task beyond the powers of even the ablest statesman.

The Province was vast, populous, restless, and, above all, prone to the influence of the French Revolution. In spite of all his efforts the French armies overran it. Although the Austrians managed to re-occupy what they lost by the battle of Jemappes, the defeat at Fleurus in 1794 finally delivered the Netherlands into the hands of the French. Count Metternich apparently fell under a cloud in consequence of these disasters, but in 1798 he was present at the Congress of Rastadt as Imperial Ambassador. Here ended his political career, save for a brief period in 1810, when, during the absence of his son Clement in Paris, he temporarily superintended the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

All authorities agree that Count Francis George was a typical old-fashioned eighteenth century gentleman, "stately, corpulent and prim." What he wanted in knowledge and talents was supplied by friendship in high places, with Prince Charles of Lorraine and Prince Kaunitz. Proud of his birth, rank and privileges, and a great upholder of the principle *noblesse oblige*, he nevertheless lacked ambition, and was a kind and gracious master to his dependants. Pleasure-loving and frivolous, he made the most of life, and was, like his son, ever a favourite with the fair sex. His chief fault was that he was a confirmed spendthrift, and this, added to the loss of estates caused by the French Revolution, resulted in the squandering of the large fortune which he originally possessed. When the French seized the left bank of the Rhine, practically all his inheritance on that side was confiscated, including Lothar's "Metternich Palace" at Coblenz. To com-

pensate him, the Emperor granted him the Abbey of Ochsenhausen in Swabia. But although the Emperor in 1802 raised Ochsenhausen to the dignity of a principality, this did not alter the fact that whereas the old Rhenish possessions had brought in an income of 50,000 gulden, the new acquisition only produced between 15,000 and 18,000. In fact, the newly-created Prince—for the Emperor had granted the rank of Prince to each head of the male line of Metternich—was so weighed down with debt that he put his affairs into the hands of his eldest son Clement, and in January 1804 handed over to him the lordship of Königswart, which he had enlarged by the purchase of Miltigau in 1790. Clement was long crippled by his father's debts, and sold the last remnants of the Rhenish possessions to satisfy the creditors. But this was not enough, and it was not until he had sold the Principality of Ochsenhausen to Würtemberg for 1,300,000 gulden that he was free from embarrassment.

In politics Prince Francis George was, as might be expected from the losses inflicted upon him therefrom, a fierce opponent of the French Revolution. This feeling was increased by a rising which he had to quell on his own estates, and by his residence at Coblenz, which brought him into contact with the French royalist *émigrés*, who made that city their headquarters.

His wife made up for her husband's defects. She was of pleasing appearance and sound capacity; above all, she understood the Prince's failings, and knew how to conceal them from the world. She survived him by ten years, dying in 1828.

Francis George's branch of the Metternich family was now the only one remaining. Clement's sister, Pauline, created a Princess in 1814, married Duke Ferdinand of Würtemberg in 1817. He died in 1834, and she survived him by twenty-two years. Joseph Metternich, Clement's younger brother, married Princess Juliana Francesca Sulkowsta, and died childless in 1830.

CHAPTER II

EDUCATION

Characteristics of the eighteenth century as illustrated by the German States—Danger that Liberalism might turn to Revolution—Austria the type of a rigid bureaucracy—Survey of the historical setting to Metternich's career and the problems confronting German statesmen—The early education of Metternich is undertaken by tutors at home—Metternich goes to the University of Strasburg—Characteristics of Strasburg University and description of some of Metternich's contemporaries and teachers—Revolutionary influences at the University—Metternich attends the Coronation of the Emperor Leopold at Frankfurt—He resumes his studies at the University of Mainz, where revolutionary tendencies are as rife as at Strasburg—He again visits Frankfurt, to attend the Coronation of the Emperor Francis—After going to see his old home at Coblenz, he travels to Brussels to continue his studies at its University—The French invasion of the Netherlands and the execution of Marie Antoinette call forth his first literary effort—Appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Emperor at the Hague—Visit to England

METTERNICH'S father was a very typical representative of the age into which Metternich was born. For the eighteenth century was the age of the great gentleman. Birth, polish, fashion stood for more than ability and worth. It was harder for a Walpole or a Pitt to climb the ladder of fame than for a Pelham or a Fox. Of Europe in the eighteenth century it may be said that it was essentially French. Not only did every petty German prince mimic French fashions, read French literature, and strive to make his palace a miniature Versailles,

but those liberal theories, dimly appreciated by the so-called "benevolent despots," which, fostered by the influence of the American Revolution, had already impregnated German university life, had long been aired in the stateliest salons of the French nobility. Here lay the danger. At first these theories were discussed by the rulers and the ruling classes for the assumed benefit of the ruled. The initiative must come—no other idea was in them—from above. But soon the principle of Liberalism filtered through to the ruled. Always discontented, but previously ignorant of better things, the lower orders now sought to make themselves heard; but since the rulers were not prepared to yield to the ruled, here were the seeds of imminent and inevitable conflict. France led the way, but since France set the fashions in Europe, Germany, too, followed suit. Nor was the soil of Germany altogether unprepared. In Austria, especially, the well-meant efforts of Joseph II. had roused the expectations of her people, while the failure of his reforms, hastily conceived and tactlessly carried out, had added to disappointment discontent. Everywhere the Universities had imbibed the principles of Liberal philosophers, and the ideas of the educated minority were gradually reaching that majority whom they were meant ultimately to benefit.

That there was any danger in the new movement was long unrealized in Germany, even after the outbreak of the revolution in France. For one thing, the German courts, who for a century had mimicked Versailles, hardly recognized how closely dependent they were upon French ideas. But far more was it the case that the ruling classes had dallied so long

with Liberal ideas with the intention of benefiting the people by fatherly legislation in which the people themselves should have no voice, that they totally failed to conceive the possibility of the people wishing to work out their own salvation. Of Austria, above all, this was true. Nowhere was bureaucracy so stolid and immutable ; nowhere was dynastic tradition so strong ; nowhere was the aristocracy so proud. As Kaunitz had moulded the constitution, so it remained, an octopus of centralization, which, half torpid itself, yet held in its tentacles every branch of departmental and provincial government and paralysed initiative on the part of conscientious officials. There would be no yielding here to the forces of Liberalism any more than there would be in Prussia, bound by the iron military discipline of Frederick the Great. As a matter of fact there was to be no struggle with Liberalism in Germany until after the struggle with revolutionary France. A great and unscrupulous intellect curbing the turbulent elements of revolution made use of the patriotism and fervour which that revolution had awakened to unite the French people under the banner of Ambition. In face of this overwhelming peril German Liberalism was merged in German Patriotism. In Austria and Prussia alike the aspirations of the masses were for the moment turned to the defence of their fatherland. When all was over, patriotism in turn assumed the guise of Liberalism. But statesmen for the most part still lived in the eighteenth century. Even gratitude could not induce them to grant the masses a voice in affairs. Then came an era of spasmodic and almost universal eruption.

Rulers thought they were fighting the remnants of the revolution; they were really kicking against the pricks of Liberty. And in the end the people won. Not least in Austria; for there the people, rising with the common aim of breaking through the rusty bars of Austrian bureaucracy, hurled from office and into exile Metternich—the high priest of eighteenth century tradition, who never dreamt in wildest nightmares of a day when the courtly Viennese should league with the squalid mobs of Revolution.

Such is the broad historical framework of Metternich's career. But when Metternich first took part in politics the danger was not internal, from revolutionary propaganda in Germany, but external, from the revolutionary arms of France. And never was time more ripe for the conquest of Germany. In Berlin and Vienna incompetent sovereigns, advised by effete bureaucracies, ruled nations—or in Austria's case a pot-pourri of nations—which regarded each other with a hatred born of long-standing feuds. The wars of the eighteenth century had always found Austria and Prussia in antagonism, and the loss of Silesia was never forgotten by the former. A host of insignificant states, jealous of each other and mindful only of their own importance in their puny spheres, clung like parasites to whichever of the larger states seemed to promise them advantage. And while everywhere the hopes of the masses were raised, either by the influence from France or by the Liberal affectations of princelings, nowhere, or almost nowhere, was any sign given that those hopes would not end in disappointment and despair. For it was not only in France that the peasantry were down-

trodden ; in Germany, and especially in the Ruthenian territories of Austria, the lower classes were in worse case than in France. And in Austria the various nationalities united under the Hapsburg domination, Slavs, Croats, Magyars, Germans, added a complicating factor to the problem of Government ; and while Germany was disunited, while luxury and ostentation in the upper classes utterly sundered them from the degradation and poverty of the lower, while as yet there seemed little patriotism and no ability, on her eastern borders loomed Russia, shadowy, indefinable, half-unknown, but young and ambitious of expansion.

When France crossed the Rhine, would Austria and Prussia sink their differences and combine against her ? Would Russia aid France or the German powers ? Would the despotism and bureaucracy of the old era withstand the revolutionary fervour of the new ? Was Europe to be French and republican ? These were the questions at stake when Metternich served his first apprenticeship in diplomacy. For Austria bore the brunt of the struggle ; her dominions in the Netherlands were first exposed to the French onslaught.

In short, Metternich's career may be summed up under two heads. First, it was a successful struggle for Austria, and incidentally for Europe, against Napoleon and the French Revolution ; secondly, it was an unsuccessful struggle against Liberalism, a force which, strengthened by the war of Liberation, was in reality the inevitable demand of the people for a share in government, but which Metternich and the older generation of statesmen never ceased to believe was the French Revolution under another

guise, a destructive agency against which all the champions of order must rage.

Clement Wenceslas Nepomuk Lothair Metternich was born at Coblenz on May 15th, 1773. Up to the age of fifteen he was very carefully educated at home in the family mansion at Coblenz by three successive tutors. The first two were Catholic priests, who superintended his studies until he was thirteen years of age. The third, Frederick Simon, a Protestant, taught Clement and his younger brother—for they were associated in their studies—until the summer of 1788. Clement's mother was chiefly responsible for his early training, since diplomatic duties frequently obliged Prince Metternich to be away from home. Still he took great interest in his son's education, and occasionally criticized such faults as he observed. In a letter to Clement, written from Mainz in April 1785, after praising him for his solicitude in regard to his mother's health, he proceeds to take him to task for his handwriting. The style was good, but there was too much repetition of thoughts and expressions ; also the characters were too small.

“ Your handwriting is already so very small, it will one day become illegible ; and that would be a pity, for I hope that Clement will write what will be well worth reading.”

In 1788 Clement was sent to the University of Strasburg. He was then fifteen years of age. Strasburg was at this time a very popular University. It was presided over by Koch, the famous lecturer on International Law and the author of the “ History of Treaties of Peace,” and contained military as well as

academic institutions. All creeds were admitted, and facilities were afforded for learning both French and German. Moreover, the town itself was attractive. The choicest society was to be found there, and the theatre was second only to those of Paris and Bordeaux. Metternich was no burner of the midnight oil. He was nothing if not fashionable, and it was not the fashion in the eighteenth century to overwork oneself. "He was," writes a German biographer, "one of those enviable natures, which move surely and easily in the highest intellectual regions without climbing the steps." One day he would listen to a whole lecture ; on another he would leave the lecture room half way through ; on another he failed to put in an appearance at all. He frequently made up riding or driving parties, and was, even at this early date, usually in love. He made many friends. Prince Max of Zweibrücken, afterwards first king of Bavaria, who commanded the Royal Alsatian regiment then quartered at Strasburg, had been asked by Prince Metternich to keep an eye on Clement ; and both now and afterwards was socially of great help to him. Among his contemporaries at the university were Cobenzl, the future Austrian statesman, and Narbonne, with whom, as the representative of France, Clement was to have many diplomatic contests in the future. One of Clement's greatest friends was Benjamin Constant, who, although slightly older, shared his admiration for Koch and his love of letters. Curiously enough Clement only just missed being a fellow student of Napoleon, who had but lately left the University ; indeed, he had the same professors as Napoleon for fencing and mathematics, and in 1808, while passing

through Strasburg on his way to Paris, he was visited by Fustet, his old fencing-master, who expressed a hope that his old pupils, the Emperor of the French and the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, would not come to blows. Apparently Napoleon had not made much impression in Strasburg, for Metternich says that he never heard his name mentioned. But Metternich was in the habit of saying unpleasant things about Napoleon.

Although not sacrificing pleasure or society to his studies, Metternich by no means wasted his time. He seems to have been most interested in German political law and philosophy, though, as a matter of fact, he went through the usual course in other subjects. Naturally of a pliable mind, his youth rendered him peculiarly susceptible to the influence of his teachers. Hence his admiration for Koch, whose lectures he conscientiously attended, had a very real influence on the moulding of his character. Now Koch was a champion of system. He liked to display the facts of history in order, connecting the past with the present and showing the necessary causation. It was a sort of doctrine of necessity, and made Metternich for the time being almost a fatalist. And perhaps Koch's insistence on methodical arrangement of facts bore fruit in the extraordinary length, detail, and elaboration of Clement's memorandums and despatches in after life. Koch viewed the French Revolution with misgiving, and this influenced his pupils. But it is unnecessary to give Clement credit for having at this time gauged the danger of the Revolution, or indeed having any decided opinion on it at all. He probably regarded it with the natural curiosity of a boy of

sixteen, and nothing more. But if Koch mistrusted the trend of events in France, it was not so with many of his colleagues. Strasburg affords a good example of what was going on at this time in other universities of Germany. It teemed with revolutionary teachers and revolutionary doctrines, and the future career of some of Clement's instructors will perhaps help to explain why in after life he regarded Universities as the hotbeds of Liberalism and sedition. Even Koch ultimately went over to the Revolutionary party, and was chosen as a deputy. But he was far too moderate for the Jacobins, who imprisoned him, and ultimately he ended his days at Strasburg on a pension granted him by Napoleon. Others became more stalwart revolutionaries, including the professor who acted as Clement's tutor up to 1790. This man was a member of the Revolutionary Tribunal during the Reign of Terror, and earned the curses of Alsace for the atrocities which he committed in that district. Later he presided over the Council of Ten on August 10th, 1792, and finally became a teacher of German in Paris, where Metternich found him in 1806. But, owing to Napoleon's dislike of Jacobins, he lost his place, and on the return of the Bourbons was employed to teach German to the children of the Duke of Orleans. Metternich's religious instructor, professor of Canon Law at Strasburg and afterwards bishop of that city, ultimately forswore religion and publicly burnt the insignia of his office in the midst of a revolutionary orgy. It is almost surprising that Clement avoided becoming a revolutionary himself.

In the spring of 1790 Prince Metternich, fearing

that the progress of the French Revolution might render Strasburg a dangerous residence, decided to withdraw his son from the University, although his studies were not really completed. A pretext was afforded by the impending coronation of the Emperor Leopold, at Frankfurt. Thither Clement accompanied his father. The splendid ceremony greatly impressed him; every trifling detail savoured of long tradition; but he noted with alarm the ignorance shown by the German world in general of the inevitable effects of the French Revolution, which must sooner or later react on the neighbouring countries. At Frankfurt Clement soon became a favourite. It was here that he made the acquaintance of the Archduke Francis, afterwards the Emperor Francis II., and of other prominent members of Viennese society. The Archduke was five years his senior, but from this time dates the friendship which was to last uninterruptedly until Francis' death.

With the fair sex especially Clement was in great request. His appearance at this time, and indeed always, was singularly prepossessing. Tall and dignified, he moved with an easy grace which attracted all eyes to him. His oval countenance, framed in masses of auburn hair which circled over his shoulders, was lighted up by large blue eyes, which added to his fascination. A slightly aquiline nose and lips, which were too sensual, complete the portrait. An agreeable voice, combined with great conversational powers, assured him a welcome at any entertainment, and usually enabled him to obtain almost anything he desired, from women's favours to loans of money. He was, in the words of

Prince Kaunitz, "a good, amiable young man of the nicest sense, a perfect cavalier." At Frankfurt Clement performed his first public function, for he was appointed Master of Ceremonies to the Catholic Imperial Counts of the Westphalian Bench. Although not a post of responsibility, it was a compliment to a youth of seventeen.

As soon as the coronation was over Clement was sent to resume his studies at the University of Mainz. Mainz was celebrated as a place where young men of fashion completed their education; it was supposed to impart a knowledge of the world and the art of *savoir faire*, so that, apart from desultory lessons in Law and Jurisprudence, Clement devoted his time chiefly to social activities, which enabled him to form many useful friendships and helped to mould his character. At this time Mainz was the *rendezvous* of many French emigrés of the higher class, voluntary exiles for the most part, with whom Clement was thrown much in contact. He consequently formed his ideas of Frenchmen and the French Revolution from them, and his mistrust of the Revolution, originally instilled by Koch, was increased. "I came to know the French," he wrote afterwards, "I learnt to understand them and to be understood by them."

Yet revolutionary tendencies were as rife at Mainz as at Strasburg. Some professors, notably one named Hofmann, interlarded their lectures with allusions to the emancipation of the human race, "as it was so well begun," sarcastically observes Metternich, "by Marat and Robespierre." Metternich was also a frequent visitor at the house of George

Foster, afterwards the companion of Captain Cook on his famous voyage, and at this time a great patron of revolutionaries. The dramatist Kotzebue and John Müller were also residing at Mainz.

Clement spent his vacations with his parents at Brussels, where his father was filling the post of Minister to the States General of the Austrian Netherlands. The Prince made his son work in his department, which was an excellent training for his future career. But there is no reason to suppose that Clement had political ambitions at this period. He was just of the age when the keenest enjoyment of life is experienced, and probably his most ardent aspiration was how best to fulfil that enjoyment.

In 1792, after five years' residence at Mainz, Clement was summoned to Frankfurt, again with the object of attending a coronation. This time it was that of the Archduke Francis, his future master. He acted in the same capacity as on the previous occasion. The function was even more imposing than the coronation of Leopold, but Clement noted that the participators in it seemed more apprehensive than before of the proximity of the French Revolution. At Frankfurt Clement was enabled to improve his acquaintance with the Austrian Court circle, and became especially intimate with Prince Anton Esterhazy, principal ambassador to the Emperor. He also renewed his friendship, commenced in childhood, with that fascinating personality Princess Louise of Mecklenburg, afterwards Queen of Prussia, whose beauty and noble qualities he never ceased to admire. It was with her that he opened a ball given after the coronation by Prince Esterhazy. Clement was en-

trusted on this occasion with the arrangement of the banquet which preceded it, which proves that even in his youth his power of entertaining and social organization was recognized. Amongst many others with whom he contracted friendships, were the Abbé Mauny, Papal Nuncio, and the Vicomte de Mirabeau, younger brother of the famous French politician, himself an ardent loyalist.

From Frankfurt the assembled Royalties moved to Mainz, where the Elector entertained them at his Court, reputed to be the most luxurious in Europe. Clement, however, went home to Coblenz. Here he made the acquaintance of the Crown Prince of Prussia, afterwards that Frederick William II., with whom he was to have so many dealings in the future. This Prince was with the Prussian army, then encamped only two miles from Coblenz. Clement was favourably impressed with his giant figure, stout in proportion, and his stately and pleasant manner. He was "a head taller than any crowd in an assembly." After a short stay at Coblenz, Clement went to Brussels, in order to avail himself of its University to continue his studies. These, however, proved somewhat intermittent. War had broken out, and French armies were already overrunning the Low Countries. In fact, he spent most of the winter of 1793-4 in travelling to and fro between Brussels and the Austrian army, either with commissions from his father or on visits to friends. He was present at the siege of Valenciennes, and it fell to him to receive as prisoners those unfortunate commissioners of the French Convention, who, having been despatched to the French army then invading the Nether-

lands with the object of arresting General Dumouriez, were instead coolly arrested by him and sent under escort to the Austrian outposts.

It was about this time (August 1794) that the execution of Queen Marie Antoinette called forth Clement's first literary effort. It took the form of a pamphlet appealing to the warlike ardour of the Austrian nation, and insisting on the "necessity for a universal arming of those dwelling on the frontiers of France." He gave an account of how the French successes against a nominally united Europe were menacing the world's peace, urged that "the citizen and yeoman" should be armed, and vehemently attacked what he called the "flathead politician" of the old school. He styled himself "a friend of the universal peace."

Towards the end of the winter he journeyed to London with the Chief Treasurer of the Netherlands Government. The visit was partly educational, for England was at this time regarded on the Continent as the classical school for statesmanship. As a matter of fact, Clement had, before his departure, been appointed Minister Plenipotentiary of the Emperor at the Hague, and this, becoming known, aided his introduction to the best English society. Cordially welcomed by the King, he also made the acquaintance of the Prince of Wales, whose handsome face and charming manners he praises, remarking with little truth, that his sound intelligence prevented his being corrupted by the bad society with which he surrounded himself. Yet Clement was disgusted at the Prince's behaviour to his father, and relates, in regard to the fact that he had

21 years



once remonstrated with him, that thirty years afterwards the Prince, when George IV., sadly remarked to him, "You were very right then." Clement also came to know Pitt, Fox, Burke, Sheridan, and Grey, besides many politicians of less note. He made a point of frequently attending Parliament in order to study the working of the British constitution, and followed the trial of Warren Hastings with interest. He visited Portsmouth in order to see the departure of the merchant fleets for the East and West Indies, and was courteously received by Lord Howe. He crossed over to the Isle of Wight, and from the hill behind Cowes watched the magnificent spectacle, which much impressed him. He begged to be allowed to witness the naval battle off Ushant which ensued, but Howe politely refused, remarking that his orders were to send him back alive to London. However, he had the pleasure of seeing four French men-of-war escorting emigrés from Toulon hoist the white flag on entering British waters and join Howe's fleet.

CHAPTER III

EARLY APPOINTMENTS : THE HAGUE, DRESDEN, AND BERLIN

The French successes in the Netherlands render Metternich's appointment a purely nominal one—The French confiscate the richest of the Metternich family lands—Metternich weds Princess Kaunitz—Reflections on the advantages of the match—Metternich spends two years in quiet and study—He attends the Congress of Rastadt—His impressions of the French diplomatists—After a visit to Berlin and St Petersburg, he returns to his scientific studies at Vienna—Metternich's dislike for Thugut the Foreign Minister—He accepts the post of Austrian Representative at Dresden—Some leading lights of Dresden society—The eccentricities of Elliot—Metternich makes the acquaintance of Gentz—On the conclusion of his appointment, he compiles a voluminous paper dealing with the political situation in Germany—Metternich is appointed Ambassador at Berlin, where he finds ample scope for his activities—Difficulty of bringing Prussia into line with Austria and Russian policy—Vacillating character of the Prussian King—Rivalry of Haugwitz and Hardenberg—Austria, as a member of the Third Coalition, declares war on Napoleon, and is crushed—The humiliating Treaty of Pressburg—Metternich's services at Berlin are rewarded with the Grand Cross of the Order of St Stephen

METTERNICH now proceeded to take up his post of Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Hague. It was to prove a somewhat nominal office. He had some difficulty in reaching the Hague at all. A French fleet was in the Channel. This he safely avoided. But while trying to cross from Harwich to Helvoetsluys, his ship was driven by a gale into the roads of Dunkirk, then being bombarded by Sidney Smith.

For two hours the vessel was exposed to a cross fire. At length, however, escaping all dangers, Metternich reached Holland. He visited Amsterdam, part of North Holland, and finally the Hague, but finding the French in occupation of most of the Netherlands, he gave up his task as hopeless and departed for the Lower Rhine. But even here he was not safe, for the French armies carried all before them, and were soon in possession of the whole left bank of the Rhine. This meant that the richest portion of the Metternich family lands was lost, and Prince Metternich, anxious for his less lucrative but still surviving possessions in Bohemia, summoned his son to Vienna and despatched him to Königswart. Here Clement remained alone during November and December of 1794, organizing the estate and making such improvements as seemed necessary.

On returning to Vienna he found his own wedding awaiting him. In his absence a match had been arranged for him by his parents with Princess Kaunitz, daughter of Prince Ernest von Kaunitz Rietberg, and granddaughter of the famous Austrian Chancellor. Owing to the bride's indisposition, the wedding did not take place until September 27th, 1795, when it was celebrated at Austerlitz. On the whole, the marriage was more successful than might have been expected. The Princess was twenty years of age, and by no means beautiful. She had been spoilt in childhood, for, as the granddaughter of Kaunitz, she had ever been accustomed to homage and flattery. She was not the sort of wife who would stay at home and confine herself to housekeeping and the management of her husband's estates. Society and amusement

were to her the breath of life. Still she was just the wife to suit Metternich. She brought a large fortune to aid his crippled resources, and the wide connection and great social standing of the Kaunitz family could not fail to be invaluable to a rising diplomatist. Moreover, being a woman of sound sense, she thoroughly understood Metternich. Husband and wife were alike in their love of pleasure and their lax standard of morals, and they made allowance for each other. Neither lived a blameless domestic life, but, apart from occasional tiffs, they had no serious differences.

For the next two years Metternich lived a quiet and monotonous life. The summer was usually spent at his wife's estate at Austerlitz, the winter at Vienna. Diplomacy, with which he professed to be disgusted, was temporarily abandoned. Instead, he devoted himself to Science, of which he had always been fond. He studied Geology, Chemistry, Physics, and Medicine, especially the latter, for "man and his life seemed to me to be objects worthy of study." Indeed, at this period it almost seemed likely that he would adopt the medical profession. He frequented the hospitals and attended all important operations, and in after life his friends often jokingly remarked that they would rather have him to attend them than a professional doctor.

In 1797 died Prince Kaunitz, full of years and honour, and shortly afterwards Metternich was summoned from his scientific studies by the Counts of the Westphalian College to represent them at the Council of Rastadt, assembled to adjust territorial claims arising from the recent French occupation of

German lands. Thither he accompanied his father, who was plenipotentiary of the German Empire. The Congress of Rastadt, where his duties proved chiefly secretarial, only increased Clement's disgust with politics, although he himself appears to have made a pleasing impression on at least one observer, who described him as "a very courteous, unassertive young man of captivating exterior." In fact, everything at Rastadt, food, people, entertainments, filled Metternich with disgust. The members of the Congress did nothing but wrangle and display their selfishness, and the Congress itself was entirely abortive. Napoleon was among the French representatives, and Metternich relates how he arrived at night in a fairylike scene illuminated by the light of torches, welcomed by crowds, and escorted by Hussars, who surrounded his eight-horsed postchaise. Josephine sat at his side, and Murat opposite him. Metternich's opinion of the French diplomatists in general is thus expressed in a letter to his wife, dated December 9th :—

"I declare that in all my life I never saw such ill-conditioned animals. . . . All these fellows have coarse muddy shoes, great blue pantaloons, a vest of blue or of all colours, peasants' handkerchiefs, either silk or cotton, round the neck, the hair long, black, and dirty, and the hideous head crowned by an enormous hat with a great red feather. One would die of fright, I believe, if one met the best clothed of them in a wood."

Indeed, his letters at this period are one continuous grumble. His only consolation was a French play

which was provided at the Château. But everything was absurdly dear, and he complains that an indifferent supper of six dishes cost 55 florins. Occasionally Metternich performed at concerts, for he was musical; he also attended balls. But even balls at Rastadt were dull.

“There is not under the canopy of heaven a more wearisome thing than a ball at Rastadt; there are nearly 100 men . . . and 8 or 10 women, half of them more than 50 years old.”

Apparently even Rastadt fashions were out of date.

“Fair perruques are still the fashion; you have no idea of the number that are sold in Rastadt. Hair is so scarce in France that they have already begun to get it from Russia and Sweden.”

But outside evidence proves that the Metternichs, both father and son, managed to pass the time happily enough, and Kotzebue, who was also at Rastadt, was amused to observe their obvious preference for the society of pretty women to the dull routine of duty. The father even encouraged the son in his gallantries, which in that lax age were not calculated to shock the hardened consciences of German courtiers.

Metternich left before the conclusion of the Congress and consequently did not witness its tragic sequel, when a detachment of Austrian cavalry waylaid the French commissioners and killed several of their number. He returned to Vienna and, with the exception of a journey to Berlin and St Petersburg with Count Stadion, again confined himself to scientific studies. He affected only the most exclusive society,

and made several interesting friends. One was the famous Pozzo di Borgo, then the secret agent of Great Britain, and always the bitter enemy of Napoleon. Metternich describes him as "a man of great fluency and warmth in expressing his feelings." Later on Pozzo entered the Russian service and became a steadfast opponent of Austrian policy. Metternich also occasionally visited the famous Prince de Ligne. This Prince had been very kind to him during his sojourn in the Netherlands, and had tried to induce him to marry his daughter. He even used jokingly to call him his son-in-law. Curiously enough, the man whom this lady eventually married had once been engaged to Princess Kaunitz, Metternich's wife.

While in Vienna, Metternich paid occasional visits to the Emperor and to Thugut, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. For the latter, who was indeed a political adventurer, he had an intense dislike. "I agreed with him in his principles," he writes, "but not with the manner in which he carried them out." Thugut was accused by some of being in the pay of England, by others of being the paid servant of France. Metternich affirms that really he was quite incorrupt, but that living in haughty obscurity, he yet interfered too much in every department of government. "The history of his Ministry," is Metternich's biting comment, "may be summed up in a series of miscalculations, all of which contributed to support and advance the preponderance of France." It must be in fairness remarked that modern historians have to a great extent exonerated Thugut from these charges.

Apparently at this time Metternich was not by any means anxious for preferment or for any active work ; indeed, the Emperor on several occasions rallied him on his " indolence."

Yet when, on the retirement of Thugut in consequence of the Peace of Luneville, a redistribution of diplomatic posts took place, Metternich was offered a choice of three alternatives, namely, the secondary post of Austrian representative at Dresden, the embassy at Copenhagen, and the post of Minister for Bohemia in the German Reichstag. Of these, he reflected, Copenhagen was remote from the hub of European politics, while a Minister for Bohemia would hardly have much opportunity for displaying that diplomatic talent in which Metternich excelled. There remained Dresden, which for several reasons was desirable. Not merely was it the centre of a brilliant society, not merely was it an important diplomatic outpost for watching French intrigues, but the ruling Prince was Metternich's godfather, and presumably he would be welcomed with open arms.

So Metternich chose Dresden. On the whole his choice was a wise one. It is true that his welcome was hardly so warm as might have been expected, and that the Prince asked him if the Emperor had been unable to find anyone else for the post. But in society Metternich made many useful friends among Russian and Polish families, and during his term of office appears thoroughly to have enjoyed himself.

It must be remembered that at this period the profession of diplomacy was, at any rate in Austria, regarded rather as an agreeable occupation than as a science. It was a means whereby young men of

noble birth satisfied their ambition, and it has been well said that "Divine Right still predominated in diplomacy as among sovereigns." And so Metternich, handsome, polished, and popular, went everywhere and knew everybody. Where pretty ladies were to be found, he was never far absent, and when Goertz paid a visit to Dresden in the summer of 1802, he was introduced by Metternich to a round of gaiety and brilliant society such as he had never experienced before. Three great ladies were pre-eminent as hostesses and society leaders, the Princess Adam Czartoryska, the Countess of Courland, with one of whose daughters Metternich afterwards became much enamoured, and Princess Bagration. The last-named was in reality a sort of Russian spy employed to further Russian interests at the Saxon Court, and was high in favour at St Petersburg. With her Metternich commenced a liaison which lasted until the Vienna Congress. She is described as small and neat, with a child-like face "white as alabaster," and a figure slightly robust but pleasing. A slight short-sightedness gave her an appearance of timidity. Her dress was apparently somewhat ultra-fashionable, for she bore the nickname of "The Naked Angel."

The society over which these ladies reigned was absurdly out-of-date. Dresden, in fact, was a sort of oasis in the desert of states affected by the French Revolution. Everything was tranquil, everyone was careless of the turmoil around them. The costumes, the gala days, the customs were the same as they had been in the middle of the eighteenth century. "The French Revolution," wrote Metternich, "after overthrowing the old monarchy had reached the stage of

Bonaparte's Consulate, but at the Saxon Court hoops had not yet been discarded."

The Diplomatic Corps at Dresden were numerous and included the eccentric English Ambassador, Hugh Elliot, who had been sent thither after losing his post at Copenhagen because he declared war on Denmark on his own responsibility. Metternich found Elliot a very pleasant companion in society, but considered him, as most other people did, a madman. There are many good anecdotes concerning him. It was the custom at Potsdam reviews for foreign officers to attend upon the King, Frederick II., who showed his preference for the French by causing their officers to be introduced singly, while the English were introduced *en bloc*. At one of these receptions, when the Chamberlain had announced in his most solemn voice, "I have the honour to present to Your Majesty twelve Englishmen," Elliot interrupted in a loud voice with, "You are mistaken, Herr Mareschal, there are only eleven." Afterwards, when Elliot was appointed to Berlin, Frederick, mindful of the incident, and wishing to show his displeasure at the appointment, chose as his representative in London a certain undesirable Count Lasi. Elliot, on being informed of this by a Prussian friend, said, "The King, your master, evidently could not have chosen anyone who would have better represented him." Elliot used to boast to Metternich that he always had news to send home to his Government. "If I do not know of anything," he gravely admitted, "I invent my news and contradict it by the next courier." Metternich often went hunting and for picnic parties with Elliot and the Saxon

Ministers ; in fact, he made a point of getting to know everybody who might be useful to him. That is the only justification for his numerous love affairs. Ladies bore no small share in the diplomacy of the day, and politicians frequently found that popularity with the fair sex smoothed away hindrances from their paths. Women such as the Princess Bagration and the Duchess of Sagan had considerable influence on Metternich's career, both then and afterwards.

It was at Dresden that Metternich first became acquainted with Gentz. He was introduced to him by Joseph von Buol, the Secretary of Legation, who was the centre of a literary circle of which Gentz was a member. The result was a lifelong friendship between the two men, cemented on Gentz' part by a very welcome loan. Gentz in his turn introduced Metternich to two of his friends. With one, the eccentric Adam Müller, Metternich found he had nothing in common, but the other, Joseph Pilat, became Metternich's private secretary, and continued in that capacity until the Chancellor's fall in 1848. But, although he afterwards said that Dresden was the cradle of his diplomatic education, Metternich had very little opportunity for distinguishing himself. Dresden was really only an appendage to the Embassy at Berlin, whence Count Stadion usually sent directions to Metternich as to his action on any important point. At most, Dresden was an outpost, recognized as such by the Ministers of Europe, whence the uncertain policy of France might be observed. The general situation was one of unrest, and Metternich's residence of eighteen months at Dresden was a period of observation and reporting. Soon after his arrival he

compiled for his own use an "Instruction," a voluminous paper, chiefly interesting as a review of the European situation, since he had no chance of putting the principles advocated in it into practice. In a letter to Count Cobenzl at the conclusion of his period of service, he sums up the result of his observations at the Court of Dresden, namely, that Saxony was prodigal indeed of fair words, but would do little practically to aid Austria in her scheme for resisting French aggression, for fear of offending Prussia. (November 20th, 1803.)

Towards the end of the year 1803 Metternich was nominated Ambassador to Berlin, which at once opened out a wider sphere for his abilities. He did not immediately enter on his new duties. In compensation for the Metternich possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, which had been confiscated by the French, the Emperor granted Prince Metternich the abbey lands of Ochsenhausen. Clement was now commissioned to take them over, after which he travelled to Berlin, passing through Vienna on his way. King Frederick William II. and Queen Louise welcomed him as an old friend, and throughout his residence at their Court dispensed with strict etiquette in their relations with him, except on the most public occasions. Metternich soon made many friends. He became intimate with the French Ambassador Laforest and the Russian Alopeus, and entered with zest into the whirl of Berlin society, which was at this time famous for its luxury and excesses.

But, however much he preferred social activities, at Berlin Metternich was compelled to take a keen interest in politics. At last he had an opportunity of

displaying his abilities, and a definite object towards which to direct them. Austria and Russia were now cordially united in opposition to France. It was Metternich's task to strengthen this alliance by procuring the adhesion of Prussia. A coalition between the three great Powers of Continental Europe, backed by the maritime power of Great Britain, would surely prevail against the insatiable Napoleon and stem the course of French aggrandizement. In the hope of such a result the Austrian Government, under the direction of Cobenzl and Colloredo, prepared for war, while Metternich used every effort to convince the Prussian Court that its interests were identical with those of Austria. At first sight this seemed no difficult task. As Metternich wrote to Colloredo (September 24th, 1804), the obvious policy for Prussia and Austria, both menaced by the power of Russia on the one side and of France on the other, both worsted in a desperate struggle with the latter, and both grievously weakened by that struggle, was to combine for mutual security. But such a policy was by no means so obvious to the Prussian Court, swayed hither and thither between two contending factions. Hardenberg represented the Austrian party, while Haugwitz, whom Metternich evidently considered the evil genius of Prussia, led those who favoured a French alliance. He was ably supported by Lombard, Secretary to the King's Cabinet, who had contrived to acquire great influence over King Frederick William. The character of this King was not equal to the crisis. He would at one moment eagerly accept the overtures of Austria; at the next, veering round under the influence of Lombard,

he would have nothing to do with them. He was a mere weathercock of faction, and Metternich considered that in the end he would decide in favour of whichever Power he most feared. Metternich was loyally supported by the Russian Alopeus, by Hardenberg, of whom he continually expresses the opinion that he was genuinely devoted to the Austrian alliance, and by the Prince Louis Ferdinand. This Prince was leader of the war-party, and is described by Metternich as possessed of a "brilliant exterior" and refined manners, but unfortunately addicted to bad company. The Queen, also, usually aided Hardenberg's policy with her influence.

Yet for a long time all Metternich's efforts seemed futile. Hardenberg was favourable but helpless owing to the various hostile influences working upon the King, whose character was "repugnant to any measure which obliges him to act with decision." Moreover, Prussia was apprehensive on several points. Might she not be inveigled into another coalition, a prospect which, in view of previous experience of coalitions, was not pleasant? If she joined Austria and Russia, would not that alliance very possibly be dominated and organized by Great Britain, and would it not also lead inevitably to schemes of aggrandizement? Again, Austria wanted Prussia to aid in the recovery of her Italian possessions, and what interest had Prussia in Italy? Nor, to add to Metternich's difficulties, was the support of Russia, though loyal enough, altogether judicious. Alopeus himself had "an abrupt and excitable manner," but was on the whole temperate. But Alexander was inclined to bully Prussia. He sent his aide-de-

camp, Wintzingerode, to Berlin, practically to threaten a movement of Russian troops into Prussian territory, though nominally with a polite request that Frederick William would permit Russian troops to pass his frontiers. But the only effect was to frighten Prussia, not to persuade her.

What the Austrian and Russian diplomatists failed to accomplish, Napoleon, by an act of incredible folly, brought about himself. In October of 1805 a Prussian lieutenant, marching with twenty-four hussars on the road between Wurtzburg and Anspach on Prussian territory, was surrounded and taken prisoner by 4000 French troops. This at once decided the policy of Prussia. Frederick William had always announced that Prussia would maintain a strict neutrality so long as her territory was not violated. Now she could hardly hesitate to throw in her lot with Austria. Yet, to clinch the matter, the Czar Alexander felt that his presence was necessary, and accordingly arranged for a meeting with the Prussian King. Metternich was delighted. He had been so convinced of the necessity for Austria to secure the adhesion of Prussia to her anti-French policy through the influence of Russia, that he had committed the error of imagining, like Alexander, that Prussia could be coerced. The meeting, therefore, which took place at Potsdam between him and the Czar was most cordial. Alexander was charmed with Metternich, whose personality always had a fascination for Romanticists, of which the Czar was one. Still there was need of tact. Not only were Haugwitz and the French party still active, but Alexander's impulsive nature had to be moderated. It irritated him to find the Prussian Court still vacil-

lating, and even Hardenberg continually having recourse to unworthy evasions and ambiguous declarations. At last, on November 3rd, a Treaty of Alliance was signed between Russia and Prussia, but it left so many loopholes of escape open to the latter that it could hardly be deemed satisfactory. In the meantime, Austria had declared war, and disaster after disaster had fallen upon her arms, culminating in Austerlitz. Prussia was called upon to bring pressure to bear upon France; instead, she pursued a course which admirably illustrates her whole attitude at this period. Haugwitz, who had never ceased his intrigues with France, was entrusted with the mission of announcing to Napoleon Prussia's determination to permit no humiliation of Austria and to resist any further advance by the French armies. With imperturbable duplicity Haugwitz delayed on his journey so long that by the time he reached Napoleon's presence the success of the French was assured, and by a premeditated change of front he was able instead of threats to offer the congratulations of Prussia to the victor.

So ended the Third Coalition. By the Peace of Pressburg Austria was forced to dissolve her alliance with Russia, and at Schönbrunn Haugwitz signed a treaty with Napoleon on behalf of Prussia. Metternich's work at Berlin had, through no fault of his own, proved a failure. He had, perhaps, suffered himself to be guided too much by Russia. It was Alexander who advocated the foolish policy of coercing Prussia, and it was Alexander's rash advice that an immediate renewal of hostilities should take place which resulted in Austerlitz. Yet it is hard to blame Metternich

for believing that in Russia lay Austria's one hope of securing Prussia's support, or to deny his statement that "without the Emperor Alexander . . . Prussia would have been immovable." But the fact remains that Prussia's adhesion was but temporary and half-hearted, and that, at the termination of Metternich's sojourn at Berlin, Napoleon was stronger than ever before. Still the activity and watchfulness which he had displayed in the course of a difficult negotiation was deservedly rewarded by the bestowal of the Grand Cross of the Order of St Stephen. "We are certain," wrote Cobenzl (November 10th, 1805), in announcing the bestowal of the honour, "that this proof of His Majesty's goodness, which you have shown yourself so worthy to receive, will only redouble your zeal in his august service."

It was at this time that Metternich, struck by the remarkable ingenuity with which Napoleon utilized the *Moniteur* and even the Continental Press to publish calumnies against the policy of the Allied Powers, advocated the publication of a newspaper under the protection of and published by the Powers to counteract these influences. His idea was that the paper should consist of official news of the allied armies, explanations and criticisms of the news officially published by the enemy, and of political treatises for the purpose of guiding public opinion. There was also to be a literary section, refuting the pamphlets published by the French and giving references to trustworthy works which might advantageously be consulted. Although this scheme was never given a practical trial, it illustrates Metternich's conviction that control of the Press was not only necessary but beneficial.

CHAPTER IV

THE EMBASSY AT PARIS AND WAR OF 1809

Dire results of the Treaty of Pressburg upon Austria—Metternich, having been appointed Austrian Ambassador to the Court of Prussia, becomes, owing to a whim of Napoleon, Ambassador at Paris—He attains remarkable social success and gains the friendship of Napoleon—His impression of the sentiments of the French nation towards Napoleon—Napoleon's measures to counteract the disadvantage of a parvenu dynasty—Metternich's relations with French politicians and political parties—His opinion of Fouché and Talleyrand—Delicate position of an Austrian Ambassador to France—Survey of the phases of the political situations with which Metternich had to deal—The final humiliation of Prussia at Jena—In spite of Metternich's efforts, the Treaty of Fontainebleau is entirely in favour of France—Metternich watches with satisfaction Napoleon's increasing embarrassments in Spain—And intrigues against him with the French malcontents—Napoleon rudely remonstrates with Metternich on the subject of Austria's military activity—Napoleon's schemes for the partition of Turkey—Impotence of Austria revealed by the Conference at Erfurt—Metternich, overrating Napoleon's difficulties in Spain, urges on the Austrian Government the necessity for war—He visits Vienna to observe the progress of the military preparations—On the declaration of war Metternich is detained some time in France—On reaching Vienna he finds the city already in the hands of the French—Metternich refuses Napoleon's request for an interview—On the completion of the arrangements for his exchange, he joins the Emperor Francis—And is present at the disastrous battle of Wagram—After being placed in charge of the peace negotiations at Altenberg, he is replaced by Prince John of Lichtenstein—He is appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the room of Count Stadion

THE Treaty of Pressburg completed the dissolution of the German Empire. For Austria, especially, it was an appalling catastrophe. It has been com-

puted that by its provisions the Emperor Francis lost nearly three millions of subjects and one-sixth of his revenue, while he had also to pay forty millions of francs to compensate for the unpaid portion of the War Contribution imposed on his hereditary states. Partly to appease Napoleon, Cobenzl was replaced by Stadion at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and amidst the general shifting of officials responsible for or implicated in the recent disasters Metternich was appointed Ambassador to St Petersburg. He had actually proceeded to Vienna on his way to take up his new post when a whim of Napoleon's changed his destiny.

Count Philip Cobenzl had been appointed Austrian Ambassador to the French Court, but Napoleon objected to the selection, and asked for Metternich. It is said that Talleyrand suggested his name, remembering that when Ambassador at Berlin Metternich had shown great kindness to Laforest, the French Ambassador, at the time when owing to the recent Treaty of Alliance between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, Frenchmen resident in the latter country were in an invidious position. To Metternich the change was unwelcome. He had formed a warm friendship with the Czar and had been looking forward to a sojourn at St Petersburg. On the other hand, he felt a strong antipathy to Napoleon, with whom he identified the principles of the Revolution. The Emperor Francis, however, had great faith in Metternich's abilities. He recognized that Austria required an Ambassador at Paris who would be content to observe and humour Napoleon, and supply Austria with a breathing space in which to recoup her shattered

resources. Metternich, with his social and diplomatic abilities, was the man, and it was an additional qualification that Napoleon was favourably disposed towards him. Francis, therefore, sent for Metternich, and by a little judicious flattery persuaded him to accept the post. He accordingly left Vienna in July 1806 bound for Paris. But Napoleon was engaged in negotiations with the Russian envoy and did not wish the two Ambassadors to meet. Consequently Metternich had to wait at Strasburg, and only reached Paris during the first week of August.

From the first moment of his arrival in Paris, Metternich's embassy was a brilliant social success. His old-world and stately dignity could not fail to impress the parvenu Court of Napoleon. He was well received by the Imperial Family, and soon contracted a warm friendship with Napoleon's sister Caroline Bonaparte, who, in his own words, "joined to a pleasant exterior uncommon powers of mind." The manner of their first introduction was not encouraging. Napoleon apparently left them together, remarking to his sister, "Entertain this simpleton, we are wanted elsewhere," a good instance of the rudeness with which Napoleon sought to conceal his awkwardness in respectable society. From this brusque introduction dated a liaison which lasted down to 1814. Caroline afterwards married Murat, Napoleon's famous marshal, who became King of Naples. In 1814, when the allied armies were invading France, Castlereagh, to his amazement, came across some intercepted letters from Metternich to the Queen of Naples, giving her advice and couched in endearing terms.

Not only with Caroline, but with all the ladies of the French Court, Metternich was a favourite. His ready wit, powers of conversation and originality made him a delightful companion, while the elegance of his equipage and his expensive habits attracted universal attention. French society during the Napoleonic era has been so often depicted that any description of it here would be superfluous. Yet it may not be amiss to give some of Metternich's impressions of the state of France during the period of his embassy to Paris, and the Court, policy and personality of Napoleon.

Metternich came to the conclusion that the majority of the French people were yearning for peace. Napoleon's marshals, raised in many cases from the lowest rank to wealth and honours, sought only an opportunity of enjoying them in peace. Such were Berthier and Davoust, who both possessed well over a million of capital. The commercial population, who had at first gained considerably from war, tired of it now that Napoleon had put a stop to fraudulent contracts; while the masses were weary of constant levies and constant taxation. Of war, then, France had had enough. But this did not mean that Napoleon was personally unpopular with the French. His brilliant succession of victories had dazzled a nation which loved to be dazzled. Moreover, he had gained respect by his sound and practical domestic reforms. Even Metternich always had a great admiration for Napoleon. If only he had curbed his ambition and adopted a policy of peace, France, in Metternich's opinion, would gladly have remained loyal to him. For France needed discipline, and

Napoleon was the man to provide it. Jena represented the summit of his power, and, if he had made Jena his last battle, all would have been well. Having weakened Prussia, he should have joined it to the Confederation of the Rhine and organized the whole. Why had he not done this? Partly because his ambition was boundless and indomitable; partly because he saw, as all close observers saw, that the embers of Revolution still flickered menacingly beneath the fabric of personal government which he had so cunningly raised up. Therefore a means of distracting the attention of malcontents must be found. War was the most obvious expedient. Another, in its way no less effective, caused considerable amusement to Metternich.

To preserve himself from the machinations of the Revolutionary party, Napoleon bolstered up his anomalous position by mimicking the procedure and surroundings of the late Legitimate Monarchy. Old forms hallowed by long tradition were preserved, and lavish expenditure was employed to build up a Court and aristocracy fit to vie in magnificence, at least, with those of the great Louis. Hunting was, of old, the pastime of French kings, so Napoleon, though he cared not a straw for the sport, imported deer from Hanover and other parts of Germany to refill the Forest of Fontainebleau, twenty leagues in circumference. Yet even so, it was but a travesty of the days of the Grand Monarch. Napoleon himself, more intent on exercise than on the deer—for violent riding was beneficial to his health—was wont to gallop at full speed right and left through the forest quite irrespective of the movements of the hounds. More-

over, so insufficient was the supply of horses in the Imperial stables that only foreign Princes were invited to the hunting-parties.

Another feature of the Bourbon Court had been theatrical performances. Accordingly Napoleon engaged the actors of the Comédie Française to perform at Fontainebleau three times a week at a salary of one thousand crowns each. The pleasing illusion of bygone splendour was heightened by a brilliant Court. The enormous rewards conferred by Napoleon upon his marshals, and even upon the old nobility, assured him a crowd of courtiers, and millions of francs spent on luxury and empty shows kept them outwardly loyal to the upstart dynasty. The Secretaries of State for France and Italy, who resided at Fontainebleau, kept open house for foreigners, thus incurring prodigious expense, while, on those evenings when no play was being acted, members of the Imperial Family took it in turn to entertain the Court.

Metternich's popularity in society brought him into contact with all sorts and conditions of prominent persons, both French and foreign. He consequently gained a real insight into French politics, which was of great use to him afterwards. He cultivated the friendship of Count Tolstoy, the Russian Ambassador, and the other members of the Diplomatic Corps. He made a point of becoming acquainted with members of all the factions in France. But there were two leading Frenchmen whom he always disliked. Of Lafayette he always spoke with scorn, dubbing him an "idéologue," and of Barère, "the Anacreon of the Guillotine," he says that from his

appearance he might have been considered a harmless creature and that, like Robespierre, he possessed a "spurious refinement."

With Talleyrand and Fouché Metternich always maintained close relations. Talleyrand was in favour of an alliance between Austria and France, and both he and Fouché were deeply implicated in intrigues against Napoleon. Metternich had called upon Talleyrand soon after his arrival in Paris and had been favourably impressed. He was wont to call this interview the beginning of his public life. He had frankly told Talleyrand that Austria was quite willing to maintain friendship with France, but that friendship was not to be regarded as equivalent to submission. Metternich's estimate of Talleyrand and Fouché is interesting. The former possessed unusual intellectual ability, but was inconsistent in character and politics. Though a priest, he was irreligious; though of noble birth, he sought to uproot the old nobility; when serving under the Republic, he forswore the Republic; when serving the Emperor, he intrigued against him; and even at the end of his career, when serving the Bourbons, he maintained a double-face. In short, though he had adopted the theories of the English school of politicians, he was fitted rather to destroy than to create. Indeed, so prone was Talleyrand to hinder any definite course from being taken that Napoleon once said of him, "I turn to him when I want a thing not to be done, which I wish to appear to want." In private life, however, Talleyrand was agreeable and trustworthy.

Fouché was a complete contrast. He was the enemy of theories, and always went to extremes.

He thoroughly understood the French character, and managed to gain the confidence even of the Emigrés.

There is little doubt that this pair of clever intriguers sought to use Metternich as a catspaw in their schemes against Napoleon; and to a certain extent they succeeded.

For of necessity, Metternich could play but an unheroic part in European politics. The task of an Austrian ambassador to France at this period was not enviable. It was essentially his policy to watch Napoleon's designs, and give Austria time to recuperate. For Austerlitz, though it had shattered the Austrian army, had not crushed Austrian spirit. Stadion wisely advised his Emperor gradually and silently to reorganize the army and prepare for a more successful struggle with Napoleon. It was Metternich's duty to conceal these intentions from Napoleon, and pretend as long as possible that Austria was friendly to the Napoleonic régime. Obviously he must not commit Austria to any definite arrangements with France, and at the same time must secure all possible allies for the coming struggle.

European politics, always tangled and kaleidoscopic while the ambition of Napoleon brooded over them, were perhaps never more complicated than during the year of Metternich's embassy to Paris. It will suffice to touch briefly on those events which affected Austria and Metternich's career.

The final humiliation of Prussia, the adjustment of the outstanding differences between France and Austria in Italy, and Napoleon's designs on Turkey and intervention in Spain, form the chief phases of

diplomatic situations with which Metternich had to deal.

The Austrian Government was naturally anxious that Prussia, as well as Austria, should have time to recuperate, for it was the policy of the two countries to combine at the first favourable moment against the overweening ambition of Napoleon. Metternich therefore spared no effort to prevent a rupture between France and Prussia. But Napoleon was bent on Prussia's humiliation, and within two months of Metternich's arrival in Paris he had set off for that campaign which ended so disastrously for Prussia with the battle of Jena. The foreign representatives crowded to congratulate the victor as soon as his return was announced. Napoleon, as might have been expected, addressed unpleasant remarks to all ; but Metternich, who perhaps had most of all desired the victory of Prussia, boasts that he escaped more lightly than the rest, merely receiving some hints as to the desirability of a prompt settlement of the boundary between Austrian and French territory in Italy.

This settlement was, as a matter of fact, soon afterwards brought about by the Treaty of Fontainebleau. Here again, Metternich had perforce to accede to Napoleon's demands. Everything was arranged in favour of French interests. The Isonzo was designated as the boundary, the Hapsburgs received no compensation for their lost territory, and Trieste was with difficulty retained for Austria. As Metternich bitterly remarked, the only merit of the Treaty was that it left no possible cause of dispute outstanding. In truth, Metternich, good diplomatist as he was,

was no match for Talleyrand either in experience or cunning, while his adroitness and eloquence, which might have availed with a more ordinary potentate, were poor weapons with which to combat the brusque bullying of Napoleon. "I have yielded at last," he plaintively wrote to Stadion on October 12th, 1807, "to irresistible proofs that each delay would only bring the chances of new sacrifices."

Far different were his feelings towards the gradual development of Napoleon's designs on Spain. Those designs, without touching vital Austrian interests, were yet fraught with hope for Austria. Every step that Napoleon advanced into the Spanish quagmire widened the sphere of politics in which Austria could secretly oppose him, and increased the possibility of success in the inevitable conflict. Moreover, as events developed, the "Spanish Ulcer" not only diverted his armies but distracted the mind of Napoleon from German problems, and following the advice of Stadion and Metternich the Austrian Government hurried on their preparations for war in proportion as Napoleon became more deeply involved.

To gain information as to Napoleon's plans, Metternich used his intimacy with Caroline Bonaparte, whom he employed to wheedle information out of Napoleon. The French ministers were not unaware of these stratagems. General Savary, chief of Napoleon's confidential police, wrote that Metternich had "the absolute disposal of a lady of whom Fouché has an indispensable need. Discretion forbids me to name her." But the advantage was not all on Metternich's side, for Fouché and Talleyrand in their turn used Caroline to gain information from her lover.

It was indeed greatly owing to Fouché and Talleyrand that Metternich's ordinarily cool temper was kindled into something like warlike ardour. They encouraged him to exaggerate the distracting effect of Spanish affairs upon Napoleon. Fouché used to invite Metternich to his garden, where he introduced him to the leaders of the popular risings in Spain and Portugal. The assertions of these men as to the formidable nature of the national resistance to France and the many symptoms of Anti-French feeling in Rome and Naples increased Metternich's conviction that now was the time to strike, and encouraged him to hasten on the Austrian preparations.

Rumours of Austrian military reorganization could not fail to reach Napoleon's ears, and, though anxious to retain the friendship of Austria during the present crisis in Spain, he was determined to fathom the real intentions of the Viennese Cabinet. An opportunity was soon afforded him. The news of the famous Capitulation of Baylen, when the French General Dupont with twelve thousand men surrendered to the Spanish, encouraged the Austrian Government to redouble their energy. Already, by the advice of Stadion, all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five had been incorporated in the Landwehr, and an unparalleled spirit of military enthusiasm seized hold of the Austrian people.

Napoleon, perplexed and annoyed, resolved to bring matters to a head. On August 15th, 1808, he received the Diplomatic Circle previous to his departure for Spain. The audience took place just before a service held in the Chapel of St Cloud to celebrate Napoleon's birthday. The Emperor entered

with a large retinue. At once he accosted Metternich "in a loud voice and pompous tone" with "Well, Sir Ambassador, what does the Emperor your Master want—does he intend to call us back to Vienna?" As in the case of most famous conversations, accounts of what followed vary. Metternich himself dwells on the brusque bullying tone adopted by Napoleon, and states that he himself remained unabashed, and answered him in an equally loud tone, whereupon Napoleon suddenly turned round, and breaking off in the midst of a sentence, strode into the Chapel without completing the round of the Circle. Champagny, the French Foreign Minister, naturally, in his account, glosses over the violence of Napoleon's tirade and gives a less lurid account of the interview. What is certain is that Napoleon reproached Metternich with the hostile armaments in Austria, which must be intended either to attack or intimidate France. If they were so intended, he would retort by arming the Confederation of the Rhine and instituting war to the death. Russia, too, would be brought in to help France in a partition of Turkey, in which case "I will no longer admit you to the future settlement of many Questions in which you are interested." Napoleon also made uncomplimentary remarks about "England's invisible hand."

The unfavourable impression left by the interview was not allayed by an assurance given by Champagny, who subsequently entertained the ambassador at a banquet, that nothing personal had been intended. The Austrian Government began to fear that their country was destined to be handed over as spoil to one of Napoleon's adherents, and from this time

relations became more strained between the Courts of Paris and Vienna. There was a frequent interchange of letters between Champagny and Metternich, in which the former protested against the Austrian preparations, while the latter ingenuously explained that the activity was due to the reorganization of the Austrian Empire. More than ever, indeed, was it necessary for Metternich to hide the warlike preparations of Austria, to foment French intrigues against Napoleon, and to make friends with foreign diplomatists.

It will be remembered that mention was made at the interview on August 15th of a Partition of Turkey. This scheme, involving as it does the relations of Austria and of France towards Russia, proved the fourth problem with which Metternich had to grapple during his embassy to Paris. Napoleon's scheme was to divide the Turkish dominions between France, Austria and Russia, and this, curiously enough, was nothing less than the first step towards ousting the British from India. Napoleon, indeed, admitted as much to Metternich when, in January 1808, he first propounded the scheme to him. Metternich always maintained that Napoleon had no desire to possess the Ottoman territories in themselves. He merely wished to obtain Austrian and Russian support in securing him a footing in the East as a means towards destroying British commerce. He pressed Metternich to advise Austria to join him in the project: otherwise, he threatened, she should not receive her share of the spoil. But Metternich, faithful to his policy of non-committal, cautiously answered that the Emperor Francis with his peace-loving nature would

almost certainly be unfavourable to a scheme which threatened so completely to upset the *status quo*.

Accordingly Napoleon decided to ignore Austria altogether, and strove assiduously to induce Russia to join him in the Partition. The position was critical for Austria; and Metternich realized it. It was undesirable that she should spend the men and money collected for the coming struggle with Napoleon upon a project suggested by, and probably to the chief advantage of, Napoleon. On the other hand, seeing that she was already isolated from Great Britain, it was dangerous to make fresh enemies by refusing to join Russia and France—in an undertaking, moreover, which vitally affected Austria as a power with interests in the Balkan peninsular. This last argument finally convinced Metternich, and on January 18th, 1808, he wrote to Stadion, "We cannot save Turkey; therefore we must help in the Partition and endeavour to get as good a share of it as possible."

Yet Austria was really powerless. In the plan of Partition tentatively drawn up by Napoleon and Alexander, Austria received but a meagre portion. All depended on the attitude of Russia, the more so in proportion as Napoleon became entangled in Spain. The crisis came with the Congress at Erfurt. Napoleon had long sought an interview with the Czar to settle the affairs of the East. At length it was arranged to take place in October.

It was now seen how little voice Austria was to have in the matter. The Emperor Francis was indeed invited to attend the Conference, but he seems to have feared that his prestige would suffer. Accord-

ingly Baron Vincent was sent as the Austrian Envoy to Erfurt. He was kept utterly in the dark as to the course of the negotiations. Metternich was in the same plight. How much the position galled him is shown by his correspondence. He had not been allowed to follow Napoleon to Erfurt, and though he corresponded with Tolstoy, the Russian Envoy in Paris, he failed to obtain any accurate information either from him or from Vincent. Though convinced that the Conference was merely a "trap" for Alexander, he could not probe the secrets of the meeting, and wrote plaintively to Stadion that he supposed Vincent would inform the Austrian Government of all that took place, since he himself knew nothing.

As a matter of fact, the issue of the Conference at Erfurt was not unfavourable to Austria. Russia refused actively to interfere against her, and Napoleon, who, hampered by his difficulties in Spain, had hoped to fascinate the impressionable mind of Alexander by a display of power and magnificence, and had failed, was forced to acquiesce. In fact, when he received the Diplomatic Corps on the 29th of October, prior to his departure for Bayonne and Spain, he made a point of being polite to Metternich.

But Metternich was bent on war. Shortly after the Conference was over, he wrote to the Austrian Government urging that now was the time to strike, and no sooner was Napoleon on his way to Spain than he obtained leave to pay a visit to Vienna. He wished to observe how the Austrian preparations for war were progressing. He arrived at Vienna on November 10th, and learnt from Stadion that Austria

was on the verge of declaring war. The Cabinet was almost unanimous in favour of bringing matters to a crisis, but Francis characteristically hesitated to commit himself to the chances of war. He took advantage of Metternich's presence to ask him to examine the Question and tender his advice to the Cabinet. Metternich accordingly drew up three Memorandums containing his views on the situation. Two were of a political nature. The third was entitled "*Armée Française ; Guerre d'Espagne.*" His argument was that, since the supremacy of Napoleon was dangerous to the very existence of Austria, war was imperative, and, since Napoleon was hopelessly involved in Spain, now was the favourable opportunity for declaring it. He calculated that Napoleon would only have 206,000 men at disposal for a war with Austria, and, although the Archduke Charles expressed his dissent from this estimate, Stadion agreed with Metternich. But Metternich did not share the view of Stadion and others that North Germany would throw in her lot with Austria. Like the Archduke Charles he considered that Austria would have to work out her own salvation. Indeed it was only an exaggerated idea of the extent to which Napoleon was crippled by the rising in the Peninsula that caused Metternich to clamour for war ; and the mistake was almost entirely due to putting too much trust in the statements of those astute intriguers, Fouché and Talleyrand.

Affairs were in this position when Metternich, hearing that Napoleon had abandoned the pursuit of Sir John Moore, and was returning to Paris, hastened

back to Paris to be present on his arrival. In spite of the inclement weather, he reached Paris on New Year's day 1809, and was cordially received by the French Ministers. Champagny, especially, the Minister for foreign affairs, showed himself obviously desirous of peace. Metternich observed that public opinion in France was excited but by no means depressed about events in Spain; but as regarded Austria the general opinion was that war was inevitable. Metternich had an interesting interview with Talleyrand, which convinced him more than ever that he was plotting against Napoleon. He had even urged Alexander to resist Napoleon at Erfurt.

Napoleon arrived on the night of the 22nd, and on the 24th received the foreign ambassadors. Contrary to expectation he made no outburst against Austria, and it almost seemed that Metternich had deceived him as to the pacific intentions of Austria.

For some months after this reception, Metternich remained in certainty that war would come, though his Government wisely forbore to acquaint him with what was actually taking place. At last, on March 2nd, he was ordered to inform Champagny that, owing to Napoleon's demonstrations, Austria had felt compelled to arm. On April 15th Champagny informed Metternich that he was to receive his Passport as soon as the exchange of the personnel of the two embassies could be effected. Yet for six weeks after this warning he remained in France, as if no rupture had occurred, until, on May 16th, Fouché informed him that he must leave for Vienna as soon as possible. Even now he was delayed by an inflammation of the eyes, and only left Paris on May 26th.

At Chalons-sur-Marne he met the first signs of war—a train of Austrian prisoners—and heard rumours of a French reverse, which probably referred to the battle of Aspern. At Strasburg he found the Empress Josephine, to whom he paid a visit.

He reached Vienna on June 5th. There he found that his father had, with others, been selected as a hostage for a contribution levied on Vienna by the French, from which position he hastened to rescue him. For the war of 1809 was half over. Vienna was already in the hands of Napoleon.

Events had moved rapidly. The original Austrian plan of campaign—a comprehensive and vigorous offensive—had broken down owing to defective transport. Napoleon had been enabled to concentrate his scattered forces. Still the Austrians had fought gallantly; Aspern was nearly a French reverse. But Napoleon characteristically followed up even a doubtful success, and pressing on with ruthless energy was in occupation of Vienna when Metternich arrived.

Metternich lost no time in securing an interview with Champagny, who entertained him to dinner in the French camp. It cheered him to observe that the French seemed ill satisfied with their partial success, and were by no means confident of ultimate victory, from which he drew fresh hope.

On the morning of the 7th, Metternich gained permission to move into a country house at Grünberg belonging to his mother, and while there was astonished one morning to observe General Savary ride up to the door. This visit was interesting, for Savary, the chief of those confidential police who were set to watch even the police of Fouché, was always employed by



Photo. Frankenstein

THE HOFBURG, VIENNA



Napoleon on missions which demanded great discretion or secrecy. Napoleon was at this time residing at the palace of Schönbrunn, the gardens of which adjoined those of Grünberg. Savary had been sent to suggest that Metternich should stroll into the garden of Schönbrunn and discuss the situation with Napoleon. But Metternich sent him away discomfited with a point-blank refusal, and later rejected a similar overture from Champagny. In his opinion it was no time for overtures. Everything he had seen convinced him that Austria still had a chance of victory. He was not going to be wheedled or bullied by Napoleon.

At length, on June 26th, the arrangements for his exchange were complete, and he left Grünberg under escort for the Austrian army. An exciting incident attended the journey. An Austrian battery mistook the escort for that of the Viceroy of Italy, who was on his way to join Napoleon, and opened fire. The first shot passed through the wheel of the carriage, the second whizzed over the top. But happily there were no casualties, and on July 2nd Metternich safely reached Acs, in Hungary, where he was exchanged for a French officer held prisoner by the Austrian Government.

Without delay, Metternich set off for Wolkersdorf, fifteen miles distant, where Francis had his headquarters. As there was daily expectation of a decisive battle, the Emperor informed him that he was to remain at his side for the rest of the campaign and tender his advice.

For Stadion, the chief promoter of the war, was in the utmost despondency, being "one of those

men of lively imagination and quick understanding, who are easily overcome by the impression of the moment."

Thus it came about that Metternich was present at the disastrous battle of Wagram. The Emperor Francis and he watched the course of the struggle until the evening of July 5th, when they retired to Wolkersdorf for the night. They returned at dawn on the following morning. At this period the Austrian right was apparently victorious, and all seemed well. Metternich had procured a telescope for the occasion and with its aid described the various phases of the battle to the Emperor. By one o'clock the balance had turned in favour of the French, and about this hour Colloredo announced that the Archduke Charles had ordered a general retreat. Francis calmly inquired if the movement had already commenced. "When the Emperor," writes Metternich, "heard that the army was already in full retreat, he said to his Adjutant, 'Very well,' and added, turning to me, 'We shall have much to retrieve!'"

There was indeed much to retrieve, and it was Metternich who had to do it. Wagram broke Stadion's heart, and he resigned immediately after the battle. Francis sent for Metternich on July 8th and offered him the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But Metternich, perhaps from policy, perhaps really from kind-heartedness, persuaded him to retain Stadion until the conclusion of hostilities. So sudden a resignation might savour of a desertion of the cause of liberty.

Shortly afterwards, Metternich had an opportunity of thoroughly discussing the situation with the Emperor, for when the Court moved for greater

safety to Komorn, in Hungary, he shared the Emperor's carriage. At Komorn came the news that an armistice had been concluded. After Wagram, the Archduke Charles had retired on Znaim. Napoleon had languidly pursued him, and again defeated the remnants of the Austrian army. Metternich never ceased to blame the Archduke for this retreat, and declared that there should be no treating with Napoleon until Austrian soil was freed from French troops.

But facts were against Metternich. Whatever ought to have been done or might have been done, the situation now demanded the opening of negotiations, and arrangements were made accordingly.

The Archduke Charles, finding that Francis was inclined to agree with Metternich's disapproval of the manner in which he had conducted the campaign, resigned in not unnatural disgust ; conscious of having done all that was in the power of mortal man. He was succeeded by Prince John of Liechtenstein. The headquarters of both Court and Army moved to Totis.

Now that negotiations had been decided upon, Champagny was sent by Napoleon as his representative while Metternich, assisted by Count Nugent, represented Austria. A difficulty at once arose as to Metternich's title. He was no longer ambassador to France ; he had not yet assumed the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs. It was eventually arranged that he should act under the title of Minister of State.

Metternich's sole desire was an honourable peace, but he was convinced that Napoleon's object was merely to gain time. The French army had suffered severely in the hardly contested battles of Aspern and Wagram. Otherwise Napoleon would have

followed up his advantage at once. When, therefore, negotiations were opened at Altenburg, in Hungary, Metternich insisted on fair terms being granted to Austria. But Napoleon was obdurate. He made certain offers regarding Bavaria and Italy which were quite incompatible with the dignity of Austria, and beyond them he refused to go. Grim despair seized Metternich and the Austrian Government. Napoleon began to threaten war if his terms were not accepted. Probably Metternich would altogether have rejected them. But matters were suddenly taken out of his hands. Napoleon sent Count Bubna to ask the Emperor Francis to send John of Liechtenstein to treat with him. "The Diplomats," he wrote, "do not know how to get through an affair like the present; we soldiers understand one another better." Francis, whether anxious to conciliate Napoleon in every possible way, or mistrusting Metternich's capacity for dealing with the crisis, acceded to the request. Metternich returned to Totis, where he learnt that Napoleon had summoned Champagny to Vienna, thus putting an end to the Altenburg negotiations. Metternich was furious at affairs being taken out of his hands. He writes scornfully in his *Memoirs of Prince John and his mission*. Though a born soldier, an ardent patriot, high-minded and with a great zeal for right, he lacked judgment. He had succumbed to the wiles of Napoleon in 1805, and since he regarded that human prodigy merely as a brother-soldier, was fairly certain to be outwitted by him again. Metternich even professes to have warned Francis against sending Prince John on the mission, and to have told the Prince himself that it was merely a device of

Napoleon to lure him away from the army. In any case he is convinced that Prince John was utterly outwitted, and recounts the improbable tale that Napoleon announced the Treaty of Vienna with a discharge of cannon, before it was actually signed, in order to force the hand of the Austrian negotiator.

There is little doubt that in reality Metternich was entirely ignorant of the negotiations preceding the Treaty, and, at first, of the terms of the Treaty itself, that the ignorance galled him, and that this explains his bitter comments on the whole proceeding. Yet his eclipse was not of long duration. It was soon after the signature of the Treaty of Vienna that Metternich became Chancellor of the Austrian Empire and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It is a moot point whether the fall of Stadion was a disaster or a blessing for Austria. Stadion was a real patriot, eager to reform abuses, to re-organize the constitution, and above all to curb the power of Napoleon. With his fall, those ideals gave way to a policy of friendship with France and *laissez faire* in domestic concerns, and it is only possible to conjecture the course which Austrian history would have pursued if Stadion had remained at the helm of government, and if his policy had not been replaced by the so-called Metternich System.

1809

CHAPTER V

THE MARRIAGE ALLIANCE

The results of the Treaty of Vienna—Metternich's assumption of office ushers in a period of reconciliation between Austria and France—Probability that Metternich had no definite policy of friendship with France, but merely wished to gain time for Austria to recuperate—The origin and authorship of the Marriage Alliance with France—The advantages accruing to Austria from the marriage—Metternich justified in advocating it—He takes up his residence for a second time in Paris with the object of learning Napoleon's intentions—His satisfaction with Napoleon's treatment of Marie Louise—He obtains some reduction in the harsh terms of the Treaty of Vienna—He enters with avidity into the gaieties of Versailles—Description of a typical fête given by the Austrian Ambassador—The veil is lifted from Napoleon's designs and Metternich learns that he is bent on the humiliation of Russia—He returns to Vienna and lays before Francis the result of his observations in France—He is nominated Curator of the Academy of Fine Arts—Reflections on his employment of social distinctions for political ends

THE terms of the Treaty of Vienna reduced Austria to the position of a second-rate power. In addition to huge territorial losses, the war indemnity of twelve million francs imposed by Napoleon was alone sufficient to cripple her resources for a considerable period. The French "Moniteur" grimly announced that the House of Hapsburg had "ceased to exist."

Consequently there is little doubt that although Metternich's promotion to supreme office was partly the outcome of Court intrigues against Stadion, it

was also due to a feeling that a sop of some sort must be thrown to France. Napoleon was known to have a favourable opinion of him, and was less likely to complete the destruction of Austria if a man whom he personally liked controlled her destinies.

At any rate, from the period of Metternich's assumption of office, a distinct change took place in Austrian policy. From 1809 to 1814 she became outwardly and ostensibly the friend of France. Metternich threw over the Partiotic party, and the man who had, when Ambassador at Paris, been foremost in the support of Stadion and the advocate of war to the death, became seemingly the servile partisan of France. It was not heroic, it was to a certain extent in opposition to the real views of Francis ; but it was essentially prudent. Moreover, from 1809 Austria ceased to seek expansion in the West. The West, it almost seemed, belonged and would continue to belong to Napoleon. There must be no clashing with Napoleonic interests in view of Austria's present condition. Therefore she must turn to the East and South, to anarchic Poland, to the ever moribund Turk, to Italy, traditional goal of Hapsburg aims. And this policy has lasted to the present day.

But Metternich had no idea of forming a policy or developing a system. What he really did was to return to his old game of waiting and watching, which he had practised so successfully at Paris. Practically this amounted to the re-organization of Austria's resources, and the conciliation of Napoleon by every possible means. The first aim involved domestic politics, over which Francis liked to exercise personal

control. Now the Emperor hated all change, and in consequence Metternich, although not unaware that there was great need of reform in Austria, bowed to his will. "Social questions, therefore," he afterwards wrote, "I placed in the background, but in the very first rank I placed the preservation of what remained of the Austrian Empire." Even the work of re-organization, and such small reforms as were executed, were confided to able subordinates, in the choice of which the new Minister was always an adept. But on the foreign policy of Austria he kept a firm grip, and while outwardly professing friendship for Napoleon he looked confidently forward to a day of retribution.

The re-organization of the Army was entrusted to Count Bellegarde, "who knew as well as I did," Metternich enigmatically remarked, "the value of letting men talk." The finances were entrusted to Count Wallis, an admirable selection. Nevertheless, Metternich at first opposed the latter's suggested reforms, characteristically veering round to cordial co-operation when he found they were popular. When we remember Metternich's youth, the circumstances of his early summons to high office, and the fact that he was practically born into a diplomatic career, to assure him which his parents had almost ruined themselves, we cannot blame his habitual inclination to trim. The retention of office was essential to his existence, and for this it was imperative to keep on good terms with Francis.


As years went on, Metternich became so wedded to power that he began to think himself essential to his country and grew to imagine, without exaggeration,

that any policy which suited himself also suited the needs of the Austrian Empire.

Napoleon was at this time engaged in a quarrel with the Papacy, in which Metternich supported him. Count Otto, the French Ambassador at Vienna, was completely hoodwinked. He explained to his Government that any apparent display of ill-will towards France on the part of the Austrian Minister must be put down to the exigencies of policy and not to conviction, and when Champagny suggested that in view of the crippled state of his finances Metternich might be open to a bribe, Otto answered that it would merely be waste of money, since Metternich was already quite committed to the views of the French Government.

The first tangible result of Metternich's return to apparent support of the Napoleonic system was the Austrian Marriage Alliance with France. Metternich's version of how it came about is as follows. There had long been rumours of Napoleon's desire to marry an Austrian archduchess. It fitted in with his policy of imparting as much as possible of the tradition of old European dynasties to his upstart title, and also of maintaining a good understanding with Austria. But these rumours had hitherto not been regarded seriously, and, indeed, attempts of Napoleon to secure the hand of a Russian princess had for a time alarmed the Court of Vienna.

Towards the end of the year 1809, however, at a masked ball given by the Archchancellor, Cambacères, Napoleon asked Madame Metternich, who had remained in Paris after Metternich's departure, whether she considered that the Archduchess Marie Louise would accept him as her husband. She very properly



told him that the correct person to approach on the subject was Prince Schwarzenberg,¹ the Austrian Ambassador, to whom she afterwards reported the conversation. On the following morning, Prince Eugène, Viceroy of Italy, called on the Austrian Ambassador and made a definite offer of marriage on Napoleon's behalf. Schwarzenberg referred the matter to Vienna, and Metternich on receiving the despatch went at once to the Emperor Francis and expressed the opinion that an immediate decision should be come to.

But who was to take the responsibility? Metternich discreetly refused to give advice. It was one of those cases, he pleaded, where one man could not put himself in another's place. Francis, never prone to lightning decision, said that it was obviously for his daughter to make up her mind. But when Metternich was sent to interview her, Marie Louise promptly placed herself in the hands of her father. If the interests of Austria required it, she was willing to be sacrificed.

This is Metternich's version of how the marriage came about, ascribing the initiative to Napoleon. But, very characteristically, in another portion of his Memoirs he credits himself with the original suggestion of the marriage, while in yet another he maintains a discreet silence as to the authorship.

Probably he was not the original author,² but eagerly fell in with the suggestion when mooted as a

¹ In this and succeeding chapters Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, the diplomatist, must not be confused with Prince Charles Schwarzenberg, the Austrian General.

² Demelisch, "Metternich und seine auswärtige Politik," Bk. ii. vol. i. p. 153.

means of preventing Napoleon's marriage with a Russian princess and furthering his new policy of friendship with France. It is certain that the Countess of Metternich used her residence in Paris as a means of materially aiding the negotiations, and that it required all her father's powers of persuasion to induce Marie Louise to consent to marriage with a man whose very name she loathed. Still, as Metternich candidly remarked, "Our princesses are not accustomed to choose their own husbands according to the promptings of their hearts."

On the evening of the day on which the Archduchess signified her assent, Glück's "*Iphigénie in Taurus*" was by a coincidence being acted at the theatre.¹ The marriage was celebrated by proxy at Vienna on March 11th, 1810.

The Marriage Alliance has often been cited as an instance of the disastrous consequences of Metternich's policy of conciliating France. Certainly if we condemn it, we condemn the whole of Austrian policy between 1809 and 1814. Without doubt it was a humiliation to the pride of the Hapsburgs that a daughter of the house should wed the Corsican upstart, and it may well be argued that Francis and Metternich were disappointed in their hopes that the marriage would inaugurate a long period of peace with France. Nor was it creditable that the Princess should have been cast as a scapegoat into the wilderness of revolution, chained to that incarnation of unscrupulous ambition which had ruined the Austrian nation.

But the condition of Austria after 1809 was such

¹ "Imperial Vienna," A. S. Levetus, p. 124.

that she must accept and not dictate the terms upon which good relations with France were to be restored. As Lady Castlereagh remarked, "it was necessary to deliver a daughter of the House of Austria to satisfy the Minotaur." Yet the sacrifice was not so terrible as it has been pictured. Napoleon behaved well to his new wife and gave her everything which she asked for. Metternich found that Marie Louise was well able to take care of herself, and she said of Napoleon, "he is more afraid of me than I am of him." Moreover, the marriage had just the effect which Metternich had expected. Whatever his personal feelings towards Napoleon may have been, he was not genuinely attached to Napoleonic policy. It was only present necessity which forced him to bow to French supremacy and court the power which he secretly longed to abase. The marriage was not the beginning of a system, but a temporary political move; perhaps a leap in the dark, but none the less beneficial to Austria. For it aided Metternich in playing his waiting game. Napoleon really believed—this is proved over and over again amidst the tangled diplomacy that enveloped the Russian expedition and the War of Liberation—that Austria was now committed to friendship for France and that nothing would induce her to sever it. Thus he maintained peace in spite of provocations which would otherwise have driven him to vengeance, and gave Metternich time to weave the web which was ultimately destined to encircle him. The marriage of Marie Louise was no cowardly surrender to Napoleonic ambition. The Archduchess was the pawn whose shifting started the long and deadly game in which Metternich schemed,

upon the chessboard of Europe, to checkmate Napoleon.

The history of the relations of Austria and France from the Marriage Alliance to the battle of Leipsic, if read aright, forms an enthralling drama, in which Napoleon became slowly but surely entangled in the toils of Austrian diplomacy, to be mercilessly overwhelmed when all the forces for his destruction had been marshalled.

Metternich, as well as Marie Louise, was bound for Paris. Indeed, he started almost simultaneously with the new Empress of the French and overtook her at Strasburg. The Countess of Metternich, as has been mentioned, had been residing in Paris during her husband's absence in a house in the Chaussée d'Antin. Here Metternich now took up his quarters. Napoleon, who gave him a hearty welcome, had placed Marshal Ney's house at his disposal, servants and all, but Metternich was unwilling to burden the French Court with unnecessary expense.

It was not merely in order to be with his wife that Metternich had come to Paris. In reply to a report which Metternich had sent him on his first arrival on French soil, Francis had written: "Placing the fullest confidence in your personality, I have commissioned you to proceed to Paris in order to act for the good of my Monarchy. I therefore impose on you the duty of doing your utmost in our interests and of endeavouring to obtain for us the greatest possible advantages. . . ."

In fact, Metternich's aims were principally three. First, he wanted to observe on the spot the effect

of Napoleon's marriage. Here his most sanguine hopes were exceeded. On March 29th, in a letter from Compiègne, where the French Court was residing, to Francis he wrote of Marie Louise : " The Emperor, I assure you, is almost entirely taken up with her ; he pays her the most assiduous attentions," and later, in April, " He is so evidently in love with her that he cannot conceal his feelings, and all his customary ways of life are subordinated to her wishes." " Impress upon the Emperor," Napoleon once said to Metternich, " that his daughter is the most precious gift he could have bestowed upon me."

In September 1810, Metternich returned to Vienna, but was back in Paris when, on March 10th, 1811, Marie Louise bore Napoleon a son. At the ensuing banquet he raised his glass, and prophetically drank to the health of the King of Rome. The birth of a son served to increase Napoleon's regard for his wife and her popularity with the French nation, and Metternich complacently reflected how greatly her influence over the French Emperor might be turned to the benefit of Austria.

It is melancholy to reflect on the sordid ending to Marie Louise's season of wedded bliss with Napoleon. Her misfortune was that, though amiable and pretty, she was a heartless, colourless woman, and on the whole deserved the remark that she was neither daughter, nor mother, nor wife.

The second object of Metternich's visit to Paris was to induce Napoleon to modify the terms of the Treaty of Vienna in Austria's favour. He felt that Napoleon's personal regard for him would aid him in this attempt, and lost no opportunity of humouring

him, notably in regard to the question of the Holy See. Pius VII., furious because Napoleon had incorporated the States of the Church with the French Empire and declared Rome an Imperial and Free City, had excommunicated Napoleon, and was now, in consequence, a prisoner at Savona. Metternich spared no effort to induce the Pope to bow to Napoleon's will, but found it impossible to reconcile the contending parties.

Still his conciliatory attitude bore fruit. He did not achieve much reduction of the terms of the Treaty of Vienna. But Napoleon allowed one important concession. Austria was permitted to pay the war-indemnity in monthly instalments, no small boon considering the state of her finances. Also, Napoleon gave Metternich every assistance in raising a loan in France to facilitate the payment of the indemnity. Other matters adjusted at this period were the regulation of trade in Illyria and North Italy and the questions arising from the recent large confiscation of German territory. In connection with the latter, Napoleon showed his appreciation of Metternich by restoring to the Metternich family their ancient possessions on the Rhine, which had been forfeited after the war of 1805.

But Metternich had still another object in view when he came to Paris. Although he hoped and believed that Napoleon was now bound to Austria by such intimate ties as would assure a period of peace, he wished to discover what were Napoleon's intentions for the future, more especially in regard to Russia. On arriving in Paris, he frankly acknowledged that he wished to obtain some guiding principles for the conduct of Austrian foreign politics.

Napoleon replied that if he waited he would gain the information required.

So Metternich waited, and in the meantime threw himself with zest into the gaieties of Versailles. It was at this time that there occurred the fatal fire during a fête given in honour of Napoleon and the Empress Marie Louise by Prince Schwarzenberg, which Metternich graphically describes in his Memoirs. The entertainment had been on a magnificent scale. Fanfares announced the arrival of their Majesties, who proceeded at once to make a tour of the gardens. The first object which met their gaze was a temple of Apollo, round which sang women dressed as Muses. During the royal progress strains of music continually issued from subterranean grottoes and from arbours formed of vines. Soon a Temple of Fame came into view, surrounded by figures appropriately representing Victory, Clio, and Fame herself. Again the trumpets blared, while tripods placed here and there exhaled incense and rare perfumes.

Then came the grand spectacle. It consisted of a play performed round a mimic castle, followed by a mimic fire, which swiftly enveloped and consumed the stately edifice of a day. After the assembled guests had refreshed themselves with ices, the ball commenced. The scene was brilliant and impressive ; the ballroom held upwards of twelve hundred guests, and Napoleon had ordered all those who possessed Austrian orders to wear them. Before the commencement of general dancing, a ballet was performed before the Emperor and Marie Louise, and it was soon after this that the tragedy commenced.

A garland in the gallery caught fire ; the flames

spread to the draperies, and soon the whole ballroom was ablaze. A horrible panic ensued ; the usual rush towards every available exit resulted in fatal confusion. Twenty persons, including Schwarzenberg's daughter, perished ; many were crushed or otherwise injured. Metternich was present throughout, and testifies to the splendid behaviour of Napoleon. At the first outbreak, he conducted Marie Louise to the Imperial coach, but immediately returned and occupied himself with superintending the attempts to extinguish the flames. He gave his orders with great precision and celerity and showed throughout resource and presence of mind.

During his stay in Paris, Metternich was gratified to observe the popularity of the new Empress. Everywhere she was received with enthusiasm, and when she accompanied Napoleon in a tour round the Northern districts of France, Metternich, who had been invited to join the party, noticed the warm welcome accorded her by all classes. Napoleon allowed Metternich every facility for conversing with Marie Louise, and even encouraged her to ask the Austrian Minister's advice upon every point which troubled her.

Yet Metternich remained for many months unenlightened as to Napoleon's intentions for the future, and, whilst this was so, the main object of his visit was unfulfilled. He had, indeed, many conversations with Napoleon, in one of which the Emperor admitted that if Austria had resumed hostilities after Wagram he would have been undone.

But it was not until September, after he had been six months in France, that Metternich received any

hint of Napoleon's intentions. Then the veil was lifted. The occasion was the selection of Marshal Bernadotte for the throne of Sweden. In an interview which Metternich had with Napoleon immediately afterwards, the latter admitted that this was a blow aimed at Russia. "I consider the Swedish affair as a more or less distant motive for war with Russia." Napoleon at the same time suggested that Austria should exchange part of her territory in Galicia for an equal portion of the Illyrian provinces, desiring, at the same time, that the whole of the conversation should be kept a secret between Metternich and the Austrian Emperor.

Metternich had now obtained the required information. He knew for certain that Napoleon was bent on the humiliation of Russia, an event which he contemplated with secret and malicious joy.¹ It was time for him to return to Vienna. In a farewell audience with Napoleon on September 14th, he obtained the revocation of the secret article of the Treaty of Vienna, which had limited Austrian armaments to one hundred and fifty thousand men. Then, leaving St Cloud, he travelled to Vienna, and after a short sojourn there rejoined the Emperor Francis at Gratz. During Metternich's absence at Paris, his father had presided over the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Old Prince Metternich had always had French leanings. He was a great upholder of tradition, and it was the traditional policy of Austria to side with France. He accordingly opened negotiations with Count Otto, the French Ambassador,

¹ Demelisch, "Metternich und seine auswärtige Politik," vol. i. p. 414.

which, without actually reaching any definite conclusion—Francis' pride had been too much stung by the humiliation of 1809 for that—yet tended to promote closer relations between the two governments.

On his return, Metternich laid before Francis the information which he had gathered during his residence in France, and even professes, in his Memoirs, accurately to have prophesied the course of the war which Napoleon subsequently waged with Russia. The truth of his predictions as to the imminence of war was substantiated by the fact that, during his absence in Paris, the Czar had sent his adjutant to Vienna to propose an Austro-Russian alliance in the event of a war with France arising from the Swedish succession question. The Austrian Government had refused the overture. Metternich, indeed, professed to solicit the good offices of Prussia and pointed out to the Berlin Government that a Franco-Russian War would, by weakening both the combatants, promote the cause of European liberty.

It was at this period that Metternich was nominated Curator of the Academy of Fine Arts, "an unexpected and honourable appointment." He characteristically determined to enhance the dignity of the office by infusing fresh strength into the old Statutes and by increasing the outward effect by the reception of foreign notabilities and the election of honorary members. It seems, indeed, to have been part of Metternich's policy to become identified with such associations with a view to obtaining a voice in and a knowledge of every phase of Austrian life, for he also obtained the Curatorship of the Architects' Association, and, later on, became Chancellor of the

Order of Maria Theresa, in order to increase his influence in army questions.

Metternich was no "snob." Like Francis, he never loved ceremony for its own sake, and in the choice of instruments he constantly deprecated courtiers being appointed to posts merely because they were courtiers. But he was never loth to secure a distinction for himself when he felt it would serve a political turn. This is illustrated by a curious letter which he wrote in 1813 just after the battle of Leipsic, requesting Hudelist to try and arrange for the Freedom of Vienna to be offered to Metternich and Schwarzenberg, the Commander of the Austrian forces which had helped to defeat Napoleon. "Anything out of the common," said he, "has a good effect. The Salvata of Vienna is worth something. Try and bring it about *sub rosa*."

CHAPTER VI

THE DRESDEN INTERVIEW

Napoleon's invasion of Russia places Austria in an awkward dilemma—That she is able to maintain neutrality is largely due to Metternich—Metternich accompanies the Emperor Francis to Dresden for an interview with Napoleon—He discusses with Napoleon the prospects of the Russian undertaking. He continually negotiates with the enemies of France in Europe—Napoleon's conviction that Austria would remain faithful to his cause—Metternich contrives to ensure the safety of the Austrian contingent serving with the Grand Army by a secret arrangement with Russia—The arrival of Narbonne as French envoy at Vienna causes Metternich some harassing moments—Napoleon's suspicions are gradually awakened—The defeat of the Allies at Bautzen induces Metternich to decide on war as soon as the Austrian preparations are complete—Metternich accompanies the Emperor Francis to Gitschin in order to be in touch with the Russian headquarters—The signing of the Armistice of Pleiswitz virtually seals Napoleon's fate—Metternich interviews the Czar at Opocno—He returns to Dresden, where he has his famous interview with Napoleon in the Marcolini Palace—He secures a prolongation of the armistice—After some ineffective negotiations, Austria throws in her lot with the Allies, and declares War on Napoleon

“**A**LL history has not recorded so strange a political situation, and it probably never will record a second of the same kind.” Such was Metternich's comment on the state of European politics during Napoleon's invasion of Russia.

The blow had soon fallen, as Metternich had foretold; and by the end of 1811 Napoleon had established his base at Danzig preparatory to entering the heart of Russia.

What course, then, was Austria to pursue? It seemed impossible that she could avoid declaring for one side or the other. The troops of the States comprising the Confederation of the Rhine had joined the Grand Army, and Napoleon lost no time in acquainting the Courts of Austria and Prussia with his intention of invading Russia, and in demanding their support. Prussia at once acquiesced, and it seemed that Austria must perforce do the same. For Austria had refused to form an alliance with Russia; her Sovereign was bound to Napoleon by the closest family ties; she was, moreover, isolated in Europe.

That she was eventually able to adopt the pose of Armed Neutrality was to a great extent due to Metternich's excellent personal relations with both the Czar and Napoleon. For Napoleon, as Metternich guessed, merely wanted some guarantee that Austria would not take up arms against him, while Russia recognized that Austria only refrained from joining her against France through a sense of weakness. Consequently, Metternich was able on March 14th, 1812, to sign a Treaty with France by which Austria agreed to furnish an Auxiliary Corps of thirty thousand troops for the Russian War, receiving in exchange a guarantee of integrity and a promise that, in the event of a reconstitution of Poland, she should recover Illyria or at any rate a large portion of it. Metternich wisely stipulated that the Treaty should be kept secret as long as possible.¹

For the moment the danger that Austria would be

¹ Demelisch, "Metternich und seine auswärtige Politik," vol. i. p. 516.

forced openly to declare herself was staved off. There was, indeed, some unpleasantness over the selection of a Commander for the Auxiliary Force. Napoleon asked and Metternich suggested that the post should be offered to the Archduke Charles; but the Archduke, who, since Wagram, had been on the reverse of friendly terms with his brother the Emperor Francis, refused the proffered honour. Prince Schwarzenberg was eventually selected in his place.

In May, Napoleon went to Dresden to receive the vassal sovereigns before his departure to join the army. The Emperor Francis and his consort were accompanied thither by Metternich, who found the universal opinion was that Napoleon was certain to succeed in his Russian enterprise.

This visit gave Metternich an opportunity of renewing his former friendly intercourse with Napoleon. Their conversations chiefly turned on the prospects of the Russian campaign and the internal government of France. As to the former, Metternich found that Napoleon did not underrate the gravity of the undertaking. He affirmed that Patience would win the day. If Russia offered a stout resistance, he would establish himself gradually in the heart of the country, until the Russians grew tired of unwillingly supporting so vast a host free of charge.

As to France, Napoleon aired his views as to the best method of governing it. It was, he said, less fitted for representative government than other countries. Talent was common enough, but there was little character and less principle among the majority of Frenchmen. He admitted that he had stifled the Corps Legislatif, but that was because they

showed a revolutionary spirit. He was not desirous of absolute power, but he wanted more than the mere form of power. His aim was to organise the State, so that there should be "no more tattlers, no *idéologues*, no false tinsel." When Metternich enquired why he had not carried out this aim, Napoleon replied that war came first and must be brought to a conclusion before domestic reform could be taken in hand. That conclusion was never reached.

All this time, and while Napoleon was actually carrying out his invasion of Russia, Metternich never ceased his endeavours to strengthen the bonds between Austria and Prussia. Whatever the issue of the struggle, he felt that the fate of Europe must lie in the hands of those two countries. But his aim was to keep the forces of Austria intact, and for this reason he steadfastly resisted Stein's persistent entreaties that Austria should immediately join Prussia in taking up arms against Napoleon. It was a policy not of inclination but of self-preservation. As Metternich wrote to Hudelist soon after the visit to Dresden, "I am daily more convinced that no other line of action can be pursued, short of taking the direct road to ruin."¹

The stubborn resistance of Russia took Europe and Metternich by surprise. The disastrous retreat of Napoleon dumbfounded them. Metternich even then could not bring himself to believe that Napoleon's power was shattered. True, he had been continually negotiating with the enemies of France. At the beginning of 1812 he had told the Russian ambassador that Austria was only waiting to join Russia until

¹ Letter to Hudelist written from Prague, June 6th, 1812.

her preparations were complete. In May he approached Hardenberg with regard to co-operation with Prussia. By November negotiations were on foot with the British Cabinet. Still, he refused actually to join Russia or Prussia. But he was unwilling that the Austrian Auxiliary Corps should suffer loss in protecting the French retreat, and ordered Schwarzenberg to retire upon Galicia, if possible, without fighting.

The policy which Austria was now to pursue needed very delicate handling. Metternich must wait until the Powers were compelled to accept Austria's intervention as arbiter or at any rate to recognise her pre-eminence in return for her active support. Napoleon must at the same time be wheedled into the belief that Francis would never turn against his son-in-law, and that Austria, under no circumstances, would ever desert France. This selfish but practical policy ultimately ensured the downfall of Napoleon, and Metternich manipulated its details with Machiavellian cunning.

In January 1813, Count Bubna was sent to Paris to assure Napoleon that Austria was faithful to his cause, but at the same time to urge upon him a policy of peace. Austria would be willing to mediate.

But Napoleon proved himself absolutely convinced of the friendship of Austria in any emergency. He adopted a high tone. He was quite willing for Austria to mediate, but he would impose the peace conditions, and would not be dictated to by anybody. "I accepted your intervention for peace," he complained to Bubna, "but an armed mediator does not suit me." Austria must abide by the terms granted her after

Wagram, Russia by those arranged at Tilsit. Yet as a concession to Hapsburg pride, the Emperor's little grandson should be crowned King of Rome, and, in the event of Napoleon's death, Marie Louise should become Regent of France.

Napoleon's haughty attitude, which presumed on the unshakeable fidelity of Austria, made it harder than ever for Metternich to restrain the warlike element in Austria. Indeed Metternich himself seems to have wished to declare war at once, but was restrained by the cautious Francis. At any rate he wrote to Stadion in June 1813, "As for me, I would have struck long since, but the Emperor is more unwilling than ever."

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Prussia had already declared war; the King of Saxony had retired to Bavaria, to avoid the bellicose patriotism of his subjects; the German portion of the Austrian Empire clamoured vehemently for war. Still the Austrian Government refused to commit itself. Metternich kept holding conferences with Otto, the French Minister at Vienna, with a view to obtaining some advantages for Austria in case of peace. But he would not go beyond tentative negotiations. Austria might come to terms, if Spain were restored to the Bourbons, if the Hanseatic Towns were given back to Germany, if the Confederation of the Rhine were suppressed, if the Grand Duchy of Warsaw were partitioned between Austria, France and Russia, if Illyria were restored to her, and if the River Inn was again constituted the border between Italy and Austria. But there was always an "if."

In view, however, of Napoleon's haughty reply to Count Bubna's mission, Metternich proceeded to

offer Austria's mediation to the allied Powers. He was received with rebuffs by all. Castlereagh, on behalf of Great Britain, said that he was convinced that Napoleon would accept no reasonable terms. The Russian diplomatists remarked that Austria herself would soon realise the impossibility of treating with Napoleon.

Metternich sent copies of these answers, through Schwarzenberg, Austrian ambassador at Paris, to Napoleon, in order that he might see that he was the obstacle to peace and be induced to give some more explicit indication of what terms he would accept. But Napoleon was still under the firm delusion that Austria was his unswerving friend. He replaced Otto by M. de Narbonne, and instructed his new representative to urge Austria to march 100,000 men into Silesia and take the Allies in flank, while Napoleon himself attacked them in front. Thus, in Napoleon's opinion, the war would soon be concluded. For her exertions, Austria should receive Silesia, Illyria, and part of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

It was evident that Napoleon was convinced that Austria would ultimately join him. Schwarzenberg, accordingly, who had no intention of going out of his way to undeceive him, gave up his attempts to induce Napoleon to accept Austrian mediation.

On April 13th Napoleon set out to join his army, little knowing that his course of political ascendancy was well-nigh run. Metternich's task was clear, but must still be handled delicately. He continued to assert that Austria was prepared to mediate; at the same time he mobilised the troops which Napoleon had demanded, though he had no intention of employ-

ing them to aid Napoleon. It was, moreover, necessary to strengthen Austria's position of neutrality. Metternich accordingly tried to form a sort of neutral league of the Princes of the Rhine Confederation. This was not a success. He won over the King of Saxony for a time, but Würtemberg, as well as Bavaria, which had gained much from her alliance with France, held aloof.

To provide for the safety of the Austrian contingent promised to Napoleon by the terms of Schwarzenberg's Treaty, Metternich engineered the Treaty of Kalisch with Russia. The Russian Government agreed to connive in a military farce, wherein the Austrian troops were slowly to retire into Galicia, apparently pressed back by superior numbers. There still remained to be dealt with a Franco-Polish Corps under Poniatowski, which Napoleon had left in Upper Silesia to watch the movements of the Austrians. It was arranged that this force was to be brought back by the Austrians in their retreat, and ultimately to be disarmed by the King of Saxony in his opportune capacity of Grand Duke of Warsaw. The inactivity of the Auxiliary Corps had already been ensured by the dispatch of its Commander, Schwarzenberg, on a mission to Napoleon at Paris—a delicate compliment, as Metternich humorously put it, to the latter, and “before all Europe a striking example of the attitude of Austria, since the Commander of the Auxiliary Corps would appear before his chief to receive his orders in person.”

The arrival of the new French envoy, M. de Narbonne, gave Metternich an uncomfortable reminder that he was playing a dangerous game. Otto had

been credulous and easy to satisfy. But this M. de Narbonne was a most inquisitive person. He was not to be taken in, and possessed a bluntness of speech which was not wholly beneficial to French interests. He saw at once that Napoleon was being duped by Austria.

Narbonne's instructions were to propose that Austria should act as mediator in the interest of France, and that if the Allies would not agree to reasonable terms she should at once pour 100,000 men into Silesia. What terms Napoleon would propose Narbonne did not know. Metternich's dilemma was aggravated. Eventually he assented to Narbonne's proposals, chiefly to gain time; it would be easy afterwards to refuse Napoleon's terms. But Narbonne was extremely suspicious, and imparted his suspicions to Napoleon. He also plied Metternich with a most embarrassing fire of questions. What would happen if Austria and France failed to agree as to the terms to be proposed to the Allies? Metternich answered that he was sure Napoleon would be reasonable. But what if Napoleon were not reasonable? Metternich could only answer that Austria as armed mediator would be found to uphold justice, but added that her prepossessions would be in favour of France? Would Austria in certain eventualities oppose France? That, Metternich hastened to reply, would be out of the question, for he was sure France would be reasonable.

Metternich had to use every sort of subterfuge to evade this indomitable Frenchman. He must consult the Emperor Francis; usually the Emperor would be too unwell or too busy to be consulted; or Metter-

nich himself would be too unwell or too busy to consult him. There was always some excuse for delay. The importunate Narbonne had many stormy interviews both with Metternich and with Francis. Sometimes Metternich parried Narbonne's suspicions with an affectation of injured innocence. "I hope that the Emperor Napoleon," he wrote on May 1st, "places some confidence in the man who has in great measure brought about the present relations between France and Austria. Is it in the nature of things that this man should in a moment betray his part as guarantor of the work of many years?" Though Metternich refused to be drawn, Narbonne was now convinced of his double-dealing. His warnings at last had their effect upon Napoleon, who informed him that he saw through Austria's duplicity, but believed that one decisive victory would allay all cause for alarm. Yet as a matter of fact it was Napoleon's victories at Lutzen and Bautzen in May which induced Metternich to throw off the mask.

Napoleon's disillusionment was further enhanced by Austria's attitude in the matter of the disarming of Poniatowski's Corps, which had been carried out, as arranged, by the King of Saxony, acting on Metternich's advice. Napoleon, of course, was furious, and forbade Poniatowski to surrender his arms, while Narbonne was ordered to obtain some satisfactory assurance from Metternich regarding Poniatowski's troops and the Austrian Auxiliary Corps, both of which, in Napoleon's eyes, formed part of the French army. Metternich speciously replied that Austria could not in reason fight and act as arbiter at the same time.

Then Narbonne re-opened his batteries of awkward interrogation. Did Austria still consider herself bound by the treaty of March 14th, 1812, or did she not? Metternich amiably put him off with the answer that it was impossible for Austria to fight Russia. Narbonne's next move was to deliver a note requiring Austria either to execute the treaty or deny its existence. He also obtained an interview with Francis. Nothing resulted, save that Metternich agreed that Poniatowski's Corps should not be disarmed while traversing Austrian territory.

So negotiations dragged on and mutual suspicion increased. Napoleon steadfastly refused to allow the armed mediation of Austria, and Metternich welcomed this refusal as affording him an excuse for not throwing Austria's lot in with France.

If anything was required to turn Napoleon's suspicions into certainty, it was provided by the capture at Dresden towards the end of May of a courier carrying dispatches from the Russian Minister at Vienna to the Russian Court, and the seizure by the French of some correspondence between the Austrian Government and the King of Saxony. Abundant evidence was afforded Napoleon of Metternich's double dealing, and letters were disclosed from Metternich to the Allies excusing Austria's delay in actively joining them. Napoleon now saw how he had been duped. Poor Narbonne, who had really carried out a very difficult task with credit, became the scapegoat. "The penetration of M. de Narbonne," said Napoleon afterwards, "was more injurious than serviceable to my interests."

In the meantime, Napoleon determined to make

advances to Russia that he might have a free hand to crush the German powers. Narbonne was ordered not to press Metternich any further, to disavow the treaty of March 14th, 1812, and to enlarge on the strength of the French resources.

Napoleon's overtures to Russia thoroughly alarmed the Emperor Francis and Metternich, mindful of the results of Tilsit. They felt that the time was at hand when Austria must throw in her lot with the Allies ; and the trend of events increased that opinion. Count Bubna, who had been sent by the Austrian Government to re-open negotiations with Napoleon at Dresden, was coldly received, but the production of a letter from Francis enlarging on the marriage tie, which bound the two countries together, induced Napoleon to suggest a Congress at Prague with a view to a Treaty for the preservation of the general peace. Moreover, Bubna carried back with him a letter from Napoleon to Francis, affirming that he entrusted his honour to the safe-keeping of his father-in-law.

The news of the defeat of the Allies at Bautzen and their retreat beyond the Oder induced Metternich, while keeping up Napoleon's delusion as long as possible, definitely to throw in his lot with the Allies, even though the Austrian preparations were not quite complete, and from this time his policy becomes more definite and straightforward.

For some time the presence of Stadion and Gentz in the camp of the Allies had kept Metternich in touch with the views and movements of Russia and Prussia, and now, in order to facilitate communication with the Czar, he persuaded Francis to accompany him to the village of Gitschin in Bohemia, half-way between

Dresden and the Russian headquarters, whither they arrived on June 13th. The ever-inquisitive Narbonne was informed that the move was necessary for the better prosecution of Austria's mediation.

On arriving at Gitschin, Metternich immediately sent to demand an interview with the Duke of Bassano on the pretext that Francis had agreed to Napoleon's proposals for mediation. But Napoleon had already sealed his own fate by signing, on June 4th, the armistice of Pleiswitz, whereby he sacrificed the advantage which he had gained by the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen, and gave a breathing space to the exhausted Allies.

Metternich, learning that Napoleon had not reached Dresden and that consequently he could not hope for an answer to his message, hastened to Opocno, where Alexander had arranged to meet him. Alexander was accompanied by his sister, the Grandduchess Catherine, by Counts Nesselrode and Stadion and by Lebzeltern, who had been employed by Metternich in 1810 to attempt mediation between Napoleon and the Papacy.

The first interview lasted two hours, and at this and subsequent meetings Metternich managed to regain the confidence of Alexander and to convince him of Austria's willingness to co-operate with the Allies. The final result was the Treaty of Reichenbach, signed on June 27th by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, with the object of over-throwing the power of Napoleon. Metternich himself had quitted Opocno seven days before the treaty was actually signed.

At Gitschin, whither he returned, he found awaiting him a letter from the Duke of Bassano pressing him

earnestly to come to Dresden. Metternich accepted the invitation after informing the Allies that he had done so, but, nevertheless, hurried on the Austrian preparations for war.

He reached Dresden on June 24th. Napoleon arrived on the following day. Then took place that famous interview in the Marcolini Palace between the French Emperor and the Austrian Chancellor, the descriptions of which vary according as the narrators are biassed by sentiments of friendship or hostility for Napoleon. To be brief, Napoleon upbraided Metternich with taking advantage of the difficulties of France to forward the aims of Austria, and his conversation consisted of "the oddest mixture of heterogeneous subjects, violent outbursts alternating with friendliness." All the time he was striding up and down the map-room, where the greater part of the interview took place. Metternich remained quite calm and sought with soft words to turn away his wrath. For a time this only increased Napoleon's fury, and in the stress of his emotion his hat rolled on to the floor. Metternich made no attempt to pick it up. Yet at the end of this extraordinary interview, which lasted more than six hours¹—an "unparalleled struggle" Metternich called it—Napoleon accepted the armed mediation of Austria and even embraced the Austrian representative. "Tell your mamma," wrote Metternich to his daughter Marie, "that I have returned from Dresden in a contented frame of mind . . . within a short time we shall have peace or else an appalling war."

¹ So Metternich states in a letter to his daughter Marie, written from Gitschin, July 2nd, 1813.

The next few days, indeed, were perhaps the most critical in the careers of both Napoleon and Metternich. For the latter the situation was extremely delicate. Austrian preparations were not quite complete. Metternich had asked Schwarzenberg whether a prolongation of the armistice would be of advantage to the Allies, and if so, how long a prolongation would be required. Schwarzenberg had replied that in twenty days the army would be increased by 75,000 men, and that, if the armistice were prolonged until then, that would be sufficient. It was, therefore, imperative that some scheme should be conceived whereby Austria should be enabled to strike at the opportune moment, and not a day sooner or later.

For Napoleon the events and the decisions of the next few days meant success or failure. Could he trust Austria? If so, delay might enable him to spare his buffeted hosts further hardships and gain an honourable peace. If not, then delay was fraught with destruction, and could only benefit the Allies.

But the fates were against Napoleon. "I saw the decisive hour drawing near," he said afterwards at St Helena, "my star waned, and I felt the reins slipping from my hands." He determined to trust Austria, and was lost. Metternich was resolved at all hazards to obtain the extension of the armistice for which Schwarzenberg had asked. He gained it by imposing upon Napoleon with an unscrupulous cunning that makes one almost inclined to pity his dupe. On June 30th, just as Metternich was about to leave Dresden, he received a message from Napoleon asking for an interview. He accordingly proceeded to the French headquarters. He noticed that the

French Marshals standing outside showed painful anxiety as to the result of the forthcoming interview. Berthier was especially concerned. It is evident that Napoleon wished to put Metternich to the test. He conducted him to his private room, and dismissing everyone except Bassano asked Metternich to name the conditions under which Austria would consent to mediate. Metternich enumerated four conditions. Napoleon must accept the armed mediation of Austria ; the plenipotentiaries of the Peace Congress were to meet at Prague on July 10th ; the last day of the negotiations should be fixed as August 10th, and until that date all hostilities must cease. It will be noticed that Metternich had in these terms provided for the extension of the Armistice for exactly those twenty days which Schwarzenberg had demanded.

To Metternich's great amazement and equal satisfaction, Napoleon then and there accepted the proffered terms. "Never surely," wrote the Austrian Chancellor, "was so great a business settled in so short a time." Moreover, so genuinely desirous of peace was Napoleon that he even allowed provisions to be conveyed from Austria for the use of the Allied armies during the Armistice. Metternich guaranteed the prolongation on behalf of the Allied Monarchs. He also wrote to Francis to make sure that the Austrian Government would fight if their minimum conditions were refused by Napoleon ; he received a satisfactory answer.

The net was now almost closed around Napoleon. It only remained to ensure the failure of the Congress of Prague. Delays occurred almost without premeditation. There were misunderstandings among

the allied Generals as to the date of the resumption of hostilities ; there were corresponding delays on the French side, and Napoleon, to use Metternich's phrase, struggled against all attempts at negotiation " like a devil in a vessel of holy water." ¹ When the meeting actually took place, Metternich objected to the presence of the Duke of Vicenza, first French plenipotentiary, because his credentials had not arrived. While the Congress, and with it the destinies of Europe, waited upon the arrival of these missing credentials, Metternich put the finishing touches to his preparations. He even made out passports for M. de Narbonne, and completed the Emperor Francis' War Manifesto. The 10th of August came, but not so the credentials of the Duke of Vicenza. The dramatic moment had arrived. At midnight Metternich caused the beacons to be kindled which announced to all the world that Austria had declared war. The period of dissimulation, of vacillating, of preparation, was over. The fate of Napoleon was sealed.

¹ Letter from Metternich to Stadion, Brandeis, July 25th, 1813.

CHAPTER VII

THE FALL OF NAPOLEON

Metternich issues a Manifesto in the name of the Emperor Francis, justifying the conduct of Austria—Having once thrown in his lot with the Allies, Metternich pursues a vigorous policy—Delays caused by jealousies in the Allied Camp and by friction between the Czar and Metternich—Metternich's reflections on the motives respectively inspiring the troops of the Allied Powers—Negotiations are opened with Napoleon at Langres and continued at Châtillon—Their effect is merely to give the French armies a respite—The Allies advance on Paris—The Emperor Francis and Metternich remain at Dijon—Reasons which probably induced Metternich to absent himself from Paris when Napoleon's future was being discussed—Metternich reaches Paris in time to witness the entry of Louis XVIII.—And subsequently visits England with the Czar and the King of Prussia—Preparations for the Congress of Vienna—Magnificence of the festivities during the Congress—Which did not prevent the transaction of valuable work by a band of capable statesmen—Metternich's able subordinates—The problems confronting the Congress—Danger that the Polish and Saxon questions would lead to complications—Tendency of the Powers to split into two antagonistic groups—In Italy Metternich secures all the requirements of Austria—And in Germany takes care that Liberal aspirations are disappointed—The escape of Napoleon from Elba falls like a bombshell on the Congress—And causes a hurried settlement of outstanding questions—Napoleon endeavours to sow dissension among the Allies—After the Battle of Waterloo, Metternich travels to Paris to assist in deciding upon the fate of Napoleon and France—The sovereigns shower upon him rewards in appreciation of his services to the Allies.

THE tortuous and shift policy pursued by Metternich between 1809 and 1814 is reflected in the Manifesto inspired by him and issued in the name of Francis simultaneously with Austria's declaration of war. It asserted that Austria felt herself compelled

to fight for self-preservation and for the maintenance of the social system. She had no selfish aims. In spite of the severe blows dealt her by France in 1809 she had made peace with Napoleon, hoping to exert upon him a beneficial influence. But this hope was shattered by Napoleon's designs on Russia, and the Manifesto proceeded to offer a sort of apology for the part which Austria had played during the Russian war. Her object had been to instil Napoleon with peaceful inclinations by inaugurating a confederacy in Germany, which might form a nucleus of resistance to the overweening power of France. It is obvious that Metternich found it difficult to attribute to a lofty regard for the public good a policy which was essentially opportunist. The policy itself was more successful than Metternich's attempts to justify it.

Whatever may be said of Metternich's policy before the Treaty of Reichenbach, now that he had put his hand to the plough there was no turning back. Austria was henceforth bent on breaking Napoleon's power. When the news came of the French defeats at Grossbeeren, Katzbach, and Kulm, Metternich wrote to Hudelist (August 31st, 1813): "Now things are looking up since we have scored three victories against Napoleon, the results of which cannot be ultimately measured"; and from this time Metternich broke off his secret negotiations with Napoleon. He expressed his joy at Napoleon's retreat to Leipsic to his daughter Marie in these words: "All proves that the hour has struck and that my mission, which is to put an end to so much evil, is supported by the decrees of Providence. I am certain that Napoleon thinks of me continually. I must seem to him a sort of

conscience personified. I predicted everything to him at Dresden. He would not believe a word of it, and the Latin proverb 'Quos deus vult perdere dementat prius,' is again proved true" (October 1st, 1813, from Teplitz). Napoleon's disastrous defeat at Leipsic he regarded as a justification of his policy in the eyes of that party at Vienna which had always been opposed to Austria's participation in the struggle, and he wrote to Hudelist (October 8th), "Now everything declares for the war, for myself, and for Schwarzenberg."

It is, therefore, quite unjust to accuse Metternich of lukewarmness in regard to the expulsion of Napoleon from Germany. On the other hand, it is certain that neither he nor the Emperor Francis, who was anxious for the future of his daughter Marie Louise, wished to oust Napoleon altogether from the throne of France. Let Napoleon remain, so long as his wings were clipped, and Europe secured against further molestation from France.¹ Consequently Metternich was continually advising Napoleon to come to terms during the whole of the latter part of the campaign and always showed himself willing to negotiate. He was anxious to show that Austria would save her Emperor's son-in-law if he would be saved, and that if Austria could bring Napoleon to reason France need not even suffer invasion. This was the sense in which Metternich, on December 1st, issued a Declaration of the Powers to the French people, assuring them that the Allies were attacking not France but Napoleon—"the hardest bit of work I ever did in my life," he told Hudelist.

¹ Edward de Wertheimer, "Duc de Reichstadt," p. 71.

These views were not relished by the Czar, nor, whatever Frederick William himself might secretly think, by the advisers of the King of Prussia. Indeed, throughout the whole of the campaign which began at the conclusion of the Congress of Prague and ended with the Peace of Paris, there was constant bickering amongst the Allies. The diplomatists were jealous of each other; the Generals quarrelled—at Frankfurt Metternich had to act as peacemaker between Blücher and Schwarzenberg—and, worst of all, the personal dislike of Alexander for Metternich, who, on his side feared Russian designs in Poland, was a constant thorn in the side of the Allies and of Castlereagh especially, who was continually acting as mediator between them. Castlereagh, on the whole, supported Metternich, who gratefully dubbed him an “upright and enlightened” man.

Friction with Alexander began almost coincidently with the campaign. The Czar wished to place Moreau, who had just returned from America, in supreme command of the Allies. Metternich had an interview with Alexander at Altenburg, when he threatened that if Moreau were placed in command Austria would leave the Alliance. Two days afterwards Moreau was mortally wounded while standing beside Alexander, who, turning to Metternich, observed “God has uttered His judgment; He was of your opinion.”

The success of the Allies only produced more bickering. The Czar supported the candidature of Stein for the post of administrator of the newly won German provinces. Metternich opposed the selection. When Napoleon was driven across the

Rhine Metternich wished to negotiate. Alexander urged a vigorous offensive.

Even when the invasion of France had been decided upon, Alexander continued to be troublesome. Schwarzenberg was anxious that the Allies should traverse Switzerland, thus violating its neutrality. It would save valuable time, and the Swiss were quite amenable to the course. But Alexander's conscience would not permit him at first to acquiesce in such a plan, and it was only after considerable trouble that Metternich was able to persuade him that Schwarzenberg's advice should be followed. Another whim of Alexander's delayed the passage over the Rhine by a few days, for the Czar was anxious that his guards should cross the river on the Greek New Year's Day. Nor, as will be seen, did the Czar's misunderstandings with Austria end here.

The lamentable disunion of the Allies palsied the action of their troops, and since the diplomatists practically controlled the strategy, keen spirits, like Blücher, as well as the cautious Schwarzenberg, whose one aim seemed to be to avoid coming to close grips with Napoleon, were debarred from energetic action. In fact, no campaign in History provides so pitiable an example of the impossibility of conducting a war through a "Debating Society." The misfortunes of his marshals, which made Napoleon exclaim, "If I am not there everything goes wrong," were counterbalanced by the lack of initiative displayed by the Allies.

As soon as the invasion of France had been agreed upon, it was decided, as a precautionary measure, to summon the King of Saxony, a partizan of Napoleon,

to Berlin, and Metternich was sent to interview him in the name of the three Allied monarchs. While Metternich was awaiting the arrival of the King, the Queen of Saxony entered the room and to his great embarrassment began passionately to upbraid him for deserting Napoleon. Metternich parried the outburst by quietly observing that his errand was not for the purpose of discussing with her such knotty questions of policy.

Immediately afterwards the Austrian Chancellor joined the Allied monarchs and with them followed in the train of the Army of Invasion until the conclusion of the campaign.

The long pause of the Allied forces after the battle of Leipsic and the failure to pursue Napoleon's shattered forces was due to the desire of the diplomatic bees to renew their buzzing. The peace-party in Austria thought enough had been done. Austrian arms had triumphed in Italy; Napoleon was beyond the Rhine; why should Austria continue to expend men and money? When at length the forward policy prevailed military interests continued to be sacrificed to political, and Langres, Châtillon, and Troyes were successively the scene of negotiations with Napoleon, which, in one instance at least, seriously jeopardized the position of the Allied forces.

It is interesting to notice Metternich's impression of the motives actuating the nations and armies taking part in this great uprising against their erstwhile master. The Prussians were by far the most eager for the overthrow of Napoleon. They burned to revenge a long succession of insults and enormities. Their army was composed to a great extent of essenti-

ally national elements, of "students and professors literati and poets," instigated by the Tugendbund,¹ "of many battalions of fanatic volunteers" who thirsted for a war of extermination. Metternich bitterly reflects that under this cloak of Prussian patriotism Stein and Gneisenau were even now introducing that revolutionary bacillus into the councils of Alexander, which was destined before long to infect the public opinion of every State in Europe. The Russians were elated at their successful display against Napoleon in 1812, "a feeling," remarks Metternich, "which, with the Russians, easily degenerates into swagger." They were quite content to rest on their laurels and had no desire to carry the war into France, especially now that on their border Poland lay a tempting and defenceless morsel. Alexander himself, dominated by the views of La Harpe, Jomini, and Stein, sought only to be the arbiter of Europe. Of the Austrians Metternich patriotically observes that, although eager enough to take vengeance on the French, they were disciplined and were content to await their orders.

Metternich was present with the sovereigns when the Allies crossed the Rhine at Basle on January 25th, 1814, and accompanied them to Langres, "the crowning point of the Vosges mountains, where they overlook the plains of France and the heights of the Ardennes."

At Langres the demands of diplomacy again retarded the chariot of Bellona. Metternich, supported by the Emperor Francis, had already resumed secret com-

¹ A patriotic secret society organized in Prussia for the purpose of cultivating the manly virtues, with a view to the liberation of Germany from Napoleon's domination.

munications with Napoleon. It is impossible to say whether he really expected that Napoleon would come to terms or whether he merely wished to keep up the appearance that Francis was doing everything in his power to avoid humiliating his son-in-law. At any rate, while Metternich was at Frankfurt settling a dispute between Schwarzenberg and Blücher, he had two interviews with a French envoy. The terms which the Austrian Chancellor suggested to Napoleon were that France should resume her boundaries of 1797, that is, retire behind the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. To this reasonable offer, which would have allowed France to retain Savoy, Nice, Belgium, and the left bank of the Rhine, Napoleon returned an evasive answer. A fortnight later, when it was too late, he accepted them. So ended Metternich's first attempt to save the husband of Marie Louise.

At Langres the arrival of Caulaincourt with pleni-potentiary powers from Napoleon to accept the terms proposed by Metternich at Frankfurt put a stop to all military operations, while diplomacy pursued its intricate course. Metternich wished to accept, the Czar refused to discuss Caulaincourt's terms. Eventually Castlereagh won over the Austrian diplomatists to the Czar's view that France ought to be confined to the boundaries of 1792, and surrender Nice, Savoy, Belgium, and the left bank of the Rhine. It was accordingly arranged that a Congress should be held at Châtillon to discuss peace on this basis. Even now Castlereagh had hard work to prevent a fresh quarrel between the Czar and Metternich as to the question of who should succeed Napoleon in the event of the Allies' success. Alexander wished the French people

to choose their own ruler. Metternich feared that this would by no means ensure the return of the Bourbons. That matter also was referred to the Congress of Châtillon.

When the Congress opened on February 5th, Caulaincourt still had *carte blanche* to accept the Frankfurt terms. Metternich, apparently eager for peace himself, only prevailed on the Czar not to break off negotiations by threatening to recall the Austrian troops. Terms were offered to Napoleon on the basis that France should retain the boundaries of 1792, but the French Emperor, believing that his recent victories betokened a turn of fortune, characteristically broke off negotiations. The Congress of Châtillon had merely given him a respite of more than six weeks. Metternich, as a matter of fact, had not been present during the greater part of the Congress, but had been discussing at Troyes the question of a successor to Napoleon. Too late, as usual, Napoleon at the last moment offered to resign in favour of a Regency representing his son, the little King of Rome. Metternich's comment on hearing of this offer was, "We are no longer masters of our actions to-day."¹ In truth, matters were at last definitely in the hands of the generals, and the capture of Paris was only a matter of time.

After the Congress of Châtillon, Metternich accompanied Francis to Dijon in the wake of the Allied troops. They arrived at four o'clock in the morning, without an escort, in two postchaises, to the obvious surprise of the inhabitants, who, however, lost no time in setting on foot Royalist demonstrations.

¹ Arneth, "Johann, Freiherr von Wessenberg," vol. i. p. 188.

Incidentally, the party only by the merest chance escaped capture when Napoleon played his last desperate move of trying to draw the Allies away from Paris by a feint at their communications.

At Dijon Francis and Metternich remained for nearly three weeks. Their reason for doing so is somewhat of a mystery. Although they must have foreseen that great events were bound to happen within a few days, they remained at Dijon long after the capture of Paris and were absent during the critical negotiations which followed. Both Metternich and his master knew that the Czar wished, in opposition to their views, to dethrone Napoleon and restore the Bourbons; yet they left the field clear for him, and it was Alexander who decided, on his own responsibility, who should succeed Napoleon and what should be done with him. If Metternich's views had coincided with those of Alexander, there would be less reason for astonishment. But Metternich professed to be furious at Alexander's solution of the problem. The Declaration of March 31st, which Alexander signed on behalf of his brother sovereign, asserted that the Allies were no longer treating with Napoleon but would recognize and protect the constitution which the French people should choose for themselves. Metternich described Alexander's effort as a "miserable performance." The word "constitution" especially displeased him, and he told Hudelist that the Declaration "would never have been couched in these terms if I had been at hand." Certainly Alexander's action was characteristically impulsive. Schwarzenberg had refused to take the responsibility of signing for Austria, and

Nesselrode went so far as to apologize to Metternich for the necessity undergone by his master of acting without waiting for the approval of Francis. But why was Metternich at Dijon and not at Paris, and why was Alexander placed in a position of sole responsibility? Certain explanation there is none, but it has been ingeniously suggested that Metternich wished to thrust all the responsibility of dethroning Napoleon and substituting someone for him upon the Czar and deliberately delayed coming to Paris. The decision to relegate Napoleon to Elba was also arrived at in Metternich's absence, though Francis signified his assent, and in his Memoirs the Chancellor protests that he was always opposed to Elba as a place of banishment, and even at that date had thought of St Helena. Yet at the time it is certain he made no protest.¹

The result of Metternich's policy, at any rate, was not to enhance Austrian prestige. The world saw in the Czar Alexander the moving spirit of the Allies, and the protector of Constitutional government. Happily this impression did not last. The fruits resulting from the accomplishment of that great object—the overthrow of Napoleon—for which Metternich had worked so long, and to which he had in his cautious cunning and unheroic way contributed so largely, were not garnered by the avenger of gutted Moscow. For a time the glamour of Alexander's personality seemed to give Russia the primacy in Europe. But the system which prevailed in Europe for a quarter of a century after the downfall of Napoleon has gone down to posterity as Metternich's and not Alexander's.

¹ Edward de Wertheimer, "Duke of Reichstadt," pp. 95-98.

Metternich remained at Dijon until the 10th of April. According to his own account, he had been on the point of starting for Paris when the news of its capitulation arrived, whereupon, feeling that there was no need for him there—a most remarkable conclusion to arrive at—he decided to remain at Dijon. A deputation waited on him to ask if the inhabitants of Dijon might hoist the Royalist colours. Francis at once assented, and Metternich describes in a letter, dated April 4th, to his daughter Marie the rejoicing that ensued. “We are in the midst of cries of ‘Vive le Roi!’ The public seems possessed. More than 2000 cockades have been sold in one day. The milliners and dressmakers do nothing else. All the street urchins have bits of white paper in their hats and caps.”

Metternich was present at the entry of Louis XVIII. into Paris. He watched the procession with Schwarzenberg from a window in the Rue Montmartre, and was struck by the ambiguous attitude of the crowd towards the restored dynasty, varying from sullen silence to enthusiastic cries of “Vive le roi!” The gloomy countenances of the Imperial Guard which preceded and followed the Royal carriage were not in keeping with the King’s air of studied affability. Louis seemed far too eager in responding by salutes to feelings so evidently mixed. Metternich called on Louis afterwards and had a conversation with him, lasting two hours, in the very same room where he had so often conversed with Napoleon. “Napoleon was a very good tenant,” airily remarked Louis, “he made everything most comfortable; he arranged everything excellently for me.” On the whole,

Metternich was not much impressed with the French monarch, and found that their views on politics were quite divergent.

After the signature of the Peace of Paris, Metternich visited England with the Czar and the King of Prussia to convey the Emperor Francis' excuses for his inability to attend. It was twenty years since he had last set foot on English soil. The royal visitors spent a night at Oxford, where the Czar, the King of Prussia, the Duke of Wellington, Blücher, and Metternich all received a Doctor's degree, the only mark of esteem which the Chancellor ever received from Great Britain. A banquet was given in their honour in the hall of Christ Church, at which most of the celebrities of the day were present.

If Metternich's reception in England had lacked enthusiasm the Viennese made up for it, for he was received on his arrival with a torchlight procession and with every demonstration of popular enthusiasm. His wife and children, together with the Duchess of Sagan, were residing at Baden. Thither Metternich went to join them, and to spend the period which must elapse before the opening of the Congress of Vienna in social relaxation as an antidote to his recent exertions.

Now that Napoleon had to all appearance been relegated to the parochial politics of an insignificant islet, the conquerors proceeded to divide the spoil. It had been Metternich's suggestion that all specifically French concerns should be settled in Paris, and that those affecting the balance of power in Europe should be settled at a Congress at Vienna.

Accordingly it was arranged that the sovereigns

and ministers of the States of Europe should meet at Vienna in August. As a matter of fact, the Congress did not actually commence its sittings until the latter half of September.

Metternich indignantly repudiates the well-known saying of the Prince de Ligne, "Le Congrès danse mais ne marche pas." Dances were, he admits, given by the Imperial Court for the benefit of the crowned heads and their retinues and for the crowds of sightseers who had flocked to Vienna. But the diplomatists, he protests, did not spend their time in dancing. The populace had looked forward to a spectacle; and they were disappointed. The Congress met in an unpretentious room and its proceedings were informal and businesslike.

In a sense the Prince de Ligne and Metternich were both wrong and both correct. To the outside world the Congress was one vast spectacle to delight the masses and to amuse the vast concourse of foreign and German guests who attended it. No such gathering of Emperors, Kings, Princes, and notabilities had ever dazzled a European capital before. Princes, diplomatists, the rich bankers of Vienna, and great ladies vied with each other in magnificent hospitality, and a mere list of the amusements and pageants provided by the Austrian Court on practically each day of the five months during which the Conference lasted renders credible the assertion that, with sublime disregard for his Empire's financial chaos, Francis spent no less than 30,000,000 florins on his guests.

Large bodies of troops were brought to Vienna that the sovereigns might indulge such military ardour as was unquenched by Leipzig and Dresden in

drilling regiments or witnessing manœuvres ; an elaborate representation of a mediæval tourney, with the most lovely ladies in Europe as Queens of Beauty, was successfully produced, and since on the day appointed the Czar was indisposed a second and identical performance took place on his recovery for his special delectation. There were monster concerts, grand routs, masked balls, theatricals, tableaux vivants, heron-hawking, battues of thousands of driven game of every description, popular fêtes in the Augarten, and the daily promenade in the Prater, when the British Ambassador, Lord Stewart, was distinguished above all for the splendour of his equipage. Lest these pastimes should pall, sleighing parties were arranged to Schönbrunn, a gorgeous religious ceremony took place in honour of the anniversary of Louis XVI.'s execution, and Sir Sidney Smith, the hero of Acre, in a vein of humour or frugality invited sovereigns and diplomatists alike to a picnic dinner in the Augarten, when each guest paid for his own repast.

The sovereigns were lavish of charity, and loaded each other with gifts varying from jewellery to colonelcies of regiments. Everything was gay and attractive, from the uniforms which enlivened the streets to the wit of the famous Prince de Ligne, which delighted the salons ; and Lawrence and Isabey, the great painters, were there to portray the celebrities. All this was thoroughly to the taste of Metternich, whose sobriquet of "*Le Ministre papillon*" was no libel. Though capable of hard work, he loved to intersperse it with play. Always a lady-killer, and always ready to gain a political end

by female intrigue, he found himself at the Congress of Vienna surrounded by all the great ladies, like the Princess Bagration, the Duchess of Sagan, and the Countess Zichy, whose acquaintance he had made in the various capitals of Europe. Like Talleyrand, he could and did carry on politics to a large extent through the salon, and under a frivolous exterior worked out serious political problems. The entertainments which he gave during the Congress were distinguished for lavishness, grandeur, and perfection in the minutest detail. At the end of January, he gave a ball at his country place near Vienna, for which a magnificent ball-room was specially constructed in the garden, surrounded by stands for spectators. At all the Chancellor's entertainments, as well as at all Court gaieties, the Princess Marie Metternich¹ was a prominent figure.

But if the Prince de Ligne's sarcasm at the expense of the Congress is not without truth, Metternich was justified, nevertheless, in claiming that it achieved a vast amount of work. This is not the place to dilate on how the Congress performed its gigantic task of settling the boundaries of the States of Europe and devising such measures as were possible to secure their permanency. That is part of the history of Europe. Here we need only sketch the main course of Metternich's policy as shown in Austria's attitude to the most important problems before the Congress.

The fact was that while the Czar was the cynosure of all eyes as in the Polonaise he headed the long string of couples in their devious course through the

¹ Metternich's favourite daughter, who married Count Joseph Esterhazy, and died young.

corridors of the Hofburg, or flirted in public with some Court beauty or charmer of more humble origin, and sometimes even condescended to give his advice on some knotty question that had arisen; while the King of Prussia sought to drown in pleasure the memory of his dead wife; and Francis gave all his thoughts to the task of playing host, the real work of the Congress was accomplished by a limited body of trained and able statesmen. In virtue of the position of Austria in Europe, the fact that Vienna was the meeting place of the Congress, and of his own merits, Metternich was elected President. If it can be said that any one statesman or personality was super-eminent at the Congress, it was he, and undoubtedly his influence was felt in every transaction and his opinion would often turn the scale in an argument.

But what the Chancellor really deserves credit for is the manner in which he chose his instruments. Austria was never better served than by the body of men who represented her interests at the Congress of Vienna; and Metternich selected them. Though, doubtless, a great deal of business was accomplished and a great many disputes and knotty points settled at friendly meetings, the spade work of the Congress was accomplished at the Meetings of the various small Committees, such as the German Committee, or the Committee on the Navigation of Rivers, into which for practical purposes the Congress as a whole was split up.

Metternich's right hand was Gentz, the Secretary of the Congress. Readers of Rostand's "L'Aiglon" will recall the characteristics of this curious man,



Photo. Levy

GENTZ

FROM THE PAINTING BY SIR THOMAS LAWRENCE



which are there quite justly portrayed—an intense love of money and luxury and a veritable passion for sweets. “If you want to make him foolishly fond,” wrote Metternich in later years to his son Victor, “send him some bonbons or a new perfume.” Gentz was also full of queer fads: he once objected to the shape of a lamp, because it was Gothic in design and “the Goths are dead.” However, Metternich “promised to indemnify him with chocolate . . . he would give the Cathedral of Strasburg for a good piece of chocolate.” Gentz was a witty and amusing companion. Metternich had first employed him at the Congress of Prague, but had not really taken him into his confidence until early in 1814, when Gentz had come to live in Vienna. Henceforth he became the Chancellor’s closest confidante. In later years there were some tiffs and a divergence in some matters of policy, not softened by Gentz’s habit of telling people that it was he and not Metternich who did all the work of the Chancery. Still, on the whole, they remained firm friends, and Gentz was a great favourite with Metternich’s third wife, Princess Melanie, who in her Diary mentions her delight at listening to the witty conversations of Gentz and her husband, and her annoyance because the former, when ill, refused to take her prescriptions. Although Metternich used to laugh at Gentz’s eccentricities, and towards the end of his own life was inclined to belittle his political insight, he was overcome with grief when in 1832 his old friend died after a painful illness. At the Congress of Vienna, at any rate, Metternich boasted that Gentz “knew everything,” and certainly the lucid and statesmanlike documents in which Gentz

from time to time announced the aims of the Powers to Europe showed a genius which entirely belied his quaint and foppish exterior.

Other representatives of Austria were Baron John von Wessenberg, second Austrian plenipotentiary, whose activity earned him the sobriquet of the "working bee," Baron Binder, who later on, in the forties, wrote a biography of Metternich, Count Radetzky, military adviser, Pilat, who voiced Metternich's views as editor of the "Austrian Observer," and State-Councillor Hudelist, a man much in the confidence of the Chancellor. It was this group of able diplomatists and professional men who, in concert with the representatives of other States, performed in numerous small but busy Committees the permanent work of the Congress.

Throughout the duration of the Congress, the Czar continued to evince the greatest dislike for Metternich, who, thanks to the unswerving support of Francis, was usually able to hold his own.

Indeed the importance of the problems before the Congress rendered harmony indispensable, though at first it appeared unlikely that it would be obtained. For everybody apparently wanted everything. Russia demanded the whole of Poland, Prussia Saxony, Sweden wished to exchange Denmark for Norway, while Austria claimed from Bavaria the cession of Tyrol and the Voralberg, and was resolved to maintain her conquests and recover her lost possessions in Poland and Italy. For even at this period Metternich regarded Italy as a "geographical expression."

There is little doubt that Metternich's tactful handling of the Polish and Saxon questions contri-

buted greatly to the success of the Congress. True, he resisted the absorption of Poland by Russia, and sought to secure the aid of Prussia in confining Russia to the boundary of the Vistula. Hereupon Alexander announced that Metternich had offered Russia concessions in Poland on condition that Russia would assist in keeping Prussia out of Saxony. Metternich denied the assertion, and tried to stir up discord between Russia and Prussia with the result that the Czar went to Francis and vowed he would have nothing more to do with such a Minister as Metternich.¹ Nor did he in future attend the soirées of the Chancellor. This is typical of the intrigues which attended almost every stage of the Congress. Also, Metternich, from at first supporting, to a certain extent, the claims of Prussia, gradually veered round to the view that the Saxons ought to retain their identity as a nation.² In this view he was supported by Talleyrand, but failed to obtain the French statesman's admission to the discussion. The Powers tended more and more to group themselves into two opposing sections, Russia and Prussia against Austria, England, and France, and in January 1815 a secret alliance was actually concluded between the three latter Powers. Though Castlereagh did his best to keep Metternich in the paths of conciliation, it is not impossible that a European war would have broken out had not Napoleon escaped from Elba, and thus necessitated a hurried burial of differences. His first remark on landing upon French soil, "Le Congrès est dissous," proved, as it turned out, a falsehood.

¹ "Cambridge Modern History," vol. ix. p. 596.

² Schmidt Wessenfels, "Fürst Metternich," vol. i. p. 184.

In regard to Italy, Austria merely aimed at the complete restoration of her possessions. Thanks to Metternich's firm policy, she succeeded. He insisted that the affairs of each Italian state in turn should be consulted, and refused to allow a Committee to be appointed for the regulation of affairs in Italy in general. He also insisted on the retention of Piacenza for Austria, which implied that the Empress Marie Louise had to give up her own and her son's possessions in Italy in exchange for some German lands, a bargain which the Emperor Francis sanctioned, in spite of the scant courtesy shown to his daughter. The Spanish Plenipotentiaries to the Congress vigorously pressed the claims of the Bourbon, Charles Louis Prince of Parma, to Tuscany. But Metternich turned a deaf ear to their representations, and with two exceptions Austria gained complete control of Northern Italy. Metternich, however, failed to prevent the Pope from receiving back the Legation, and made the capital error, fruitful of future complications, of guaranteeing to Prince Murat the throne of Naples.

In regard to Italy, Metternich has been credited with the interesting project of making the King of Bavaria King of Lombardy, with capital at Milan, and compensating Austria with Bavaria. This would have accomplished the dream of Austrian statesmen in the eighteenth century of a great South-German state under Austrian rule. Although the King of Bavaria himself was favourable to the project, his Minister, Count Wrede, persuaded Metternich, through the influence of the Duchess of Sagan, to abandon the scheme.¹

¹ Schmidt Wessenfels, "Fürst Metternich," vol. i. pp. 189-190.

In regard to German affairs, it was obvious from the first that the high hopes of Liberals like Stein and Görres, who aspired to a united Germany under a single Constitution, were doomed to disappointment. The Great Powers, including Austria and Prussia, showed themselves bent on settling the destinies of Germany, as they were settling those of other countries, by means of the Congress. It was, indeed, arranged that the Committee which was to discuss German questions should consist only of German Ministers, but it was obvious from the first that Austria and Prussia, not to speak of the other Powers, had never contemplated aught but a loose Federal Constitution for Germany, and in this sense Wessenberg drew up a draft scheme at the end of 1813, which formed the basis of the arrangement ultimately adopted. The only interest which Austria and Prussia took in the proceedings seemed inspired by the fear of the one that the other would secure a preponderance in Germany under the new arrangement, and such progress as was made was due almost entirely to the efforts of the representatives of the smaller States.

In fact, when the news of Napoleon's escape from Elba arrived the settlement of Germany was not much more advanced than the majority of the other problems which were in process of solution by the Congress.

This startling event happened just when matters, especially in regard to the Polish and Saxon questions, were looking serious. Points of contention were multiplying every day. Constant friction between the interested Powers, and not least between Metter-

nich and Alexander, seemed on the verge of breaking into a terrible war. Then the blow fell. Napoleon left the regeneration of Elba for the regeneration of France. The Congress had been counting their chickens before they were hatched. On the night of March 6th, a conference between the plenipotentiaries of the five Powers had taken place in Metternich's house ; it had lasted until three o'clock in the morning. Metternich, worn out with a long and busy day, left orders with his servant that he was not to be awakened even if a courier should arrive in the course of the night.

Yet at six o'clock on the morning of the seventh the man woke him and handed him a despatch from the French Consul-General at Genoa sent by courier and marked " Urgent." Metternich, who had enjoyed but two hours' rest, laid the despatch unopened upon the nearest table and turned round with the intention of going to sleep again. But sleep he could not, and at half-past seven he opened the despatch. Its contents would have awakened the Fat Boy in Pickwick. " The English Commissary Campbell has just appeared in the harbour to inquire whether Napoleon has been seen in Genoa, as he has disappeared from the island of Elba ; the question being answered in the negative, the English ship has again put out to sea."

Metternich, who had always been doubtful of the security of Elba as a prison for Napoleon, took the news calmly, but acted promptly. By nine o'clock he had called upon all the Allied sovereigns and obtained their consent to immediate action, and by ten o'clock adjutants were already on their way to

order the troops to return to the positions they had occupied at the time of the Treaty of Paris.


Such at least is Metternich's version. Its truth is not less doubtful than that of other statements contained in his Memoirs. At any rate the news of the actual landing in France arrived on March 7th. Accounts differ as to whether it came during a Court concert or a ball given by Metternich, and Pertz states that Wellington was the first to receive it.¹ Also, it is open to doubt whether the sovereigns and diplomatists took the news quite so calmly as Metternich asserts or acted with such rapidity. At any rate their Proclamation to Europe was not drawn up until March 13th.²

It is an interesting fact that Metternich, convinced that Napoleon would sooner or later escape from Elba, had written to Fouché, now Duke of Otranto, to inquire what he thought would happen if Napoleon suddenly returned to France or if the King of Rome appeared on the frontiers; also what France would do if matters were left for her to manage entirely by herself. Fouché had replied that the Army would join Napoleon, that France would welcome either Napoleon or the King of Rome, but if left to herself, would choose the Orleans dynasty.

Before the opening of the campaign of the Hundred Days, Napoleon made strenuous efforts to secure the support of Austria or failing that to sow dissension among the Allies. For the latter purpose he found an instrument to hand, for Louis XVIII. had carelessly left upon his writing table in the Tuileries the

¹ Pertz, "Baron von Stein," vol. iv. p. 367.

² Edward de Wertheimer, "Duke of Reichstadt," p. 147.



draft of that secret treaty which had been drawn up in January between England, France, and Austria, to combat the claims of Russia and Prussia. Napoleon lost no time in sending this document to the Czar, who behaved magnanimously. He sent for Metternich and showing him the document asked him if he recognized it. But before the Chancellor, could compose himself sufficiently to answer, the Czar interrupted him with the assurance that as long as they lived he would never mention the matter again, that they had other things to do, and that the alliance between Austria and Russia must at all costs be drawn closer, after which he threw the paper into the fire. The Czar forgave what he did not forget.

The effect of Napoleon's return upon the labours of the Congress was, that as soon as the necessary measures had been taken for the invasion of France, great efforts were made to conclude them as expeditiously as possible. Some of the assembled diplomats wished to prorogue the Congress until after Napoleon's downfall, and it is chiefly to the credit of Metternich that it was eventually decided to continue the sittings. The necessity for haste engendered a conciliatory spirit amongst the representatives of the Powers which had been wanting before; and although there was little time for elaboration, most of the problems which had hitherto proved stumbling-blocks to a peaceful settlement were, if sometimes in a rough and ready fashion, finally adjusted between the date of the return from Elba and the month of June.

Here it will be sufficient to glance at the solution of those questions chiefly affecting Austria. Poland,

which had proved such a bone of contention in the earlier part of the Congress, was partitioned between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The latter retained her possession of the greater part of Eastern Galicia. In regard to Saxony a compromise was effected whereby a portion of it was handed over to Prussia. The question of granting Marie Louise possessions in Italy was solved by an arrangement which was lauded by Gentz as a masterpiece on Metternich's part, but which was really a shabby attempt to rob the King of Rome of his heritage while appearing to act in the interests of Napoleon's wife and son. She was allowed Parma and Piacenza, but no mention was made of the succession devolving upon the little King of Rome. The settlement of the affairs of Germany was also completed in a few hurried sittings in a manner eminently satisfactory to Metternich, but not at all to the satisfaction of those who longed for a united Germany. The sittings of the German Committee had been suspended for five months in view of the hopelessness of procuring any unanimity amongst the lesser States. After the return of Napoleon, however, a settlement was rapidly arranged under the stimulating vigour of Metternich, on the lines of the Federal Constitution drawn up by Wessenberg quite early in the history of the Congress. The final draft, which was the ninth since the beginning of the Congress, provided that the Germanic Confederation should comprise thirty-eight States with a population of over twenty-nine millions. Austria and Prussia joined it for those only of their provinces which had formerly belonged to the German Empire. It was briefly stated in one of the Articles, subse-

quently embodied in Article XIII. of the Vienna Final Act, that every German State had a right to a constitution, but apart from this there was nothing in the Federal Act which encouraged the hopes of Liberalism. It was, in fact, thoroughly to Metternich's taste. Germany was still to remain a loosely joined conglomeration of States, and all important questions regarding the constitution and working of the Federal Government were postponed for the consideration of the Diet.

The Federal Act was decided upon just in time to be incorporated with the other results of the labours of the Congress in the Final Act, which, in the absence of the sovereigns, was signed by the plenipotentiaries on June 9th.

Metternich watched the course of the final struggle against Napoleon from Heidelberg, and in a description of the battle of Waterloo, written to his daughter Marie, he ascribes the result to "the iron resolution of the English General and the courageous assistance of Field-Marshal Blücher."

Soon after the battle Metternich travelled to Paris, where the Allies were already established, and for the next few months flung himself with his usual zest into all the gaieties of that Parisian society which he knew and loved so well. On one occasion he happened to be dining with Blücher "in the room where I have conversed hours and hours with Napoleon." The blunt Field-Marshal, as they were crossing the gallery of St Cloud, exclaimed, "That man must have been a regular fool to have all this and go running after Moscow."

A period of festive relaxation in Paris was not the

only reward which Metternich received for his strenuous diplomatic efforts against Napoleon and his successful conduct of the Congress of Vienna. The Allies presented him with the old ecclesiastical property of Johannisberg on the Rhine; he received a portion of the Indemnity which was assigned to Austria from France, and the Czar of Russia conferred upon him an annuity of 50,000 francs, increased to 75,000 by his successor Nicholas.¹

To judge from the abnormal capacity for spending money, which the Austrian Chancellor had inherited from his father, these additions to his income cannot have been unwelcome.

¹ Schmidt Wessenfels, "Fürst Metternich," vol. i. p. 195-6.

CHAPTER VIII

THE METTERNICH SYSTEM IN GERMANY

Exhaustion of the Powers—The Czar of Russia institutes the Holy Alliance—Its meaning to contemporary statesmen and its significance in history—Failure of European statesmen to seize the opportunity to conciliate Liberalism—The so-called "Metternich system" was in reality a policy of "Stability"—Metternich endeavours to secure the supremacy of Austria in the Diet by fair means or foul—In combating Liberalism in Germany, he is hampered by the Liberal tendencies of the Czar—He nevertheless overawes the smaller States of Germany in succession—The Prussian King shows leanings towards Liberalism—After his usual Autumn water-cure at Carlsbad, Metternich visits his estates at Königswart and Johannisberg, and also his old home at Coblenz—He accompanies the Emperor Francis to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. The journey down the Rhine resembles a progress of the old Holy Roman Emperors and enhances Austrian prestige—The Congress proves a triumph for Metternich's policy—The Czar is converted from Liberalism—On the conclusion of the Congress, Metternich accompanies the Emperor Francis to Italy—He is recalled by the news of Kotzebue's murder—A meeting is arranged to take place at Teplitz between the Czar, the Emperor Francis, and the King of Prussia, to discuss what means should be taken to control Liberalism—As a result, a Conference of German ministers assembles at Carlsbad—In spite of opposition from the smaller States, Metternich secures the passing of the Carlsbad Decree—After a visit to Königswart Metternich makes Vienna his headquarters—Domestic bereavements—Effect of the Carlsbad Decrees upon Liberalism in Germany


THE termination of the death-struggle with Napoleon found all Europe ready for peace. Austria, especially, exhausted and nearly bankrupt, needed repose, and it was this, rather than a spirit of self-abnegation, which had forced Metternich, in

the words of Gentz, to substitute Europe for Austria in his policy during the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Chaumont. Prussia was in a similar state of exhaustion. Russia alone emerged from the war capable of dominating the councils of Europe.

It was then from the eccentric ruler of Russia that the idea of the Holy Alliance originated. During the negotiations for the second Peace of Paris the Czar requested Metternich to procure for him a private interview with Francis for the purpose of discussing "a great undertaking" which he contemplated. In the course of this interview Alexander, explained his scheme for a Holy Alliance between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, and handed to Francis a document containing his views. This document Francis showed to Metternich. Metternich, at this period, regarded Alexander as "a madman to be humoured";¹ he advised assent to the plan with certain modifications, a course which was followed by the King of Prussia, a sincere admirer of the Czar. To Metternich was assigned the awkward task of suggesting the modifications to Alexander, who, with considerable difficulty, was induced to accept them.

Thus it came about that on September 26th, 1815, on the occasion of a review on the plain of Vertus, the Holy Alliance was solemnly proclaimed. Its aims were noble. The three Sovereigns agreed to conduct the domestic and foreign affairs of their kingdoms according to Christian principles, and to render mutual assistance for the protection of religious peace and justice. They were to regard themselves as delegated by Providence to govern three branches

¹ Alison Phillips, "Modern Europe," 4th Edition, p. 17.



of the Christian nation, and might admit any other Powers who announced their adherence to these principles. Undoubtedly the Czar and the King of Prussia carried out these aspirations to the best of their ability; undoubtedly the Holy Alliance had a lasting influence on European politics. It made Congresses the fashion, and thus sowed the seed of the modern idea of the European concert. Moreover, on its less practical side, the Holy Alliance has produced to a large extent that sentiment of the universal brotherhood of nations, which, illustrated in such concrete measures as the Geneva Convention, and the institution of the Hague Tribunal, has gone far to educate humanity in the advantages of the maintenance of peace.

Unfortunately, its original author was almost the only individual connected with the institution of the Holy Alliance who either thoroughly believed in it or knew what it was intended to achieve. Perhaps no political venture of lofty purpose has received so many uncomplimentary epithets from the very men who were presumably its principal supporters. Metternich spoke of it as "verbiage" and "a loud sounding nothing"; to him it was merely a philanthropic aspiration clothed in a religious garb, which supplied no material for a treaty between the monarchs. Castlereagh dubbed it "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." But apart from ridiculing the whole idea, few statesmen trusted Russia's intentions. Metternich, at any rate, thought that Alexander was disguising schemes of aggrandisement "under the language of evangelical self-abnegation," and, in common with others, the Austrian Chancellor pro-

ceeded to use the name of the Holy Alliance to cover the intrigues of Austrian diplomacy.

It is true enough—as Metternich argued—that the Holy Alliance was “not an institution to keep down the rights of the people or promote absolutism or any other tyranny.” “It was only the overflow of the patriotic feeling of the Emperor Alexander, the application of Christian principles to politics.” But the purely negative qualities of the Holy Alliance were its greatest condemnation. Now—at the end of a Titanic struggle, which had called forth all that was best of patriotism and of liberal spirit in the inhabitants of Europe, and which had only ended in success for the Allied monarchs, thanks to the efforts of their subjects—now was the time to reward those efforts with some concessions in the direction of popular representation and the recognition of the existence of nations apart from sovereigns. Very little would at this time have been sufficient—a mere hint that it was recognized by the rulers that popular forces had had some influence in the Liberation of Europe.¹

But that hint was not given, and for forty years the throbbing lava streams of Liberty kept bursting up, now in Germany, now in Italy, now in France, through the worn-out but still resisting crust of an out-of-date European system, until at last they formed those mountains of democratical government which now dominate a world where “benevolent despots” and their régime have almost vanished into oblivion.

¹ Colonel G. B. Malleon, “Metternich,” Foreign Statesmen Series, p. 145.

Alexander himself was favourable to a Liberal policy. The King of Prussia was pledged to popular reform. But Francis — representative of rigid Hapsburg autocracy—was not the man to yield an inch, and Metternich was the mouthpiece of the despotism of the old régime. If only Alexander had been less of a visionary and more of a practical statesman, much might have been done. As it was he gradually became the dupe of Metternich, who slowly but surely procured the predominance of his policy in Europe, and used the Holy Alliance as an opportune cloak for his cynical but astute designs. Metternich's foreign policy may be summed up in a single sentence—the manipulation of the idea of a Concert of the Powers to forward the aims of Austria and secure the maintenance of the old régime.

“The system of the new ruler,” remarks a writer,¹ who portrays Metternich in the light of Napoleon's successor in Europe, “resembled that of Napoleon in its contempt for the rights of men and nations, but it was to be varnished over with an appearance of legality, a seeming respect for the rights of kings and a determination to procure peace and avoid dramatic sensations, which made it welcome to Europe after eighteen years of almost incessant wars.

“The political history of Austria,” it has been said, “from the peace which followed the disaster of Wagram up to the Revolution of 1848, may be summed up in the career of Metternich.”² More than this,

¹ “The Revolutionary Movements of 1848-9 in Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Germany, with some explanation of the previous thirty-three years,” by Edmund Maurice, 1887.

² “A Century of Continental History,” Holland Rose, 3rd Edition, p. 175.

and especially after 1815, the life of Metternich is bound up with the history of Europe. For more than thirty years Vienna was the hub of European diplomacy, while the influence of Metternich was felt in connexion with every political movement: and few periods have been so rich in events, so marked by progress, so difficult intelligibly to portray, as the years between 1815 and 1848.

It is manifestly impossible here to describe in detail the part which Metternich played in meeting the crises, grappling with the problems and mistaking the spirit of that crowded age. Of himself he said, "I have made history, I have not had time to write it." Rather it will be attempted to show the main principles by which Metternich was guided, and to employ the main incidents of his career as illustrations of their working.

What has been called "Metternich's System" was a very simple matter in the mind of its so-called author. Metternich's sole creed may be reduced to the maintenance and aggrandisement of the Austrian Empire and to the preservation of the dignity of the House of Hapsburg. This one principle explains Metternich's attitude towards many questions. It made him the enemy of German unity, because, now that the Holy Roman Empire and the Hapsburg Holy Roman Emperor were no more, German unity meant the disintegration of Austria. It made him, apparently, the enemy of all progress. Yet Metternich would have been the last to admit that he was reactionary. Stability was really his guiding principle, since the very existence of the Austrian Empire depended on the non-shifting of political forces.

*the main
policy
of Austria*

With the example of Napoleon before him, all liberal ideas and movements savoured to him of revolution and the uprooting of old traditions, and because the Hapsburg dynasty essentially depended on tradition Metternich consistently opposed every outburst of Liberalism in Germany and in the Austrian dominions.

And since the force of example was not to be neglected, he sought to extinguish revolution in foreign countries, and developed into a sort of Angel of Absolutism spreading his wings over all Europe. This implies—and it is generally admitted—that he entirely mistook the spirit of the age. He never understood that Liberalism was the winning force, that eighteenth century despotism was a dying fallacy, that the future was with democracy and not with “benevolent despots.” It was a terrible mistake, and the edifice of Austrian supremacy which he painfully but triumphantly raised with the brick and mortar of unscrupulous diplomacy was ultimately to crumble into oblivion so soon as the architect was swept away by the forces which he had combated. The means which Metternich used to achieve his end were principally two. In German affairs he sought to employ the cumbrous Diet for the execution of Austrian aims; abroad he manipulated the European Concert—off-spring of Alexander’s much-vaunted Holy Alliance—to serve the ends of Hapsburg dynastic policy.

This attitude and these principles of action will be found reflected in and illustrated by almost every sphere of Metternich’s political activity.

For a time he achieved unparalleled success, and made Vienna the centre of European politics. He failed ultimately, because he stood for an out-of-date

system which the strongest props could not maintain intact.

Nowhere was the policy of stability better illustrated than in Metternich's treatment of the problem of Germany. The Holy Roman Empire, with its shadowy and nominal authority over all Germany, was gone. The War of Liberation, indeed, had done something to revive German loyalty to an institution hallowed by a long and sacred tradition. Francis had actually been invited to receive again the Imperial Crown. But Francis was a practical man. An Austrian Empire in the hand was worth two Holy Roman Empires in a mediæval bush; and with Metternich's approval he refused the proffered honour. History has proved that this renunciation of Austria's traditional supremacy in Germany had results similar to Metternich's deflection of Austrian ambition from the West to the South-east. Prussia gradually undermined the position of Austria, and taking her place as the bulwark against France changed the face of German history.

But whether Francis was wise or foolish in his renunciation, the Holy Roman Empire had ceased to exist; and Metternich, as President of the Congress of Vienna, had considerable influence in the decision as to what should take its place. It may be said once and for all that his attitude was decidedly not that of a German patriot. Men like Stein who had led the national uprising in Prussia, and to a less extent in Austria, yearned for a strong united Germany ruled by a capable government. Metternich, on the other hand, looked at the question entirely from the point of view of an Austrian Minister, or at best from

the point of view of a member of the European Concert. In neither capacity did he favour German unity. For Austria, especially, it would be fatal. Her motley Empire would dissolve into its component nationalities; bereft of her ancient title to superiority overwhelming physical force alone would insure her continued supremacy in Germany, and this, with Prussia as an obstacle, was impossible. That is why at the Congress of Vienna Metternich had supported the retention of Germany as a loose Confederation of States, nominally and cumbrously regulated by a Diet, the inefficiency of which was ludicrously patent to all.


If Metternich desired that Germany should remain disunited, his object was attained. The authority of the newly constituted Diet was as shadowy as that of the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire, while the jealousies, bickerings, and grumbings among the smaller States and pigmy potentates were as intricate and universal as ever.

Still it was of the greatest importance for the success of Metternich's policy that Austria should be supreme in the Diet, and Austria by Francis' act of renunciation had sacrificed her old legitimate title to supremacy. Moreover, the smaller States vastly surpassed both Austria and Prussia in voting power. Intrigue must make amends for the lack of legitimate right.

Matters continued to go well for Metternich. Upon Austria was bestowed the perpetual Presidency of the Diet, and its first protocols were issued under the seal of the Imperial Austrian Federal Chancery. Evidently Austria still retained in the eyes of her neighbours the glamour of her ancient position in

the Empire. Metternich knew well how to improve the occasion. Prussia alone was really dangerous to Austrian preponderance, and the Austrian representatives at the Diet were instructed to take measures to prevent Prussia exerting any influence upon the proceedings of that cumbrous body. Accident aided the Austrian Chancellor's designs. A representative of Prussia foolishly suggested a partition of Germany between Austria and Prussia. Metternich saw his chance. He informed the German Courts of this perfidious Prussian proposal and assured them that Austria at any rate would enter into no secret agreement. This roused a storm of indignation against Prussia, and by this clever stroke Metternich gained for Austria that unquestioning support of the majority of smaller States which assured her supremacy in the Diet. He clinched his victory by ordering Count Buol, the Austrian President of the Diet, to announce "that the constitution as fixed by the Act of Confederation and guaranteed by Europe must be regarded as final."

This was a promising start. How Metternich gradually secured complete ascendancy over the Diet is best illustrated by the story of his struggle against Liberalism in Germany—a struggle which culminated in his complete if temporary triumph at Aix-la-Chapelle and Carlsbad. As has been already mentioned, Metternich was by no means a rabid reactionary. He was genuinely alarmed at the prevalence of a Liberal or, as he regarded it, a revolutionary spirit throughout Europe, mainly because he feared that its influence would react harmfully upon the hitherto tranquil inhabitants of the Austrian dominions.



But perhaps he was not so perturbed by the desire of the German Liberals for unity as by the growing craving for constitutional government in the various States. The former was rendered less dangerous by the jealousies of the component parts of Germany and by the possibility of playing upon this jealousy by diplomatic methods. What he really feared was the Press. Writers like Görres and Arndt were constantly urging the need for constitutional rights and spreading their views broadcast, and Metternich was from the first impressed with the necessity of maintaining a rigid supervision of the Press.

The Liberal aspirations of the Czar were a constant source of annoyance to Metternich. "The Emperor now begins to occupy himself with the condition of the peasantry in the Russo-Polish provinces," he wrote on July 22nd, 1818; "that there is plenty of good material is undeniable; but, on the other hand, the Emperor runs some risk of kindling a conflagration in the interior of his kingdom. The Russians are, in general, very well under control; what would be the result of further progress is very difficult to determine." What Metternich really feared was the effect of the Czar's liberal tendencies upon Germany. It was important, if possible, that Alexander should be shown the error of his Liberal ways; but it was more important that the King of Prussia should be convinced that all reform in his dominions was undesirable, nay, utterly suicidal to the interests of the monarchy.

For Metternich was able to curb the Liberal instincts of the smaller States, temporarily at least, by means of the subservient Diet. It is true that all the German people were clamouring for Liberal reform.

The Universities were seething with what Metternich called revolutionary spirit. "The gymnastic establishment," he wrote, "is a real preparatory school of University disorders"; and although he pretended to regard the movement as the work of a small minority—as late as July 1824 he talked to Francis of "the revolutionary tendencies of a faction in Germany supported in an incomprehensible manner . . . by many German governments"—he was nevertheless thoroughly alarmed. It is true, moreover, that the Constitutionalists had legal right upon their side. The famous Thirteenth Article of the Act of Confederation had decreed that there should be Assemblies of Estates in all the States comprising the Confederation. Apparently this legalized the granting of constitutions and placed the reformers under the protection of the Diet. Thanks to Metternich's clever manipulation no promise was ever less completely fulfilled, in spite of feeble attempts by the Diet to justify its existence. The Elector of Hesse was the most reactionary of German princes. Within his puny sphere he raged against every symptom of Liberalism. Complaint was made to the Diet, which prepared to take measures against the despotic Elector. But the Elector appealed to the princes, and Metternich supported him. The Austrian Chancellor even went so far as to rebuke Count Buol for permitting the Diet to protect rebellious subjects against their sovereigns. Henceforth the Diet ambled ineffectually along the path of Austrian policy; and the subsequent warning of the Emperor Francis against "over-activity" on the part of that ponderous assembly was quite unnecessary.

→ The Diet did, indeed, make one further attempt to be independent. The Grand Duke of Weimar had presented his subjects with a constitution modelled on correct Liberal principles. The Diet, quite within its rights, confirmed this constitution. This roused Metternich's wrath. He procured Hardenberg's adhesion to the principle that each individual State ought to decide whether or not Article XIII. should be put into force, and that the Diet's only function was to frame "abstract resolutions." This private agreement between the Prussian and Austrian representatives completely neutralized the Diet's action; and when a few months later the Diet passed a resolution that German governments should without undue delay fulfil Article XIX. no one was obliged to comply.

g With the Diet reduced to subservience, Metternich was able to take measures against those German States which seemed inclined to stray in Liberal paths, and it is instructive as an illustration of Metternich's methods to observe how in the years between the Congress of Vienna and 1824 he established his system in Germany by means of the Diet and in spite of very considerable opposition from the forces of Liberalism.

g There arose great opposition in Germany to that system, identified with Metternich, whereby the politics of the world were to be dominated by a clique of great Powers under the ægis of the Holy Alliance. There was every prospect that States like Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and the two Hesses would form a Mid-German League antagonistic to the Holy Alliance, which would be a serious blow to Austrian primacy in Germany.

Metternich determined to counteract the influence of these Liberal States by enlisting the aid of Prussia, of whose support he was fairly certain, in weeding out their representatives from the Diet. He hoped, however, that he would procure their peaceful recall by dangling the bogie of revolution before the eyes of the Mid-German States.

Having at the Congress of Vienna established the superiority of Austria in Germany, he resolved to lose no time in bringing his influence to bear upon Bavaria, the most important of the Mid-German States. On his way back from the Congress accordingly he stopped at München and handed to the King of Bavaria a letter from Francis, suggesting a Conference of German Ministers at Vienna, to discuss means for so changing the constitution of the Diet as to prevent the freedom of the Press and publication of debates in the Chambers of those States which had constitutions. But Bavaria met him with a point blank refusal.

The Chancellor now suggested to Count Bernsdorff, the Prussian Chancellor, that it might be safe to trust to a majority of voices in the Diet and lay before it measures for changing its own constitution, stopping the publication of its Protocols, and shortening the period of its sittings. Also it must be pointed out to the Diet that by the provisions of the Vienna Final Act it was bound to interfere in the internal affairs of the various States of Germany.

Prussia seemed agreeable, but the smaller States proved more troublesome than ever. Bavaria especially thwarted her in every direction through her representative at Vienna. Würtemberg went further,

and on January 2nd, 1816, sent round a circular to her representative at the various courts inveighing against the policy of the Congress of Vienna on the ground that it infringed the liberties of the smaller powers. This circular was published, and it annoyed Metternich beyond measure to find that the falsehood of his assertions as to the unanimity of German support of the Holy Alliance was now bruited abroad. Though forced to bide his time he made up his mind to be revenged on Würtemberg, and a letter of Gentz's written in February, complaining that although he was confined to his bed with illness Metternich was constantly either visiting him or bombarding him with dispatches, shows the fluster prevailing at Vienna.

Metternich now sounded Saxony as to a Conference of German Ministers at Vienna. Saxony was grateful to Austria for her support of Saxon independence at the Congress of Vienna. Still she hesitated. Metternich cleverly manœuvred her in the right direction. Being dissatisfied with the energy of Count Buol-Schauenstein, the President of the Diet, he took the opportunity of recalling him from Frankfurt and offering the post to the Saxon Ambassador at Vienna. This was accepted, and henceforth Saxony was the obedient disciple of Austria.

Pursuing his policy of cajoling such of the smaller States as appeared wedded to Liberal ideas, the Chancellor now turned his attention to Baden, a State in which Liberalism had hitherto made dangerous progress. Metternich took advantage of a misunderstanding between the Grand Duke and his Estates to persuade the former that the power of the latter should be curbed, and managed by his arts of fascina-

tion to deliberalize the Grand Ducal representative to the Diet. The result was that the Grand Duke ultimately agreed to support Austrian policy.

Next came Brunswick. Here also Metternich characteristically took advantage of circumstances. During the minority of the young Grand Duke Charles, this State was being administered by the King of England, whose one wish was to be relieved of the responsibility. Consequently, Metternich had no difficulty in inducing him to consent to Charles taking over the government at the age of nineteen. The youthful ruler, whose despotic temperament had caused Metternich to make him his protégé, ultimately developed into such a monster of reaction that even Metternich had to confess that he had not entirely gauged his character.

Still Brunswick was gained, and when the Diet of 1823 opened Metternich was confident of victory. At the Congress of Verona, summoned principally to settle the Eastern Question, as will be seen hereafter, many discussions had taken place between the statesmen of Austria, Russia, and Prussia regarding German affairs, and measures had been agreed upon with a view to combating Liberalism and regulating the Diet. These measures Metternich proceeded to lay before the Diet. Already in December 1822 he had induced the Czar and the King of Prussia to establish a secret Committee of Enquiry at Mainz for combating "the conspirators of Central Europe." The indignation aroused by this species of German inquisition was only increased by the fresh proposals put before the Diet by Metternich on behalf of the Powers. Strong opposition was offered by Bavaria, Würtemberg,

1822
Verona

and the two Hesses. The King of Würtemberg sent forth a circular through his diplomatic agents in which he protested against the interference of the three Powers in the affairs of other countries and their failure to consult the smaller powers of Germany. He talked of the Allies as "those who have inherited the influence which Napoleon had arrogated to himself in Europe." Metternich was furious. "The King of Würtemberg," he wrote, "has allowed himself to be carried away by a folly which he will find very serious."

For the moment Metternich had to stifle his wrath. He had hoped to overawe all opposition to his proposals; as it was, the support which Liberalism received from members of the Diet forced him to temporize and content himself with a Pyrrhic victory. But he determined forthwith, in combination with Prussia, to purge the Diet of the elements of opposition. He began by demanding the recall of the Hesse Darmstadt representative from the Diet, and accompanied the demand with such a threatening dispatch that the terrified Court lost no time in yielding.

It was now Würtemberg's turn. Here Metternich was determined to have no mercy, for Würtemberg was an old offender. He drew up a lengthy Memorandum combating the insinuations made against his policy in the Würtemberg Circular and demanded an explanation. The government of Würtemberg replied through an announcement in the Würtemberg Court Paper that the circular had been quite unofficial. Thereupon Metternich demanded the recall of the Würtemberg representative at the Diet on the ground that he continually opposed Austria's wishes and the

supremacy of the Holy Alliance. The Würtemberg government shilly-shallied, and merely replied that if its representative disobeyed his orders he should be recalled. This did not satisfy Metternich and the Continental Powers withdrew their representative from Stuttgart.

All this time Metternich was complaining of Würtemberg in the Diet. In spite of the Carlsbad decrees, there was very little Press censorship in Würtemberg, and a paper called the "German Observer" grated especially upon Metternich's sensitive nerves. In an article of March 1823 it described the activities of the Central Investigation Committee at Mainz as unnecessary and unsalutary. Against this paper Metternich brought forward a motion in the Diet which was supported through fear of Austria by nearly all the smaller States. Würtemberg, unwilling to provoke open hostility, interdicted the "Observer" under protest. The Austrian Court replied that it hoped the lesson was learnt, and that in future the censorship would be stricter and editors more careful.

Even Baden and Bavaria had by this time succumbed to Metternich's threats, and the opposition of Würtemberg, which now found itself entirely isolated, after a few feeble efforts to kick against the pricks entirely collapsed.

Metternich always followed up a victory. Now that he felt strong enough to show his hand he determined to make his opponents support him at all hazards, whether by threats of coercion or by playing upon their fears of revolution. The success of his policy was manifested when the Diet of 1824 opened in July. Various reactionary measures were carried

without opposition. The Protocols of the sittings were no longer to be published, since, in Metternich's opinion, its proceedings were not for the public eye. The measures against the Universities were to be indefinitely prolonged and the powers of the Mainz Commission were to be increased. This Diet marks the zenith of the triumph of Metternich's policy in Germany.

To all appearances German Liberalism was cowed, and for nearly six years Metternich was no longer disturbed by dreams of a revolution. His system was established in Germany, no less completely than in Europe, and it was not until the statesmanship of Canning and the French revolutions of 1830 and 1848 had thoroughly shattered Metternich's influence in Europe that the revolutionary and reforming party in Germany dared to raise their heads.

But, if it was comparatively easy for Metternich to bully the smaller States, Prussia caused him more disquiet, though ultimately, as has been seen, he gained her temporary adhesion to anti-liberal principles. King Frederick William had promised reforms, and his people clamoured for them. Nor was he averse to carrying them out. But there were objections, and on these objections Metternich and the opponents of reform laid stress. He genuinely felt that while the country was disorganized and almost bankrupt it was dangerous to change the form of its government. In any case, he had no desire to see Frederick William a constitutional monarch. A system of provincial estates was the most that could be conceded. Central representation, he wrote to Prince Wittgenstein in November 1817, meant "the disintegration of the

Prussian states"; Prussia required "a free and sound military strength; and this does not and cannot consist with a purely representative system."

Metternich, therefore, did everything in his power to play upon the misgivings of the Prussian King, and events aided him in converting that monarch and the Czar as well. Weimar, a great centre of Liberalism, supplied Metternich with his first opportunity. A festival was held at the Wartburg, the Grand Duke's castle at Weimar, to celebrate the Battle of Leipzig and the tercentenary of the Reformation. The presence of some enthusiastic reformers turned the proceedings into a Liberal demonstration, in the course of which a pigtail, a Uhlan's stays, and a Code of Police Law—sacred symbols of reaction—were consumed by an improvised bonfire.

Metternich saw his chance. He announced to the Prussian ambassador that the time had come "to rage against the spirit of Jacobitism," and he arranged a meeting with Hardenberg. He also persuaded Francis to invite Alexander to support a joint intervention in the affairs of Germany. Alexander refused, and advised that a Conference of the Powers should be summoned.

Nothing could have suited Metternich better. He felt that a Conference would force the Czar to some decisive line of action. He hoped to use recent events in Germany as an argument to bring Russia into line with Austria. If he accomplished this, Austria would be supreme in Germany and Europe, for Russia was her only formidable antagonist. It was arranged that a Congress should be held at Aix-la-Chapelle.

1818 → Metternich had been absent from Vienna since July. He had already adopted the habit of going through a cure in the autumn of each year, and in 1818 he chose Carlsbad, where many of the diplomats intending to take part in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle were already gathered. He accomplished the journey from Vienna in forty hours, and wrote triumphantly, "They could not do more in England or Italy." He was suffering from lumbago, and was attended by his private physician, Standenheim, whose advice he professed to follow implicitly. "I have arranged," he wrote, "my manner of living according to the custom of the place." This implied rising at six o'clock in order to take the waters at half-past six. Breakfast followed at nine or ten o'clock. This was a very pleasant meal. Tables were laid in front of the various houses, and those who wished had their tables placed together. Metternich usually breakfasted with Prince Schwarzenberg, whose house was more pleasantly situated than his own. After breakfast, he usually went for a walk until mid-day. Dinner was at three o'clock. At about four Metternich would take another walk of two or three miles. At eight he would go to the Salle or have a whist party at home. "All Carlsbad is in bed at ten." Goethe was also at Carlsbad, and the evenings were enlivened by the singing of Madame Catalini. Metternich had become acquainted with this beautiful woman and famous singer at Florence in 1816, and at Carlsbad she often rehearsed her songs at his lodgings.

From Carlsbad, Metternich travelled to Königswart, which he reached on August 3rd. In the evening

his neighbour, the Abbot of Tepl, dined with him, a worthy man, who lived in constant dread that the Emperor would secularize his abbey and present it to Metternich.

For a few days the Chancellor amused himself inspecting the estate. Many roads and paths were being laid out at considerable cost, and he intended planting trees on a large scale. Hitherto the peasants had recklessly cut down trees all over the estate, but were gradually being induced to preserve them. From Königswart, Metternich travelled to Franzensbad. Here he heard that his father was in a hopeless state of decline, and wrote to console his mother and express his regret that he was unable to be present. On the following day he received the news of his death, and wrote to his mother that the knowledge that his father was unconscious consoled him for his absence from the death-bed. This melancholy event and his separation from his family seems to have had a dispiriting effect upon Metternich's usually cheerful disposition. On August 26th, he wrote to his wife, "I am feeling very sad. Everything which separates us is painful to me, and I feel more and more every day the pain of being separated from my dear little family. I should like to have you always with me or never to leave Vienna."

In September, Metternich visited for the first time the estate at Johannisberg, which he had been given as a reward for his services during the struggle against Napoleon. Every one who had seen it had been delighted with it, and Metternich, in a letter to his mother, regretted that his father, "who would have taken a thousand times more pleasure in the place

than I do," was not among the number. He arrived at five o'clock on the evening of the 12th of September, "early enough to see from my balcony twenty leagues of the course of the Rhine, eight or ten towns, 100 villages, and vineyards which this year will yield twenty millions of wine, intersected by meadows and fields like gardens, beautiful oak woods, and an immense plain covered with trees which bend beneath the weight of delicious fruit. This much without. As for within, I find a large and good house of which in time a fine château may be made. I have spent nearly 10,000 florins in the last two months to make it what may fairly be called passable. My friend Handel has chosen the paper-hangings and furniture. The papers he has put on the walls are inconceivable; above all, it is inconceivable where he could have found what he has chosen. The evil is, however, confined to three rooms; the rest of the apartments are painted in one colour." Metternich wrote his wife a description of the stables and the places where the wine was made. The latter was superintended by a certain Father Arndt, an old man of sixty, who "had such a horror of wine that he has not drunk one bottle since he has been at Johannisberg; yet he is the best connoisseur of wine in the Canton, but he judges of it by his nose. It is sufficient for him to smell a bottle of wine to decide its quality, its growth, and its year; he can even distinguish mixtures, and has never been known to make a mistake." Metternich observes, however, that M. de Handel, the chooser of the wall-papers, "seems to have drunk all that Father Arndt has not drunk."

One day Metternich went over from Johannisberg

to revisit his old home at Coblenz. He wrote a rather pathetic letter to his mother, describing how everything had changed. The old garden reaching down to the Moselle was now a field; the riding-school, the coach-house, the hermitage had disappeared. "The house is in the most pitiable state and very dirty." The English garden was replaced by a score of large trees, "planted without order." All his old acquaintances were gone. "Faithful to the custom of the country, all those gentlemen have ruined themselves more than the Revolution has ruined them. Since I have been here, I have not met two people I know."

On September 23rd, Metternich reluctantly took leave of Johannisberg in order to be present at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. He joined the Emperor Francis at Mainz, and at the commencement of the journey to Aix, had the honour of entertaining the Emperor and the Prince and Princess of Denmark at Johannisberg. The Imperial party thoroughly enjoyed the beautiful journey up the Rhine. But it was not merely for this reason that Metternich had arranged for Francis to travel to Aix by this route. "I know the feeling of the people in those districts," he wrote to the Emperor on August 26th, "and have advised your Majesty's journey by that river because I am convinced that it would have the character of a triumphal procession. . . . The great difference will also be seen between the journey of your Majesty and those of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, and this will certainly be for the advantage of Austria."

Aix-la-
Chapelle
1814

The extraordinary enthusiasm which attended the

Emperor's progress proved that Metternich was right. At Cologne and at every stopping-place the populace gave him an ovation, and showed that the old reverence for the traditional wearers of the Imperial crown still lived. "The voyage on the Rhine," wrote Metternich, "has been one continual triumph for the Emperor, and has ended by becoming quite embarrassing to him. The whole thing recommenced on his arrival at Aix. Everything breathes of the Empire in the natal city so beloved of Charlemagne. The people see in the Emperor only his successor." The scene in the Cathedral, whither the Emperor together with the Czar and the King of Prussia went to see the relics and skull of Charlemagne, was most impressive. The Emperor knelt upon the tomb and prayed. "The people, who had forced the doors to see the Emperor, all fell on their knees instantly, and I thought the King (of Prussia) seemed very uncomfortable, standing in the midst of his people."

Even a bad cold and the dullness of Lady Castlereagh's entertainments could not damp Metternich's satisfaction with the results of the Congress. Of amusements, indeed, there was a great lack. He played whist every evening "with men," he blandly observes, "who do not find themselves distressed or even incommoded by the loss of a good round thousand or so." Aix was inundated with youthful prodigies, who performed at daily concerts. "The last arrival," Metternich plaintively remarks, "is a little boy of four years and a half old, who plays the double bass. You can easily judge of the perfection of the execution." Shops were bad and costly, and no one bought more than was absolutely necessary.

The ladies, even, did not appeal to Metternich. "Our ladies here," he wrote, "are Lady Castlereagh, three or four English more or less old—that is they are between fifty and sixty, quite youthful for London,—the Princess de la Tour, Madame de Nesselrode, and three Russian ladies. It is with the ladies as with the shopkeepers; there is a total want of admirers."

On November 3rd arrived Lawrence, "the greatest painter in the world," sent by command of the Prince Regent to take portraits of the Sovereigns and Ministers assembled at Aix. "My portrait,"¹ wrote Metternich, "I believe will be excellent. I shall try to get Lawrence to paint Clementine."

As regards the serious business of the Congress, Metternich himself, from the first, was full of hope. He had broken his journey at Frankfort, where the Diet was sitting. That dilatory body had for months been engaged in a debate on the military organization of the Confederation—without result. Metternich's presence applied the spur, and in a couple of sittings secured a settlement of the principles of the measure to be proposed. This tickled his pride. "You can have no idea," he wrote to his wife, "of the effect produced by my presence at the Diet. An affair which would perhaps never have ended has been concluded in three or four days. . . . I have become a species of moral power in Germany, and, perhaps, even in Europe."²

¹ The portrait of Metternich, painted by Lawrence, is in the Imperial Picture-Gallery in Vienna.

² "Autobiography of Prince Metternich," English translation, vol. iv. p. 64.

1818
The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was typical of the period. The actual sittings as a rule only lasted from noon to two or three o'clock, and the real business of the Congress was to a great extent transacted in the course of private conversation and at the numerous soirées, of which Metternich's were the most frequented. As at Vienna, women played no small part in the negotiations. Chateaubriand, the French representative, brought with him the famous Madame Recamier for the express purpose of furthering French interests. The Czar, the King of Prussia, and most of the Ministers succumbed to her charms. Metternich alone pronounced her "beautiful but stupid," but this was probably due to the fact that this versatile lover was at present under the influence of the Princess Lieven, wife of the Russian ambassador in London.

For Austria circumstances seemed favourable. A Tory government in England, a crippled France, a Prussia inclined to relapse into reactionary paths, promised her a free hand. Only Russia was doubtful, and three timely incidents converted even Alexander. Before the Congress met, a secret society was discovered amongst the officers of the Russian army; and the effect of this upon his mind was heightened by an attempt to kidnap him during his journey to Aix. Towards the end of the Congress a Russian agent in Germany published a pamphlet condemning revolutionary tendencies in Germany. This attracted the wrath of the reformers towards Russia, and the Czar, disgusted with their ingratitude, was inclined to support Metternich's endeavours to direct the unwonted unanimity of the Powers against the forces of Liberalism in Germany. For "never before and

never since have the Great Powers . . . presented so united a front." The Baden succession, the quarrel between Sweden, Denmark, and Hesse, and the question of the evacuation of France by the Allied troops had all been amicably settled. The only point of dispute between Austria and Russia—the admission of France to the Holy Alliance—had, thanks to England's support of Metternich, been decided in the negative.

The Congress was, in fact, a great triumph for the Austrian Chancellor. The moral influence of Austria in European politics had been demonstrated to all the world, the antagonism of Russia to Austria had been neutralized, and Alexander had practically been diverted from the paths of Liberalism. Further, the way had been smoothed for united opposition to "revolution," as Metternich called it, by all the Powers. Metternich might justifiably write from Aix, "I have never seen a prettier little Congress," and again, "I believe that we shall gain honour in Europe. I have never seen more perfect agreement between the Cabinets; our affairs—the rough as well as the smooth—ran as if they went of themselves." Only a very slight stimulus was now required to secure Prussia's hearty co-operation with Austria in "raging against Jacobinism." That stimulus was provided by the murder of Kotzebue, "a senseless crime," which "did more than a thousand arguments to bring about the triumph of Metternich's policy." Kotzebue was a poet and pamphleteer on the reactionary side, who had, moreover, incurred much hatred for his pro-Russian views. His murderer, a half-insane student, Karl Sand, was acclaimed by many as the champion of freedom, a circumstance

which not unnaturally threw the German governments into the greatest consternation.

After the conclusion of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Metternich had accompanied the Emperor Francis on a journey to Italy.

The Imperial party started from Vienna in March and arrived at Florence on the 15th in very wintry weather. They accomplished the last stage of the journey from Bologna to Florence in nine hours, "at a quick trot with eight horses," and had nothing to complain of on the way, "except excess of attention." At Florence, which, as Metternich remarks, was "full of English," a fête was given in honour of the Emperor on the 22nd in front of the Palazzo Vecchio. At the end of the month the Imperial party travelled to Rome.

Metternich, who lodged in the Consulta, was agreeably surprised with Rome. He had expected to find it "old and sombre," instead of "antique and superb, brilliant and new." He admired the fine view of the city which his windows commanded, and was delighted with the Pope, by whom he was received and who "laughed constantly" during an interview in which he seemed to enjoy talking of his troubles under Bonaparte's persecution.

The visitors were present at a succession of grand religious ceremonies, and Metternich graphically describes to his wife how the crowds of foreigners and general crush led to free fights with the Papal guards. "Generally blood flows," is his cheerful comment. "Yesterday, for instance, an English lady, fancying herself stronger than a guard, had her cheek pierced by a halberd. One hears nothing but cries of, "My

shoe," " My veil," " You are crushing me," " Your sword is running into my leg." One Englishman had his nose cut off. On the whole Metternich did not think the ceremonies very impressive. " I cannot understand how a Protestant can turn Catholic at Rome. Rome is like a most magnificent theatre with very bad actors. Keep what I saw to yourself, for it will run through all Vienna, and I love religion and its triumph too much to wish to cast a slur upon it." More to his taste was a firework display at the Castle of St Angelo, " the most beautiful I have ever seen."

From Rome the Imperial party travelled to Naples, where they arrived on April 30th, and remained for over a month. Metternich thoroughly enjoyed himself. He visited all the surrounding places of interest, Baia, Pozzuoli, Pæstum, Tivoli, Pompeii, and recommended his wife to read the beginning of the sixth book of Virgil's " Æneid," which treats of that region of Italy. He found the ascent of Vesuvius very exhausting. " God never made Vesuvius to be climbed by men." But he was well rewarded for his exertions. " I could scarcely tear myself away from a spectacle full of beauties beyond description, and at the same time full of awe impossible to describe."

In the evening he amused himself at the Opera House, " unquestionably the most beautiful in Europe." There were 180 boxes, and 6000 spectators could be seated. By June 10th the Emperor and his suite were back in Rome, where they viewed the procession of Corpus Christi, and shortly afterwards commenced the return journey to Germany, necessitated by the news of the murder of Kotzebue.

Metternich, on hearing the news of Kotzebue's murder, saw that his opportunity had come for convincing those who were as yet unconvinced of the necessity for strong measures. On April 7th he wrote, "Poor Kotzebue now appears as an *argumentum ad hominem* which even the Liberal Duke of Saxe-Weimar cannot defend," and later to his wife, "By the help of God I hope to defeat the German Revolution, even as I have vanquished the conqueror of the world. The German revolutionists thought me far away because I was a hundred leagues off. They have deceived themselves; I am in the midst of them, and I will now deal out my blows. You will observe a singular coincidence between the discoveries and arrests in Prussia and Germany and my passage of the Alps."

A meeting between the Emperors of Russia and Austria and the King of Prussia and their ministers had been arranged to take place at Teplitz. Metternich and his master made the return journey via Verona and Innsbruck. At the latter town Metternich began to feel the contrast to the warmth of Italy. "I, who scarcely six days ago," he wrote on July 16th, "drank a large glass of iced orangeade every night before going to bed, will this evening drink hot punch to prevent myself freezing." From Innsbruck the journey lay through Carlsbad and thence to Teplitz. The latter town had memories for Metternich. "I am writing to you," he informed his wife, "in the same room and on the same table where I signed the Quadruple Alliance six years ago. Everything has changed since then except myself."

At Teplitz the measures to be taken against the

revolutionary organizations were practically settled upon by the sovereigns before being brought before the Diet.

Metternich's proposals were comprehensive and drastic. He demanded the suspension of the freedom of the press, the appointment of a commission to purge the German universities of professors suspected of Liberal leanings, and the formation in the name of the whole Bund of a judicial commission to investigate the conspiracy alleged to exist for the dissolution of the German Confederation. Francis at once signified his approval. Frederick William hesitated. But Metternich took him in hand at Teplitz, and plainly stated that Prussia was the focus of revolutionary ideas and movements in Germany, and that if Frederick William persisted in granting a Constitution, he would receive no help from Austria.

Having secured the reluctant adhesion of the King of Prussia to his proposals, it was Metternich's intention to get them approved by the Diet, and to increase the executive powers of that body for the purpose of combating Liberalism—a good illustration of the fact that he had no wish to abolish the Diet, or even to diminish its power, so long as its authority was used to further Austrian aims.

Accordingly, Metternich proceeded to Carlsbad to lay his proposals before a conference of German ministers.

During the journey from Teplitz to Carlsbad, Metternich had an amusing discussion with the Austrian Consul-General at Leipzig on the subject of clouds. The Consul-General affirmed that clouds were divided into two classes—male and female.

Carlsbad
|| (Teplitz)
1879

So long as they were scattered they were harmless. But if allowed to marry they produced rain, thunder, and noise, and became objectionable.

The Ministers assembled at Carlsbad accepted Metternich's proposals without demur. "The German Cabinets," he wrote on September 3rd, "have met together as if they were members of the same family."

To gain the approval of the Diet was merely a matter of manipulation. True, the Grand Duke of Weimar protested against the clause about the supervision of universities, a protest which Metternich contemptuously alluded to as "childish stuff." Also it was necessary to obtain a unanimous vote of the Diet. By means of a cleverly worded circular, however, in which he stated that the widespread secret organizations of Italy had spread to Germany, and that Germany in general and Prussia especially were honeycombed with factions, Metternich frightened many doubters into acquiescence. He took measures to render innocuous the opposition of the stalwarts. The Diet passed the decrees in four sittings, and it was falsely proclaimed that the voting had been unanimous. Thus was proved the ascendancy of Austria in the Diet.

After the successful conclusion of the Carlsbad Conference, Metternich spent nearly a week at Königswart before returning to Vienna. He appreciated the peace and quiet of the place, the "enormous forests, high mountains, wide valleys, much water, lovely streams," after his recent life of sight-seeing, travel, and strenuous political activity. He amused himself by arranging the old family portraits.

These included a picture of himself as a boy of five years old. "I must have been a most ill-favoured child," he wrote in relation to this portrait, "or the painter not extremely clever." With characteristic extravagance he had just had a road constructed seven miles long at a cost of one hundred and thirty thousand guilders.

On September 8th, he started for Vienna. He had to pass through Prague. "I never come to Prague," he wrote to his wife, "without thinking I hear midnight strike. Six years ago at that hour I dipped my pen to declare war with the man of the century—the man of St Helena—to kindle the beacon which was the signal for a hundred thousand men of the Allied troops to cross the frontier."

The reason of Metternich's return to Vienna was that there were still some questions relative to the position of the Diet requiring to be settled, notably whether Article XIII. should or should not be put into force. A conference of Ministers was accordingly summoned to Vienna. Metternich showed great moderation, considering his recent triumph. This was partly in order to conciliate some of the smaller States, who were piqued at their exclusion from the Carlsbad Conference. Moreover, he found that the Liberal element presented a more solid front at Vienna than had been the case at Carlsbad, and received the support of Russia and England. The Kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg especially vigorously opposed the abolition of Article XIII. The former had promised, the latter had actually granted, a constitution to his subjects, and neither wished to perjure themselves.

In the end the Vienna Final Act, as it was called, proved little more than a clearer definition of the principles of the Federal Act of 1815. Metternich relinquished his objection to publicity of debate and to the sanctioning of constitutions by the Diet. He felt that a little moderation would give the smaller States confidence in Austria and induce them to rally round her. Besides, his control of the Diet enabled him to render abortive the most determined efforts of Liberalism.

Metternich now took up his residence at Vienna for the rest of the winter. Soon after his arrival he had the pleasure of meeting General Marmont, whom he only knew slightly, and whom he describes as "an intellectual man," partly no doubt because science proved a mutual hobby.

Metternich himself has provided us with a description of his mansion in Vienna, which must have been very fine. His favourite apartment, approached through a spacious anteroom, was the library, in the midst of which stood his much prized "Venus" by Canova, and which contained about 15,000 volumes. This room was also used for ball suppers. Leading out of the library was Metternich's private study, full of works of art, "pictures, busts, bronzes, astronomical clocks, and all kinds of instruments." It contained three writing-tables; for, wrote the Chancellor, "I like to change my place, and I do not like to be disturbed at my desk by anyone else writing at the same table."

Though fond of Vienna, Metternich often longed for the country. In February he wrote, "I really hunger and thirst for my garden in the Rennweg; for a whole long month I have not been able to pay it a visit." He constantly regrets that he has not

the time to visit his numerous estates scattered over Austria. "I have estates which I have never seen, and among them some which I hear travellers describe as Paradise. Among others a castle on the Lake of Constance, which commands the whole lake and gives a panorama of Switzerland."

In the middle of March Metternich's daughter, Clementine, fell ill, which caused him much worry and anxiety, especially as he was at this time very busy. "I go," he wrote, "from my writing-table to the sick bed and back again." Clementine lingered on until the middle of April, when she became rapidly worse, and finally died on May 5th.¹ Father and mother were both overcome with grief. "My wife," wrote Metternich, "does not leave the room in which my daughter died. She has collected round her everything which belonged to her. I cannot enter the room without tears and I soon return to my business, which makes a barrier between me and myself."

At the end of May Metternich left Vienna for Prague in order to attend the wedding of the Archduke Rainer to the Princess of Carignan. Then, after a short stay at Carlsbad, he spent nearly a month at Königswart. Since his last visit he had set up two manufactories of earthenware, one of which made jugs for the Marienbad water, the other pots for cooking purposes. He had no less than twenty-two

¹ At the time of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Sir Thomas Lawrence, the great English painter, had met Clementine walking with her governess, and, struck by her beauty, asked Metternich if he might paint her portrait. During her illness Clementine often inquired after the progress of her picture, which Lawrence had taken back with him to England to complete. It arrived in time for her to see it ere she died.

springs of mineral waters on the estate, and at one place had constructed public baths. He was also building a family vault and chapel in the Egyptian style, which was unfortunately burnt in 1820 soon after its completion.

From Königswart the Chancellor travelled to Coburg on a visit to the Duke and Duchess, who treated him with great ceremony. "I was conducted to my abode," he sarcastically observes, "like the Holy Father in the procession of Corpus Christi."

Towards the end of July Metternich paid a visit to his mother at Baden, but was hurriedly recalled to Vienna by the news of the Neapolitan revolution. Here another domestic bereavement awaited him—the second within the year—for Marie died on July 25th after a very brief illness. Apart from the fact that all Metternich's family seem to have had delicate lungs, there is little doubt that the family mansion in Vienna was from some cause unhealthy. No less than eight of its inmates had died of illness within twenty years. At any rate, Metternich agreed with his wife that Vienna did not suit the children, and it was arranged that while the Chancellor remained in Austria the Princess, together with the three remaining children and Marie's widower,¹ should take up their abode in Paris.

With good reason Metternich had written during the Carlsbad Conference, "the Weimar clique is in great anxiety." The Carlsbad Decrees are the high watermark of Austrian influence in Germany. They mark the success of Metternich's policy of using the Diet as a bulwark against all progress in Germany and as an instrument of Austrian diplomacy. "The

¹ Count Joseph Esterhazy.



Photo. Lowy


PRINCESS CLEMENTINE METTERNICH, DAUGHTER OF THE
CHANCELLOR



dawn of a new era of salvation" had arisen, and Metternich joyfully wrote, "if the Emperor doubts that he is Kaiser of Germany he is much mistaken." In truth for Austria, as Metternich told Francis, "the Carlsbad Congress had the most happy results." "If the alliance of the European Powers," he continued, "has shown how beneficially the principle of strength gained by the union of many for the general welfare acts in relation to politics, the example of Carlsbad shows the world that the union of governments for salutary legislative ends is not less possible and is equally productive of results."

The Carlsbad Decrees were a vindictive act of frightened despotism. Quite apart from the inherent injustice and severity of their provisions, they put back the clock of German progress for a quarter of a century. They widened the breach between sovereigns and people, and rendered Liberalism desperate. Metternich and the Austrian government gained thereby a reputation for sinister bigotry, which was greater than they perhaps deserved. Yet from the Austrian and Metternich's point of view they were invaluable. Revolutionary movements were imminent all over Europe, threatening that stability in politics which was a necessity for the very existence of the Austrian Empire. If only Germany could be kept quiet, if only German Liberal movements could be effectively stifled, Austrian statesmen would have their hands free to deal with pressing outside problems. This is the justification for the Carlsbad Decrees. As a far-seeing and statesmanlike measure they were deplorable; as a practical, temporary, patriotic, political experiment, they were entirely successful.

Carlsbad
Decrees



13



CHAPTER IX

THE SYSTEM IN ITALY

Metternich's various visits to Italy—The conditions prevailing in the several States of Italy—The stifling of nationality and individuality in the Italian provinces ruled by Austria—Metternich is aware of the prevalent evils, but professes to attribute them to the presence of Russian revolutionary agents—The outbreak of the Neapolitan Revolution gives Metternich an opportunity of employing the Holy Alliance as a means towards Austrian aggrandisement—The Congresses of Troppau and Laibach enhance Metternich's prestige—Austrian troops restore order in Naples—A revolution in Piedmont is easily suppressed—Opposition only whets the harshness of Austrian rule in Italy—Predominant position of Austria in Europe

ONE reason why Metternich had sought so strenuously to curb German Liberalism was the necessity of combating revolutionary movements in Italy.

Metternich was no stranger to Italy. Even before his visit in the suite of the Emperor Francis in 1819 he had twice travelled in the Peninsular. In the spring of 1816 what he had intended to be a flying visit was prolonged by a complaint in one of his eyes, and in² the following year he escorted to Leghorn the Archduchess Leopoldene, who had just been married by proxy to the Crown Prince of Portugal and was on her way to her new home.

The party traversed North Italy by easy stages, stopping amongst other places at Padua, Venice, Ferrara, Bologna, and Florence. In letters to his

wife and others Metternich characteristically describes his experiences and impressions. At Venice he was chiefly impressed with the late hours observed by the inhabitants. "The people are in the streets till day-break, the cafés close at five in the morning." Everything delighted him, weather, gondolas, the big tents erected in the Piazza in front of St Mark's, the women. "The only ugly thing I have seen," he wrote to his wife, "are those horrible old witches one meets everywhere, their grey hair streaming in the wind, and all having bouquets of roses or perhaps one great rose fastened to their horrid old wigs"; and he enclosed a sketch of "one of these nymphs of the Lagoons." On the journey from Venice to Florence some of the roads were terrible, and between Rovigo and Lagoscuro, at the point where the road crossed the Po, the only choice was between "being drowned in the Po or smothered by the dust of a narrow causeway."

Everywhere the party were magnificently entertained, especially at Bologna and Ferrara. At the latter town the Cardinal-Legate arranged a concert "in one of the great theatres, not being able to give us a play, which, for want of spectators, can only be managed once or twice a year." At Bologna Metternich was delighted to find that the Librarian of the University could talk "thirty languages," although he had never left Bologna and "never had a master." Hindoostanee and Chinese were the only tongues which embarrassed him. After the arrival of the Archduchess' suite at Florence, Metternich wrote to his wife describing all he had seen, which "far surpasses my expectation." He went into ecstasies over the

art-treasures, the flowers, even the "luccioli" of Florence. "Great God!" he exclaims, "what men they were in past times," and again, "I protest that the Grand Duke is the richest man in the world." He was pleased to find that the Venus de Medici was much better placed in the Pitti Palace than it had been in Paris. Before leaving Florence Metternich purchased "a charming copy of Canova's Venus and an enormous alabaster vase, at a ridiculous price." Besides exhausting the sights of Florence itself, Metternich made excursions to Fiesole and Pisa.

On July 18th, the Archduchess arrived at Leghorn, only to learn that the Portuguese squadron, "this devil of a fleet," as Metternich impatiently called it, which was to escort her to Lisbon, was many days overdue. Metternich, after visiting an American man-of-war lying in the harbour, which in his opinion surpassed such English ships as he had seen in appearance and neatness, though not in respect to the physique of the crew, went off to Lucca, "the most charming spot in the world," for a course of baths. On the 26th news came that the Portuguese squadron had arrived, but on being informed that it would take at least ten days to re-victual, Metternich remained at Lucca, convinced that "the Portuguese are the slowest people in the world." It was at length arranged that the Archduchess should set sail on August 15th. The Ex-Empress Marie Louise came to Leghorn to bid her sister farewell, and numerous festivities attended the handing over of the bride to her husband's subjects. The Portuguese gave a grand dinner in her honour, which "did not do credit to the cook of his Imperial and Royal

Apostolic Majesty." The Crown Princess had luxurious quarters on the flagship, the "Jean VI.," and a large suite of attendants. Metternich found the ship loaded with "cows, calves, pigs, sheep, 4000 fowls, some hundreds of ducks, and from four to five hundred canaries, as well as large and small birds from Brazil." "The Ark of old Noah," he comments, "was a child's toy in comparison with the 'Jean VI.'"

While he was still at Florence, Metternich had the pleasure of writing to inform his wife that she had been decorated by the Emperor Francis with the Order of St Elizabeth. He enclosed the ribbon, which ought to have been rose-coloured but had been turned by the sea-air into a sort of straw colour. "The Order itself," he wrote, "is superb; it is generally given only to Queens and Princesses of the blood."

Metternich's eye, which had again been causing him trouble, rapidly improved under the care of Dr Jaeger, a famous Italian oculist. This doctor astonished Metternich by his tales of the ignorance of surgery and medicine prevalent in Italy, aggravated by a law which enacted that only the blind might beg, and thus encouraged poor people to do their utmost to make themselves blind. On one occasion a poor man, whose sight Dr Jaeger had offered to restore, asked if the Doctor was also prepared to undertake his maintenance.

After the departure of the Portuguese squadron, Metternich remained a few days at Leghorn and then returned to Lucca, which he did not leave until August 30th. At both places he entertained the principal inhabitants. He then proceeded to pay brief visits to the Courts of Parma and Modena and

to Marie Louise at Carrara, after which he returned to Vienna.

In the Italian Peninsula Austria was practically supreme. The North was either directly ruled from Vienna, as in the case of Lombardy and Venice, or by Austrian Archdukes, as in the case of Tuscany and Modena. In the South, Austria had restored the Bourbons to the throne of Naples, where the incomparable Ferdinand proceeded under Austrian 'auspices to undo most of what his predecessor, Murat, had accomplished.

Metternich, himself, always regarded Italy as an Austrian "sphere of influence," in which no one else must meddle. At the Congress of Vienna, when Talleyrand suggested that the affairs of Italy ought to be discussed, Metternich rejoined that Italy was merely a "geographical expression." Metternich even had some idea of forming an Italian Federation under Austrian leadership, and the Pope's strenuous opposition to this scheme strengthened the Austrian Minister's dislike of ultra-montane influence.

Perhaps the least unhappy portions of Italy were those presided over by independent rulers of the Hapsburg House, who were not entirely at the beck and call of the Court of Vienna, and permitted some measure of liberty to filter through the institutions of their dominions. But the provinces ruled directly from Vienna were full of misery. Liberal aspirations were as strong in Italy as elsewhere. Yet nowhere were they more throttled and discouraged. There was no sentimental tie between Austria and her Italian possessions, and she attempted to substitute for it a system of closely centralized government.

Everything was worked from Vienna ; all officials were Austrian, and all initiative was deprecated. The Archdukes, Antony and Rainer, who were successively placed in charge of the Lombardo-Venetian territories, though not unwilling to give rein to milder sentiments were not allowed a free hand, while officials who seemed too leniently disposed to Italian Liberalism were constantly being recalled. Education was discouraged in accordance with the Emperor's view that "obedient subjects were more desirable than enlightened citizens," and the Emperor's visit to Italy in 1815, which had raised high hopes of better things, especially at Venice, proved utterly barren of results. Enterprise in trade was systematically stifled ; and although taxation continued to increase Italian commercial prosperity miserably declined.

Metternich was not ignorant of the parlous condition of North Italy. In 1817 a commission was appointed to report on Italian affairs. The result of its investigations was to convince Metternich that the prevalent discontent in the Austrian provinces was due partly to natural causes and the general unrest, but chiefly to bad government. He even suggested that some form of self-government might be devised in Lombardo-Venetia in order to counteract the idea that Austria wished to Germanize Italy. This was not likely to meet with the approval of Francis, who, in answer to a deputation asking for a constitution presided over by an Austrian Prince, had exclaimed that the Lombards must forget that they were Italians. Metternich also suggested that it would be well to admit some native Italians to public offices and to arrange for the quicker dispatch

of business. Happily, he reported, good relations existed between the clergy and the government, and although the revolutionary sects were very powerful, especially in Genoa and Bologna, yet they had no leaders of repute, and so long as no foreign Power intervened were not dangerous. Russia was the only danger in this respect. The presence of Russian agents among the discontented Italians was a constant bugbear to Metternich. He talked to the Austrian Ambassador in London of the "pitiable creatures" composing the Russian Cabinet, who devoted their whole efforts to intriguing against the conservative principles of Austria. To Gentz he wrote in 1819, "If Russian agents did not go about in Italy and encourage the sects to hopes founded on the Liberalism of the Emperor Alexander there would be hardly any active agitation in the minds of the people. Italians talk loud but do not act." Four years afterwards he wrote, "Three or four years ago Italy swarmed with them, and every individual of them openly preached revolt, though he gave it to be understood that he was no agent of his Government. Is it credible at the present moment that during the journey of the Grand Duke Michael, La Harpe, who accompanied him, was received in every city by a club of the Carbonari, to whom he promised the Emperor's support?" There is little doubt that Metternich exaggerated the influence of foreign agents in exciting discontent in Italy. It was convenient to conceal the real reason—Austrian misrule. For quite apart from the fact that he had the information of the 1817 Commission, he accompanied Francis to Italy in 1819 and was able to observe both the sullen demeanour

of the people and the evidences of misgovernment. He did indeed suggest that intercommunication should be encouraged between Austrian manufacturers and Italian retailers, and greater facilities should be granted to youths entering commercial or literary professions for learning the Italian languages. But undoubtedly Metternich either did not wish or had not the courage to grapple with the root of the evil. He was content to deplore the wicked machinations of foreign mischief-makers, and at the same time to allow the Austrian dominions in Italy to be administered by men who had no stake in the country, who neither cared for nor understood the Italian people, and who really instituted a definite system of Germanizing Italy.

The eyes of European statesmen were first attracted to Italy by an outbreak not in the Austrian Provinces but in the Bourbon kingdom of Naples. As a result of a military revolution in July 1820 King Ferdinand was forced by his people to grant them a constitution, which he swore, with an admirable appearance of sincerity, to observe and defend.

Metternich's attitude towards the Neapolitan revolution is an excellent example of his method of adapting the principles of the Holy Alliance, in regard to the intervention of the Powers in the affairs of individual States, to the needs and interests of Austrian policy. Lately he had been propounding the doctrine of non-intervention. In the spring there had been a revolution in Spain, which ultimately spread to Portugal. In the latter country the mob insulted the Austrian Ambassador, which called forth the anger of the Chancellor. But both here and in

Spain he insisted that matters should be allowed to take their own course. The Czar was anxious to march Russian troops across Europe into the Spanish Peninsula to quell the revolts, but Metternich would not hear of it. Spain, he said, was suffering from a material complaint, while Europe was afflicted morally. Whatever he meant by this it was plain that he would have no Russian intervention, which might be detrimental to Austrian influence. Even when it was ultimately arranged that France should undertake the task of restoring absolutism in Spain, Metternich was at first apprehensive that the French would become as preponderant in the Spanish Peninsula as the Austrians were in the Italian.

Yet in spite of these professions of the non-intervention principle Metternich had no hesitation in intriguing against the King of Portugal, who seemed inclined to abide by the constitution which he had been forced to accept, and in promoting an absolutist reaction which ultimately compelled him to rescind it. In Switzerland, too, on which the Austrian Chancellor always kept a paternal eye, he insisted upon the appointment of a censor, the suspension of the Liberty of the Press and the suppression of Liberal publications.

It is not surprising, then, that in Italy Metternich soon showed that he had every intention of intervening. Italy was in perilous proximity to the Austrian Empire ; there was danger of contagion if revolution was allowed to thrive. King Ferdinand had at once written for advice to Metternich, who communicated with the Czar and the King of Prussia. What Metternich particularly did not want was a European Congress. He had no wish to see the problems of

Italian Government investigated by the Powers. He wanted Austria, and Austria alone, to interfere. This did not suit the Czar, who saw an opportunity of bringing the Holy Alliance into prominence by means of a Congress; and pressed for a meeting of the representatives of the Powers. Great Britain and France supported him.

In the end a conference was arranged to take place at Troppau. It commenced deliberations on October 20th. All Metternich's efforts were directed to procuring a free hand for Austria. He issued a cleverly worded Circular to the Powers, claiming that their interests in respect of the Neapolitan Question were identical with those of Austria. All the Powers were interested in maintaining the Treaties of 1815; movements such as the recent revolution in Italy threatened the stability of the Treaties; consequently all that had to be settled were the means to be taken to deal with the situation. Circulars proved less efficacious in the case of the Czar than quiet talks with Metternich over a cup of tea. The Austrian statesman exerted all his powers of fascination to gild the pill of Austrian intervention in Italy. Fortune aided him. A mutiny occurred in a regiment of Russian guards. Alexander believed that it was part of a Liberal plot to distract him from the business of the Congress. "This shows," wrote Metternich, "how much the Czar has changed." Indeed, if we may believe Metternich, Alexander made an abject confession of his former errors. "To-day I deplore all that I said and did between the years 1815 and 1818. I regret the time lost; we must study to retrieve it."

When, therefore, the scene of the deliberations of

Troppau

1820

the Congress was shifted to Laibach, Metternich could count upon the support of the Czar. Ferdinand, with characteristic perfidy, deserted his people and his newly-granted Constitution, and declared his willingness to attend the Congress of Laibach. Here Metternich easily convinced him that he had taken the oath of fidelity to the Constitution under compulsion and was not bound to adhere to it. The Neapolitan Foreign Minister, the Duke of Gallo, was accordingly summoned to Laibach and informed, to his dismay, by his royal master that he had annulled the Constitution, and that for any further particulars he must refer to Metternich, in whom he might place implicit confidence. When the unfortunate Minister did apply to Metternich, he was received with little courtesy and returned disconsolate to face the indignation of his master's subjects.

The trend of events in Italy confirmed Metternich in advocating a firm policy. Not only had there been a rising in Piedmont, but there were sinister movements in Lombardy and Venetia. Metternich found no difficulty in convincing the Powers that it was Austria's function to act the policeman by virtue of her proximity to the scene of action, her interests in Italy, and the fact that she had guaranteed the possession of the throne of Naples to the Bourbons. He told Castlereagh that Great Britain need not be alarmed, since Austria only favoured intervention in the internal movements of a country when those movements had an external effect. It was accordingly agreed that sixty thousand Austrian troops should be sent to restore order and the Bourbons to South Italy. Alexander was naturally anxious to take a

part in the military operations, but had to be content with holding one hundred and fifty thousand men in readiness in case their help should be needed. It was certain that Metternich would do his best to ensure that it should not.

At first there seems to have been some apprehension that the Neapolitans would offer the same sort of popular resistance to the Austrians as the Spanish guerillas had to Napoleon. But old King Ferdinand had justly remarked of his army, "You may dress it in blue or in green or in red, but whichever you do it will run"; and the campaign which ensued is one of the farces of history. Happily for Metternich the Neapolitan army was even more inefficient and disorganized than the Austrian, and in thirteen days—the almost bloodless march of the Austrian troops commenced on February 6th, 1821—Ferdinand was back again in Naples, prepared, now that he was freed from the fetters of a constitution, to enter upon a fresh period of reactionary despotism.

The success of Metternich's policy was no less evident in the North. Order was restored in Lombardy and the rising in Piedmont was easily suppressed. The latter would have had some chance of success if it had occurred simultaneously with the revolution in Naples. But as it was, although the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel and the appointment as Regent of Charles Albert, Prince of Carignano, who was known to be in favour of a united Italy, seemed to augur well for the movement, the much-discussed conduct of Charles Albert, who at first consented to lead the revolt and then drew back, and the stubborn refusal of the new King, Charles Felix, to countenance

the granting of a constitution or a rising against Austrian domination in Italy, assured the ultimate failure of the scheme. A few ardent spirits raised the standard of Italy and of revolt, but at Novara the hopes of the patriots were dashed to the ground by the crushing victory of the Austrian troops.

The result of these abortive movements was to render Austrian rule, which had always been severe, positively tyrannous towards the Northern provinces of Italy.

An Aulic Council was established in Vienna to superintend the two provinces and to crush the spirit of local independence. There were numerous arrests and every effort was made to terrorize Italians out of sentiments of patriotism. The fate of Count Federigo Confalonieri, the leader of the literary movement in Italy, excited the pity even of the Empress of Austria. It is fairly certain that his condemnation was the result of a deliberate policy of providing political criminals at all costs, and the story reflects little credit upon Metternich. It was difficult to prove the Count's guilt, and so fearful was Metternich that he might escape punishment that he wrote to the Milanese officials, "It is of the utmost importance that this leader of the Liberal party should never at any time reappear on the scenes as a victim of arbitrary power." Eventually sentence of death was passed. This was commuted to penal servitude for life. Even now the unfortunate Count was not left in peace. While passing through Vienna the prisoner noticed that he was being treated with greater courtesy and kindness. He had not long to wait for an explanation. He received a visit from Metternich, whom he had last met in Paris at the

wedding of Marie Louise. The Chancellor used all his powers of fascination to induce his victim to give evidence against his associates. But threats and blandishments alike were of no avail, and they parted politely, Metternich on his way to a ball, Confalonieri to lifelong confinement.

No wonder that discontent daily grew, that armies of spies had to be employed by the Government, that the police and officials themselves were watched by other police and officials, that the dungeons of the Spielberg were soon teeming with political prisoners, and that the downtrodden, overtaxed, unrepresented peoples of Italy were ready to snatch at any hope of shaking off Austrian domination. For it was evident that the Austrian Government was definitely determined to strengthen and not to relax the bonds of a tyrannous, alien and over-centralized government.

It is unfair to blame Metternich altogether for the harsh treatment meted out to Italian Liberals. Again and again during the lifetime of the Emperor Francis he pleaded for the release of the hosts of political prisoners confined in Austrian dungeons. He was not cruel or vindictive by nature, but the bigoted obstinacy of Francis thwarted all his efforts. It was not until the accession of Ferdinand that anything in the nature of an amnesty was granted to political offenders. Still a stronger man than Metternich might have forced the Emperor to see the wisdom of clemency, and the Chancellor's policy towards the Italian provinces of the Austrian Empire is only one of the many illustrations of the inherent weakness of his character.

But whatever may be said of the manner in which

he used his victory, there can be no question that Metternich had been, for the time at least, entirely successful in his manipulation of Italian problems. There is no better illustration of his deft use of the shadowy ideals of the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe to defeat Liberalism and enhance the prestige of Austria than his conduct at the Conferences of Troppau and Laibach. So strong was Austria's position in Europe that he had been able to defy Great Britain and France and go his own way in spite of their disapproval. Russia had been entirely converted from Liberal ways, and the spectacle had been witnessed of Austria advancing in arms as the representative of Europe to curb revolution while Russia meekly waited in the background in case her services should be demanded. "It looks," wrote Metternich, "as though the dawn of a better day was beginning to break." Yet it was from Russia that arose the little cloud that gradually dimmed the serene sky of Austrian supremacy in Europe.

CHAPTER X

THE EASTERN QUESTION

After the Congress of Laibach, Metternich returns to Vienna and finds that he has been appointed Haus-, Hof-, und Staatskanzler—The beginning of "The Eastern Question"—Metternich's interest in it is due to fear of Russia's designs on Turkey—At the Congress of Laibach, he succeeds in restraining Russia from aiding the Greek insurgents—The attention of Europe is diverted to the Revolution in Spain—Metternich visits George IV. at Hanover and thence repairs to Johannesburg—Suicide of Castlereagh—At the Congress of Verona, in spite of Great Britain's opposition, France is authorized to intervene in Spain—Metternich accompanies the Emperor Francis to Czernowitz, where a meeting has been arranged with the Czar—Owing to illness, Metternich is unable to attend the Conference, which is a failure—Illness and death of Princess Metternich at Paris—Metternich goes to Paris—And thence travels to Italy with his son Victor—The continuance of "The Eastern Question" renews tension between Austria and Russia—Death and character of the Czar Alexander—Metternich draws up a Memorandum on the conduct of the Powers regarding the Eastern Question—Stubborn attitude of Canning, who refuses to allow intervention in Greece—And thwarts Metternich's policy in regard to the South American Colonies and Portugal—Effect of British policy on the Metternich System—Metternich purchases the estate of Plass and shortly afterwards visits Königswart—A Conference of the Powers meets in London to discuss the Eastern Question—The Treaty of London, from which Austria and Prussia dissented, results in the Battle of Navarino—Metternich's second marriage startles Viennese society—The death of Canning marks a change in British policy—Metternich connives at the recognition of the Independence of Greece, convinced that Turkey has lost her hold upon it

METTERNICH had thoroughly enjoyed the Congress of Laibach. Not only was his policy successful—"we have accomplished great and good things," he remarked when all was over—but

he was comfortably lodged and the country was pretty. He was genuinely sorry to leave.

Staatskanzler
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By May 28th, 1821, he was back in Vienna, where he found new honours awaiting him. He had been appointed Haus-, Hof-, und Staatskanzler. "In this new position," he wrote, "my sphere of action will be much enlarged." In June he went to Baden for a short course of baths. He had sold his house there against the wishes of his wife, because he hated revisiting the spot where his daughter Marie had died.

At this period he was very busy, and many of his letters show that his great success had increased his never very dormant sense of his own importance. On August 28th he writes, "Eight days ago my mother invited me to visit her at her villa, which is a mile and a half from Vienna. I entered my carriage at eight o'clock in the evening. By nine o'clock the report was spread that I had posted off to meet the Emperor Alexander. Hence it was concluded that a very grave crisis was to be feared, whilst the same evening at eleven o'clock five-and-twenty of my intimate friends assembled at my house. Another proof that I cannot stir without making a sensation." He mentions that his hair had turned quite white, "at which I am less astonished than at its tenacity in not leaving me altogether."

It was in 1821 that the Eastern Question first began seriously to attract the attention of Europe. In March came news of an outbreak in the Danubian Principalities. Prince Hypsilanti, a Major-General in the Russian army but a Greek by nationality, had crossed the Danube with a small following of Greek patriots and foreign adventurers in the hope

of inciting a universal rising of patriotic Greeks within the Turkish dominions to be supported ultimately by Russia. This outbreak was, to a great extent, the fault of the Turkish Government, which had allowed Greek patriotic sentiment together with the elements of Greek naval power to grow up beneath their eyes unchecked and almost unnoted. At first sight it would seem that a rising of Greeks against Turks had little to do with Metternich ; and indeed it was not so much the quarrel itself as the results of the quarrel which caused the Eastern Question to occupy a large part of his attention for the next decade.

The real cause of Metternich's interest in Eastern affairs was Russia. Austria, since 1815, had turned her face towards the south and south-east of Europe as opposed to the west, and in this new direction Russia was her chief rival. Now Russia appeared desirous of taking any opportunity that presented itself of annexing portions of Turkey. Russia alone failed to regard Turkey as one of the Powers, and Alexander had never invited the Sultan to join the Holy Alliance. Moreover, the fact that the Greeks were Christians added to the favour with which the Czar regarded them.

Now Austria had formerly been famous as the bulwark of Christendom against the infidel. But Austria, and Great Britain too, had come to see that the rising power of Russia was more formidable than the waning power of Turkey, and that at all costs the Turkish Empire must be bolstered up. For this reason Metternich had constantly advised the Porte to beware of the movement in favour of Greek in-

dependence. "We have for some time warned the Ottoman Government of it," he wrote, "but they attached no importance to its existence."¹ Metternich knew well that there was great sympathy with the Greeks in Russia, that the Czar was much under the influence of his Greek Minister, Capodistrias, and that Russia was Turkey's worst enemy, ready to take advantage of every opportunity to do her harm.

As to the outbreak in the Danubian Principalities, Metternich was convinced that Alexander was not an accomplice. On March 26th, 1821, he wrote to Stadion, "As for the Greek Revolution, let it alone. I answer for it that the Emperor Alexander has as little to do with that now as with the Revolution in Piedmont. . . . The affair must be looked upon as beyond the pale of civilization." What alarmed Metternich was that Alexander was very anxious to interfere. To Russia the Danubian Principalities held the same relationship as Italy did to Austria. Russian support at Troppau and Laibach had enabled Austria to restore order in Naples. Why should not Austrian support now enable Russia to restore order in the Balkans, especially since the Turks had occupied certain territories under Russian influence and refused to evacuate them?

The matter was discussed at the Congress of Laibach, when Alexander did not prove very amenable. Metternich put forth all his powers of persuasion. The Russians, he said, were confusing "strict rights" with "the general interest." Austria was quite prepared to force Turkey to respect Treaty obligations

¹ "Autobiography of Prince Metternich," English translation, vol. iii. p. 523.

on which the European system was based and to yield to Russia's legitimate demands for the evacuation of the Principalities and the return to the *status quo* before the revolt. As to what appertained to "the general interest," Metternich promised that the Powers should, after consultation, provide some régime in the Turkish dominions calculated to obviate further troubles. At the same time Metternich, in conjunction with Lord Strangford, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, endeavoured to impress on the Porte the necessity for agreeing to Russia's minimum demands.

In the end Metternich's influence with the Czar triumphed over that of the Russian Minister's, Capodistrias, who was an ardent supporter of the Greeks. It was agreed that Russia should not actively intervene, and that the Eastern problem should be discussed at the Congress, which had been summoned to meet at Verona in September. Once again Metternich had triumphed; once again he had used the Concert as an instrument for the maintenance of stability. In a letter to Francis he talked of his triumph as "perhaps the greatest victory that one Cabinet has ever gained over another," and boasted that "with one blow the grand work of Peter the Great and all his successors" had been destroyed. Exaggeration of his own achievements was one of Metternich's weaknesses.

One reason for Alexander's unexpected docility in accepting Metternich's advice was that affairs in Spain were demanding the attention of European statesmen. In fact the original object of the Congress of Verona was to discuss the Spanish Question. "My views regarding Turkey," wrote Metternich in 1823,

"are different from those generally entertained. Turkey does not make me anxious, but France and Spain." For in the latter country the reactionary King Ferdinand VII. had been deposed, a Constitution had been proclaimed, and such a state of anarchy prevailed that Spain was becoming a danger to her neighbours.

Metternich had thrown cold water on a suggestion that Russian troops should be employed to restore order, and Great Britain had steadfastly refused to sanction a French invasion of Spain. Metternich had hoped to remedy this attitude on the part of Great Britain by a friendly conversation with Castlereagh at the Congress of Verona.

In October, after accompanying the Emperor Francis to Hungary to witness some manœuvres, Metternich had visited King George III. at Hanover. Here it was that Castlereagh had promised to attend the Congress of Verona. Although the British King greeted him affectionately and overwhelmed him with flattery, Metternich seems to have been rather bored with his visit, which consisted of a succession of dinners and a brief spell of "real Congress life, full of gala days."

From Hanover the Austrian Chancellor sought peace and rest at his estate of Johannisberg, visiting on the way no less than five Universities, at all of which he received a hearty welcome. "Travelling is a terrible affair in my present position," he grandiloquently wrote. "I am bored as monarchs are bored by the attention of the Courts which entertain me on my journey: and I am bored as a prophet is who is constantly asked advice by everyone." By

December 31st he was back in Vienna, where early in 1822 he received a curious request from the famous Ali Pasha of Janina, who, having revolted from his suzerain, the Sultan of Turkey, begged Metternich to send him a "constitution-maker." Ali was in great straits, and without quite knowing what a Constitution was, had apparently been told that it was a certain remedy for all evils. Metternich merely advised him to yield to Turkey. The Austrian Chancellor was, indeed, a curious person to go to in search of a constitution !

Early in the autumn of 1822 Castlereagh committed suicide, so that all hope of his attendance at the coming Congress was ended. Metternich was much distressed. Castlereagh had in many ways agreed with his views and had often proved a good ally, especially in regard to the Eastern Question. "He had learnt to understand me," wrote Metternich, "it will be years before another reaches the same stage of confidence."

Metternich spent most of the period between his visit to Hanover in the autumn of 1821 and the opening of the Congress of Verona in October 1822 in Vienna. He attended, not without grumbling, the Carnival which took place in January. "Nothing," he writes, "is so insupportable to me as a ball where not a corner is to be found to enjoy a quiet chat."

In April, to his great joy, an Italian Opera was established at Vienna. "It may be supposed," he wrote, "what delight this gives to a melomaniac like me." Indeed for some time he had been agitating to this end.

When not too busy, Metternich used to make up picnic parties of about fourteen or eighteen persons for driving excursions into the country. Vienna was adapted for this form of recreation, since by driving only a few miles outside the town one could be amongst the most delightful surroundings.

In July the Chancellor went through a "cure" of eighteen days at Baden, whither the Emperor had also repaired. Thence he returned to Vienna, where he went to hear a German Opera, with which he was much disappointed, coming to the melancholy conclusion that "a German voice is quite pitiable in comparison with an Italian."

The time was now approaching for the opening of the Congress of Verona, and in October Metternich left Vienna on his journey to Italy. As his family were now at Johannisberg, he suggested that his son Victor, whom he had not seen for several years, should meet him at Innsbruck. Metternich was very proud of Victor, "a tall and excellent young fellow, the quintessence of a 'fashionable,' new to the world, as people are at eighteen. He does not want for understanding, and if he is in a good mind he makes one laugh, for he has much humour." After the meeting at Innsbruck, the delighted father wrote again, "Victor loves his work as much as his Vienna friends love the Prater."¹

Metternich was sometimes affectedly "blasé." In a letter from Verona he complained that Count Lieven, the Russian Minister, was his "only social resource." Yet there is little doubt that the work of the Congress of Verona was carried on under just those conditions

¹ The Hyde Park of Vienna.

which he loved—the best society and some of the prettiest women in Europe, plenty of luxury, plenty of intrigue, and little necessity for haste.

For the success of Austrian policy at the Congress everything boded well. Not only the Eastern Question, but affairs in Spain and in other parts of Europe where the flames of Revolution had broken out, were to be discussed. Though Castlereagh's absence was regrettable, Wellington, at Metternich's request, had been sent out as the representative of the British Government. He would, no doubt, prove an amenable disciple of Metternich's gospel. "It was singular to see," wrote the Austrian Chancellor, "how my mere appearance caused the greatest expectation among all the different parties."

But Wellington proved a broken reed ; he adhered to the instructions which he had received from Canning, who had succeeded Castlereagh as Prime Minister, and steadfastly refused to agree to a French invasion of Spain for the restitution of King Ferdinand. It was no part of the policy of Great Britain to countenance interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. This was the first of many blows which Canning was to deal to Metternich's System. "English diplomacy at present," wrote the Chancellor, "is careful to spoil whatever lies within its reach."

There was no alternative for Metternich and his faithful trio of sovereigns but to ignore the attitude of Great Britain, and commission France to restore order in Spain. Accordingly a French army crossed the Pyrenees and without difficulty replaced Ferdinand on the throne. Metternich was delighted, and wrote that "the progress of the French operations makes

the same impression here (Vienna) as if it were a victorious Austrian army."

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The attitude of England had one important effect upon Metternich's position. It threw Austria more and more into the arms of Russia and facilitated a temporary solution of the Eastern Question. It was agreed at the Congress of Verona that Turkey should be left alone to restore order in Greece, and the Czar showed himself entirely amenable to the Austrian point of view.

All would doubtless have been well had the Turks proved capable of wearing down the resistance of the Greeks. But the rising was now general throughout Greece, foreign adventurers flocked to the aid of the rebels, Turkish trade was being ruined by daring pirate warfare, and Turkish armies proved unable to cope with a widespread system of elusive guerilla commandoes. Indeed, for eight years the Eastern Question loomed large before the fogged eyes of European statesmen. "That miserable Eastern Question is again coming to the front," wrote Metternich in October 1824.

On the conclusion of the Congress Metternich paid a brief visit to Venice, where he was joined by Gentz, and the two statesmen travelled together as far as Innsbruck. On his way back to Vienna Metternich spent a couple of days in Munich in order to attend the Golden Wedding of Prince and Princess Furstenberg, and a great banquet given in their honour by Prince John of Liechtenstein.

He found Vienna very dull, except for the Italian Opera, which "affords me great delight, for my life is so monotonous that the sound of something quite

different from what I am daily condemned to hear thrills through my whole being." His daughter, Melanie, had been ill, but was now completely recovered. He was pleased to find her tall, pretty, and very like poor Clementine, who had died four years before. At the end of May 1823 the rest of the family came up to Vienna from Johannisberg for the summer. "I am busy preparing for the reception of my family," he wrote on the 15th; "my sad solitary life comes to an end and my heart once more awakes. I am not made for loneliness."

Metternich had arranged that the Emperor Francis should meet the Czar in the autumn of 1823 at Czernowitz, in Bukowina, for the discussion of the Greek and other questions. As this meeting was to coincide with a sort of tour, on the part of Francis, of the eastern portions of his dominions, Metternich and he started from Vienna in September. Lemberg, in Galicia, was their first objective. Metternich was charmed with the country through which they passed, level and cultivated as far as Galicia, then rugged and mountainous, until the hills opened out into a broad, well-wooded plain bounded by mountains. He was impressed with the large population of Jews, who "swarm here." With Galicia itself he was much disappointed. The country was productive, but there were no means of exporting the products, and although many unrequired luxuries were obtainable, necessities were so expensive that proprietors were often in a state verging on pauperism.

On arrival at Lemberg, Metternich succumbed to an attack of rheumatic fever, which at first seemed trifling but ultimately kept him in bed until the last

week of October. The Emperor was most kind to him during his illness, and sat by his bedside for hours chatting on topics unconnected with politics in order not to worry him.

Since Metternich was unable to be present at the meeting of the Monarchs, which had been arranged for October 6th, Nesselrode, the Russian Minister, with whom Metternich had always been on the most friendly terms, came to talk matters over with him at Lemberg.

Metternich had attached great importance to the Czernowitz meeting. Earlier in the year he had written, "the thing will have an effect like the firing of a gun of the first calibre." But from the Austrian point of view there was a miss-fire.

The position was difficult. It was no longer possible to keep the Greek insurrection "beyond the pale of civilization," for it had become a national rising, and the British Government had recognized the rebels as belligerents. Also there is little doubt that the Czar was already secretly hankering after the liberation of the Greeks from Turkish domination. At any rate he proposed a conference at St Petersburg to discuss the erection of Greece and the Archipelago into three principalities under Ottoman suzerainty and guaranteed by the European Concert. This revealed to Metternich the trend of the Czar's intentions. He asserted that Austria would consent to no half measures. There must either be complete independence or complete subjection. Metternich was indeed now inclined to regard the Greeks in the light of Christians rather than as revolutionaries. "I confess," he wrote, "that I very much prefer the Greeks to the Turks, for both being barbarians there

is more hope of Christians than of Mussulmen. The English envoy at Constantinople took his side. "Stratford Canning has behaved very well here. I have brought him at every interview to see my point of view."

After the unsatisfactory conferences at Czernowitz and Lemberg, Metternich, who had now recovered from his illness, left the latter town on October 20th and continued his journey to Tarnow. The Emperor had left earlier in the month, but, thanks to the instructions he had thoughtfully given, Metternich was everywhere excellently accommodated, usually in the houses of the Captains of Circles.¹ Since Polish politeness required that rooms destined for guests should be absurdly over-heated, a courier, who always preceded him to each stopping-place, made it his business to see that the temperature was decently moderated, much to the surprise of the proprietors of the houses, who had been preparing according to their lights for the reception of an invalid.

By October 30th he was at Neutitschein, in Moravia. He notices the great contrast between that province and Galicia. The country was equally beautiful and in most respects similar. But whereas Galicia was almost Oriental in character, in Moravia civilization began to show. "No rags, homes neat, and inhabitants well-clothed: no Jews, no squalor, misery and death. . . . Two days ago (in Galicia) in a very low temperature I saw peasants working in the fields with no garments but a shirt, and their children, from two to four years old, sitting naked in the fields their parents were tilling. . . . The first little Silesian I

¹ The Austrian dominions were divided for judicial and administrative purposes into territorial divisions called Circles.

saw had a nice cap and frock and was carried by his mother, dressed in a good pelisse, with thick red worsted stockings and good shoes."

From Neutitschein Metternich made his way back to Vienna. At the end of July he began a course of baths at Ischl. The attentions of the other visitors flattered his vanity. "In every place where I halt," he wrote, "at every spot which I hurry by, a crowd presses towards me, surrounds me, gazes on me, smiles on me, and offers to shake hands." The baths did him a great deal of good, but the weather was variable. He spent much time in excursions into the country. At the end of August he went to stay with the Emperor, "in a real Castle, which stands on high rocks in the Danube." He was impressed with the simplicity which prevailed there. The homely arrangements were "far beneath those of a wealthy landowner," everything in the slightest degree bordering on luxury was banished, facts which "might disconcert the most radical of radicals."

He returned to Vienna during the first week in December. The city was "lonely and deserted," except for the Diplomatic Corps, and his only amusement was the Opera, "which is all one can desire."

After a brief sojourn at Vienna, Metternich's family had returned to Paris, the climate of which suited them better. Nevertheless, in January 1825, news came that the Princess was ill. Metternich was much perturbed, fearing that if her lungs were affected the malady would prove fatal. His absence from the scene of her illness increased his anxiety, and his family, with the mistaken intention of allaying it, refused to allow even the doctor to send him news.

This Metternich could not endure, and at last dispatched a special courier to find out the truth. His depression was increased by the grave condition of the Emperor Francis, whose life was at this period for a time despaired of, and by the constant nightmare of the Eastern Question.

By the beginning of February he received such alarming accounts of his wife's illness that he hurried to Paris. The sufferer lingered on for over a month, but on March 19th passed away. "From her childhood deeply religious," wrote the bereaved statesman, "she felt towards God as a child to a father. . . . It was the departure of a beautiful soul." Yet there have been many happier marriages than that which death had just dissolved.

Indeed, reasons of State had brought the Chancellor to Paris as well as anxiety for his wife; for in view of the threatening political atmosphere he wished to win over King Charles X. to his views on the Eastern Question, and more especially to gain his support against Canning in the matter of the South American colonies. Consequently he remained in Paris with his son Victor until the middle of April.

It cannot be said that he made even a pretence of mourning for his wife. By April 2nd he was going into society. "I have dined to-day," he wrote, "at the Palais Royal with the Duke of Orleans. The Duchess I like very much. She is one of my oldest friends and a thoroughly excellent woman. We spent the evening together, and the Duke showed me his fine collection of modern pictures." He then describes his busy life in Paris. "I get up at seven o'clock and write till ten, when the most remarkable

people came to me, many of them quite strangers to one another—Ministers, place-hunters, ultra-Legitimists, Bonapartists, Jacobins, and Jesuits, a complete valley of Jehoshaphat ; at one o'clock I endeavour to get rid of all my visitors and go for a walk to see how Paris has altered in ten years. There is plenty of fine material. At six o'clock I go to a not very agreeable dinner. At nine I go home and join some of the men whose company is pleasant to me. . . . There we analyze the perfection of social institutions or discuss the history of the time, and those are my only happy hours."

He constantly had to attend soirées given in his honour, at which he usually met his old antagonist and ally Talleyrand. On the eleventh he dined with King Charles X., and wrote to Gentz with obvious satisfaction that since the Restoration only two other foreigners had been honoured with a similar invitation, Lord Moira and the Duke of Wellington.

On the 17th of April Metternich and Victor left Paris for Milan, driving in the latter's calèche through Marseilles, Nice, and the Corniche over the Splügen Pass.

They left Milan on July 4th, and spent some days visiting various places on the Italian lakes, at all of which they were effusively welcomed. At Sondrio the Emperor had been expected, and consequently Metternich was treated to all the ceremony intended for his master. "Illuminations, fireworks, operas, deputations—everything must I swallow." "The people," he commented, "are so thoroughly Austrian in their feelings that I cannot help loving them."

Meanwhile the Eastern Question still occupied the

minds of European statesmen. Russia was still the ambiguous factor in the problem. "Thick mists lie on the Neva," wrote Metternich to Gentz. The conduct of Great Britain, too, which had refused to continue further negotiations, was eminently unsatisfactory. "The Greek Question," complained Metternich, "is clear and simple, if one is not afraid to look it in the face. I do not understand the part that Wellington plays; when not in the battlefield does he lose the energy he there displays?"

The result was that Austria and Russia were left face to face. Meanwhile Austrian Levant trade suffered from the continuous naval warfare, and a settlement became more and more imperative. All that had been done hitherto by the Powers was to send a Joint Note to the Porte offering mediation. This had been indignantly refused.

Tension between Austria and Russia became more and more serious. Neither would yield and it seemed as if war must result. Then suddenly, in December 1826, came the news of the death of Alexander. A grand but eccentric figure was thus removed from the stage of European politics. "Alexander," wrote Metternich to Neumann some months after the event, "was, unhappily, the child of the age, always going from one religion to another, from one taste to another; he moved everything and built nothing. Everything in him was superficial and exaggerated and he was inclined to prefer bad means to good." This was an unfair judgment. Alexander was a strange mixture of earnestness and frivolity, of Liberal sentiments and almost Oriental despotism, of religion and vice. Nevertheless, until the advent

of the Greek Question, he had proved himself a good ally to Austria, and his death was a great blow to the system of the Holy Alliance.

Metternich took it for granted that the Grand Duke Constantine would succeed to the throne of Russia. Indeed, he wrote a somewhat premature letter on December 18th to Ottenfels, the Austrian Ambassador at St Petersburg, expressing his pleasure at the prospect. "I deceive myself," he wrote, "if the History of Russia does not begin where the Romance of Russia ends." Constantine, he thought, was a far more practical man than Alexander, whereas "if the Grand Duke Nicholas were to succeed . . . it would be impossible to cast any horoscope whatever of the new reign."

However, by March 1826 it was Nicholas who occupied the throne. "I do not know a more difficult post to occupy," Metternich told Neumann, "than that of the Emperor Nicholas." The change was not to Metternich's taste, for Nicholas was known to regard him with aversion and to favour Liberal doctrines. It soon appeared that Austrian policy was going to wreck over the Greek Question. In January Metternich had drawn up a Memoir for the instruction of the Archduke Ferdinand, who was about to visit St Petersburg as the Austrian representative at Nicholas' coronation. It is interesting as showing Metternich's idea of the part which Austria had played. Originally, he said, all Europe had condemned the Greek rising as a revolutionary outbreak and the Powers had been prevented from immediately helping Turkey to quell it, not by public opinion, which was originally little in favour of the Greeks, but by the fact that the

Greeks were Christians. Passive neutrality, therefore, was the only correct attitude for the Powers to maintain. But Russia had spoilt this plan by attempting to advise the Porte. The Porte refused the advice, and Russia, thinking herself rebuffed, recalled her Ambassador, thus depriving herself of her ability to correspond with the Porte. Europe had, therefore, to intervene to calm the differences of Russia and Turkey. This was accomplished by the Congress of Verona and the meeting at Czernowitz. The Powers agreed to Austria's proposals to separate the two branches of the Problem, namely, Russia's claims against and the relations of the Greeks to the Porte. By 1824 the first difficulty had been solved, and Austria's efforts peacefully to compose the Eastern Question seemed assured, when Great Britain saw fit to retire from the Conference. This showed Turkey that the Powers were not unanimous and she promptly refused to allow this pacific intervention in Greece. Then followed the inevitable split between Austria and Russia.

The conduct of Great Britain, to which Metternich had drawn attention in his Memorandum, was typical of her attitude towards Austrian policy since the Congress of Verona. It has been remarked with truth that if any one man can be credited with causing the decline of Metternich's System that man was Canning. He did nothing with the overt intention of crushing that System, but ignored it with such supreme and open contempt, and supported those who were jeopardized by its action with such fearlessness and candour, that he broke mesh after mesh of the net with which, under the specious guise of the

Holy Alliance, Metternich sought to entangle the nations of Europe.

In 1824 Canning had opposed the extension of the principles of the Holy Alliance to the New World. Metternich seriously wished to deal with the Spanish colonists in South America, who had revolted from the Mother-Country, as he had dealt with revolution in Germany, Italy, and Spain. When, shortly after the Congress of Verona, Canning had suggested that the South American colonists should be recognized by the Powers, the Austrian Chancellor repudiated the suggestion with such warmth that he was credited with the madcap idea of organizing a gigantic modern Crusade, having for its goal not Acre or Jerusalem, but Buenos Aires and Valparaiso. Any such scheme was rendered futile, in view of Great Britain's overwhelming maritime supremacy, by Canning's curt intimation that he would allow nothing of the sort.

Irritated at Canning's successful opposition, in which he was supported by France, Metternich combined attendance at his wife's deathbed with an attempt to win over Charles X. to his views during a brief visit to France early in 1824. He wrote peremptorily to Canning that the members of the Holy Alliance could not tolerate any other than the monarchical principle. Canning's sole but very effective reply was to begin recognizing the respective South American States so soon as they proved the stability of their governments.

But more pinpricks for Metternich were to come. Great Britain had consistently refused to recognize that the Holy Alliance had any right to interfere in Greece, and had pursued her own course oblivious of any

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"Metternich System." Now she induced Czar Nicholas, only a few months after his accession, to recognize the independence of Greece (April 4th, 1826). Metternich was furious; all his calculations were upset; save for Prussia, a broken reed, Austria was isolated in Europe. No wonder that he talked of "the crafty and unscrupulous mind of Mr Canning," and of "the present British Cabinet" as "the natural accomplice of all the extravagancies of the time." No wonder that while his Chancellor called the British Prime Minister a "blockhead," the staid Emperor Francis exclaimed that the "Devil must have taken possession of the fellow."

1826
Before the end of the year Metternich had another bone to pick with Canning. During a succession of revolutions and counter-revolutions which had taken place in Portugal practically since the Congress of Verona, Metternich had continually supported the reactionary, Great Britain the constitutional party. On the death of King John VI. the kingdom fell to his daughter Donna Maria, who was supported by Great Britain in her desire to govern constitutionally. Metternich at once began to intrigue against her and endeavoured to enlist France and Spain on his side. To his disgust, Canning paid a flying visit to Paris and induced the French Government to remain neutral, whereupon a revolution, fomented by Austria, and supported by Spanish troops, placed Donna Maria and the existence of the Portuguese constitution in the gravest danger. But Canning made quick work. In December 1826 he dispatched a British fleet and army to Lisbon, which effectually thwarted Metternich's aims, and,

to the Austrian Chancellor's dismay, followed this up by a strong speech in the House of Commons directed against the principles of Absolutism.

Though Canning's action in each of these instances was perhaps due as much to regard for the commercial interests of Great Britain as for the cause of Liberty, or the constitutional and national aims of Greece, Portugal, or the South American colonies, yet the effect on Metternich's policy was equally disastrous, and Metternich knew it. Russia and Prussia, formerly stalwarts of the Holy Alliance, no longer gave him their whole-hearted support. It is abundantly clear from the contemporary correspondence of Russian, Prussian, and Austrian statesmen, nay of Metternich himself, that they regarded the System as in process of decay. So long as it had represented the struggle of Monarchy against Revolution it succeeded; it was bound to fail when it supported Absolutism against constitutional principles.

Troubles in Hungary increased Metternich's ill-humour. To his son Victor he wrote in October, "My situation is like that of a crucified man: one arm is nailed to Constantinople and the other to Lisbon; home affairs occupy the trunk; Mr Canning is my crucifix and the Hungarian Diet the sponge steeped in vinegar."

Early in 1826 Metternich had bought an estate called Plass.¹ In announcing the fact to Victor he enclosed in his letter some engravings of the place. "I shall be much surprised," he wrote, "if you have ever seen anything grander. Besides the château—that is, the old abbey—there are three others of less

¹ In Western Bohemia.

importance. We must decide on the spot which of them can be made habitable without a ruinous expenditure."

In July urgent affairs of State obliged Metternich to visit Hungary. While he was going through some papers with the Chancellor of Hungary, with whom he had been quietly dining, he had the unpleasant experience of seeing his host suddenly seized with an apoplectic fit and expire while in the middle of a sentence. Shortly after this untoward event he went to reside at Königswart for some weeks. He wrote a long letter to his mother describing the numerous improvements which he had made in the place, quite regardless of the expense. Amongst other items he had drained a lake and converted it into meadowland, built new stables on the site of a public-house and a new farm, designed a sham Swiss castle and laid out a park two leagues in circumference. He was distressed to find that the proximity of Marienbad had destroyed the former seclusion of Königswart. People were constantly coming to admire the grounds and park, and Metternich had to do a considerable amount of entertaining. From Königswart he went on to Johannisberg, spending one night at Frankfort, as he had to interview the King of Bavaria at Aschaffenburg. At Johannisberg, as at Königswart, many improvements had been begun, which would not be completed for about four years. The gardens were beautiful, and Metternich spent a great deal of his time showing visitors round them. One day he took a party on an excursion to Coblenz by water. One of his visitors was Lord Hertford, "an old friend of mine and the most decided Tory in England," whose "society is congenial and our politics the same."

Even at Johannisberg Metternich found that he was overwhelmed with visitors. "Every day I have from thirty to forty people to dinner. All Frankfort and the neighbouring towns inflict themselves upon me."

By October 14th he was back in Vienna. He wrote to Victor that a new drawing-room which he had been building was just finished and that he was going to open it with a ball. He claimed to have invented a method of ventilation. Four apertures had been constructed in the ceiling, "of which two are for the introduction of fresh air and two act as syphons to expel the heated air."

The ball was actually given on February 12th of the following year, and was apparently such a success that Metternich gave another ball and a concert in this ingeniously ventilated chamber. All these festivities took place during the Vienna Carnival.

Towards the end of 1826 Russia, although still acting under British influence, had so far shown signs of a desire for a rapprochement with Austria, that a Conference was arranged to take place in London to discuss the Eastern Question.

To Prince Esterhazy, the Austrian representative at the Conference, Metternich issued minute instructions. First of all unanimity must be obtained between the five Powers. Then an amnesty must be obtained from the Sultan for the Greek belligerents, and after that a suspension of hostilities; finally, arrangements must be made for a lasting peace entailing a separation of the Christian population from the Mussulman and a guarantee of the Powers on behalf of both parties. If the Porte refused these

terms coercive measures must be employed, the breaking off of diplomatic relations, threats of aiding the insurgents, and cutting off Ibrahim's troops from Egypt.

But, added Metternich, "the Emperor is unwilling to admit the chance of war with the Porte." He bitterly complained of the attitude of France, who had "never comprehended the alliance." "Austria and Prussia alone," he maintained, "have remained faithful to the principle of the alliance."

But Russia refused to agree to Austria's proposals, and Kaubars, the Russian representative, issued a declaration of regret that Austria did not see her way to a complete unanimity of view. Metternich made a dignified reply to the effect that Austria could not join in an unrighteous compulsion of Turkey. He objected to suzerainty being substituted for sovereignty and the admission of the principle of the mediation of the Powers between sovereigns and subjects. Also there would be great difficulty in defining what portion of Greece was to be independent. Still he recognized that Turkey was not blameless, "the Porte must be made to comprehend," he wrote to Ottenfels at Constantinople, "that it cannot escape from these dilemmas by mere refusals and a passive attitude"; and he even put pressure on the Porte to grant some concessions to the Greeks.

In the end Austria and Prussia dissented from the Treaty of London, which was signed by England, France, and Russia on July 27th, 1827, for the coercion of Turkey.

In view of the isolation of Austria in Europe, Metternich made every effort to frustrate this design.

He bombarded the lesser States of Europe with Circulars inveighing against the action of the three Powers. He was anxious to mass troops on the eastern frontiers of Austria for the purpose of preventing a Russian invasion of Turkey, but Francis, with greater caution, refused his assent. Finally, he made a last effort for peace by trying to induce the Porte to ask for Austrian mediation. But his letter only reached Constantinople on the day of the Battle of Navarino, when the British and Russian squadrons destroyed the Turkish fleet. The naval power of Turkey had already ceased to exist.

This was in November. A month before Metternich had announced in a letter to Victor his intention of marrying again. He never suffered politics to interfere with pleasure, and all through the difficult negotiations in regard to the Greek Question this easily consolable widower had been seeking another wife amongst the beauties of Viennese society. To the astonishment of all his choice fell upon Antonia von Leykam,¹ the daughter of a versatile painter and skilled violin-player, who had married a certain Antonia Pedrella, a native of Palermo. Undeterred by the protests of his mother and the murmurs of the salons—for it was undoubtedly a *mésalliance*—the Chancellor persuaded the Emperor to create Antonia Countess of Beilstein, and the marriage was arranged to take place quietly at Hetzendorf, an Imperial

¹ According to Hormayr this girl was the daughter of a parvenu baron, Ambrosius von Leykam, who had married a Neapolitan dancer, La Bretella, formerly the mistress of the King of Naples. But Hormayr, apart from being prejudiced against Metternich, seems to have erred from a confusion of names. Hormayr, "Kaiser Franz und Metternich," p. 30.



Photo. Lowy

PRINCESS METTERNICH, NÉE ANTONIA VON LEVKAM



seat not far from Vienna, on the 3rd of November. Just as Metternich was stepping into his carriage to leave Vienna for the ceremony, an Adjutant of Francis rushed up to him, hot and breathless, and said that the Emperor wished to see him at once. Metternich laughingly replied that he was just going to be married. However, on the Adjutant explaining that the news of Navarino had just arrived, Metternich hurried off to the Hofburg, talked the matter over with Francis, whom he found in a state of great agitation, and then drove off to Hetzendorf as fast as the horses could take him.

His failure to put in a punctual appearance had encouraged the waiting guests to hope that at the last moment he had decided to break off the match. In the end, however, the ceremony was duly performed in the presence of the Archduke Ferdinand of Würtemberg, the bridegroom's brother-in-law, and of Metternich's mother and sister, who still disapproved of the match. For fifteen months Metternich, perhaps for the only time in his life, enjoyed perfect married bliss. Though socially, perhaps, a *mésalliance*, it was really a love-match, and Antonia, without being actually beautiful, must have been a singularly fascinating girl. But his happiness was brief. In January 1829 Antonia bore him a son, Richard Clement Joseph Lothair. But she never recovered and died on January 17th. Metternich was quite overwhelmed with grief. "My life is over," he wrote to Victor, "and nothing remains to me but my children," and again, "Indeed I am again left alone in this great wide world." All his devotion for Antonia was transferred to the tiny Richard, who later on he described to Victor as "strong, robust, and very

ugly." For some months he shunned society, and to the end of his days, in spite of the disapproval of his third wife, kept Antonia's portrait opposite his writing-table.¹

"The terrible catastrophe of Navarino," increased Metternich's wrath against England and Russia. "I send you a copy of an official report addressed by Admiral Codrington to his Government," he wrote to Count Apponyi in Paris. "Never before has a report of this kind come from the pen of an English admiral." "The Ottoman Empire," he added, "has ceased to belong to itself." He talked of Russia as "a Power always coveting and consequently always uneasy." But he was convinced that England was the evil genius of Russian policy, "without contact on terra firma that Power alone can influence Russia, for she is in a position to do Russia as much harm as Russia can possibly do her." "Whatever England does not wish, Russia will not do"; and he wrote to Esterhazy, Austrian Ambassador in London, "what will be the ultimate decision of the Court of London it is very important for me to know."

The policy of the British Government was entirely changed by the death of Canning. This had taken place before the Battle of Navarino, and had been a source of unchivalrous elation to Metternich. In a letter written to Esterhazy, shortly after the news arrived, he referred to Canning as "the man whom Providence hurled upon England and Europe like a malevolent meteor." England, he continued, had been "delivered from a great scourge," since Canning had "shaken everything and destroyed a great deal,"

¹ Bearne, "A sister of Marie Antoinette," pp. 94, 95.

but had built up nothing. It was true enough that Canning had shaken to its foundations the anti-Liberal foreign policy of Austria. At any rate, the accession of Wellington to office marked the commencement of better relations between England and Austria. Ever since Navarino Metternich had striven to induce Turkey to make peace, but the more conciliatory the Porte showed itself the more exacting became the demands of Russia, and in April 1828 war again broke out between the Sultan and Czar. Metternich now endeavoured to rouse Great Britain, Prussia, and France to the aid of Turkey.

The British Government was favourable, but Prussia, as usual, was shy of making any definite move, while France was strongly under the influence of Russia. The Austrian Chancellor now endeavoured to cajole France, by removing the objections which he had hitherto put forward to the Prince of Carignano, the French candidate, as successor to the kingdom of Sardinia, while at the same time he used Napoleon's son, the Duke of Reichstadt, as a weapon against both France and Russia, hinting to the former that the Duke might be employed as the centre of a Bonapartist plot and to the latter that he might be acceptable, if put forward by Austria, as a prospective King of Poland.

But all in vain. King Charles X. hated Metternich; Pozzo di Borgo, Metternich's old schoolfellow at Strasburg, and now Russian Ambassador in Paris, worked hard to undermine Austrian influence in Paris, and Metternich entirely overreached himself in an attempt to procure the fall of the Russophil Cabinet in Paris.

Metternich became more than ever convinced that the only solution of the problem was to make Greece independent and he gained over to his opinion Wellington, who had hitherto proved but a lukewarm supporter of Austrian policy. The Austrian Chancellor failed to observe that by taking up this position he was with his own hands putting a nail into the coffin of his System. Indeed, the decline of his influence was manifest to those who observed how little attention was paid to Austrian views during the negotiations for the Independence of Greece. "The future existence of the Ottoman Empire," he plaintively remarked, "has become doubtful; and yet there is no Power more interested than Austria in the preservation of what remains of that Empire."

Already the Russian arms had beaten back the Turks almost to Constantinople, and forced the Porte to accept the Peace of Adrianople, 1829. There was now no obstacle to the Independence of Greece, for there was no longer any Turkish power to bolster up, and diplomacy, tired of the Eastern Question, turned to problems nearer home. "Europe," wrote Metternich, "is just now in a situation like that of a person after a great debauch."

CHAPTER XI

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830 AND THEIR RESULTS

Metternich's devotion to his son Victor—Metternich carries out improvements at Plass—Death of Victor—Constant anxiety of the Powers in regard to France—Metternich's interest in French politics accentuated by the fact that the Duke of Reichstadt was in Austrian custody—The Revolution of 1830 begins in France and spreads over Europe—Dangers of its effects beyond the borders of France less apparent in Germany than elsewhere—Metternich is half inclined to aid the revolutionary Poles against Russia, but eventually leaves them to their fate—A meeting at Teplitz is arranged between the King of Prussia and the Emperor Francis to discuss measures to be taken in view of the Belgian Revolution and the progress of German Liberalism—Metternich meanwhile marries for the third time—Reflections on the desirability of the match and the characteristics of the bride—Life at Teplitz—Arrival of the Czar to take part in the Conference—Decision to summon a meeting of German Ministers to Vienna—Metternich is successful in obtaining their consent to a renewal of stringent measures against Liberalism—The smaller States prove refractory, and the reforming tendencies of the Prussian King cause Metternich some alarm—In the settlement of the Belgian Question—Austria is left in the cold—Death of the Duke of Reichstadt—Absurdity of the charges which have been brought against Metternich in relation to his treatment while in Austrian custody

WHATEVER may be said of Metternich as a husband, there is no doubt that he was genuinely devoted to his son Victor. Many letters passed between father and son in regard to the diplomatic post which Victor took up in Rome at the beginning of 1829. Victor complained that he did not like Rome. Metternich begged to differ. Rome

was interesting because it partook of ancient and mediæval history as well as of the present time. He mentioned Leontine's conviction that Victor always took a long time to get accustomed to new surroundings. Of St Peter's, Metternich wrote: "I do not think that this church inspires devotion."

Victor seems gradually to have settled down, and wrote some weeks afterwards that he was going into Roman society.

Victor was an ardent collector of autographs, and his father frequently sent him those of the distinguished personages with whom he was constantly corresponding. In March Victor went on a holiday trip to Naples, and his father sent him lists of places which he ought to visit; and recommendations as to the best method of visiting them, which would have done credit to Baedeker. Metternich had a vivid recollection of his exertions in climbing Vesuvius. "Do not attempt to climb Vesuvius," he wrote, "at any rate go no farther than the hermitage; you can go so far quite well on a donkey." As to Naples, he sarcastically remarked that "if man had only seconded the Creator" it "would be a true Paradise."

Victor had been very ill during the early part of May, and Metternich wrote advising him to read Bourrienne's "*Memoirs of Napoleon*" to pass the time during his convalescence. "The style is not brilliant, but that makes them all the more trustworthy."

In January Metternich wrote complaining of the emptiness of Vienna. Those people who remained seemed to have a mania for excursions into the country in all sorts of weather. Metternich mentions one picnic party which started off at 7 A.M. in an

omnibus and returned half an hour after midnight, with the result that a third of the party had to remain in bed, a third had lost their voice, while the other third were loud in their praises of the delightful day they had spent. Leontine, proudly comments the Chancellor, did not go in for these frivolities, and was consequently always well.

In July Victor again fell seriously ill, which caused Metternich much anxiety. However, by August he was convalescent, and went to Bohemia for a change of air. Metternich went to his property at Plass, in order to be near him, and on the way spent a fortnight at Königswart. This beautiful spot proved such an attraction to sightseers from Marienbad and the surrounding country, that crowds of carriages and pedestrians incessantly spoilt Metternich's quiet. He complained that he was forced to give large dinners almost every day, and was overwhelmed with visitors, amongst them the Queen of Hayti with her two "august and very black daughters."

At Plass he was joined by Gentz, who did not approve of the new acquisition; it was too large, there was no flower garden and "nothing but horrible iron, big rooms, white walls, provincial officials and miners." At Plass, as in the case of his other estates, Metternich spent large sums on improvements. There were no less than four residences on the estate, one of them an old abbey turned into a château, and all of them requiring extensive repairs. There was also a private chapel, in which Metternich interred the deceased members of his family. For this Pope Leo had granted him "three days of plenary indulgence and the magnificent remains of St Valentine, a martyr

of the end of the Second Century," which had "attracted from twenty to thirty thousand pilgrims."

Space was soon required in the family vault for another member of the family. On December 1st, Victor passed away. His sufferings had been severe, and even his grief-stricken father felt that death had come as a welcome release.

Since the Congress of Vienna, France had been a constant source of anxiety to Metternich and the Allies. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Richelieu, the French representative, had pressed for the evacuation of French territory by the Allied troops and the admission of France to the Alliance. Metternich had demurred on the ground that it would imply "an amalgam of the conservative principle with that of innovation, of the remedy with the very evil it was intended to cure, of stability with movement, of security with risk." Eventually Metternich agreed to a compromise suggested by the Czar, that the Quadruple Alliance should still be maintained against France, but that France herself should be admitted to the Holy Alliance, since that institution represented, not an anti-revolutionary organization, but the ideal of the brotherhood of nations.

With the changes of ministry and shifting of policies in France it is unnecessary to deal, since Metternich was only interested in them as a European statesman. He was delighted at the tranquillity attending the death of Louis XVIII. and accession of Charles X. On September 23rd, 1824, he wrote: "Louis XVIII. is dead, and there is nothing more to be said in the matter. . . . The world is nowadays so far better that kings can die undisturbed," and again in October:

"Never has an accession to the throne of France been accompanied by more perfect tranquillity than that of Charles X." Metternich's only fear was that Charles would veer round to Liberalism under the influence of the Dauphin. He had no great opinion of contemporary statesmen in France, whom he met when on his visit to Paris in 1825. "The only man whom I have discovered here among the crowd is Villèle,"¹ he told Francis. He recognized the significance of the advent to power in 1829 of the reactionary statesman, Polignac, and wrote in April: "The whole event has almost the value of a counter-revolution."

In fact France suddenly became the pivot of European politics. All the forces of Liberalism and Revolution in France opposed Polignac's ministry. The Bonapartists looked to Vienna, where the Duke of Reichstadt was in residence—prisoner in a gilded cage. But Metternich, though he regarded the Duke as a useful tool, and did not hesitate to flirt with Bonapartism, would not commit himself. He even emphatically refused to send the Duke to France, and was supported by the Emperor Francis, who asserted that it was his duty neither as a statesman nor as a grandfather to launch the son of Marie Louise on a doubtful career of hazardous adventure.

Metternich, from his peculiar position as the guardian of the destinies of Napoleon's son, perhaps understood the position of affairs in France more clearly than any other European statesman. At any rate, he had long presaged that Revolution which startled Europe in 1830, but which, in its magnitude,

¹ The most brilliant and prudent of the Ultra-Royalist leaders in France.

its influence and results, must ultimately have surprised even the Austrian Chancellor.

"The occurrence bears in many respects the stamp of the English Revolution of 1688," was Metternich's comment when news came of the French Revolution of 1830. So far as France was concerned, the remark was true. The ousting of Charles X. and the substitution of Louis Philippe was effected with remarkable ease and bloodlessness. To Metternich, the event did not come as a surprise. He had indeed approved of the Four Ordinances, which included suspension of the Freedom of the Press and new electoral laws, and which had practically brought on the Revolution, but when he saw the strength of the opposition to be expected, he did all in his power to prevent King Louis' Government from going to extremities. He had always predicted that France might at any time go through another revolution.

But, unlike the English Revolution of 1688, that of 1830 had an extraordinary effect upon Europe at large. It seemed almost as if the Revolution in France had been a preconcerted signal for risings all over the Continent. Metternich thus explained the phenomenon in a memoir to the Russian statesman, Count Orloff: "The extraordinary influence exercised by the Revolution of July over men's minds far beyond the boundaries of France is shown by what happens every day. This influence is for many reasons far more decisive than that of the Revolution of 1789 was or could be. What methods have not been employed since that now remote epoch, to beguile the masses in every state. The entire generation has been brought up in the dogma of

Liberalism ; too young to have witnessed the disasters of the past, the new generation has been led to consider public order, established only at the cost of gigantic efforts as the natural consequence of a previous revolution, directed solely against hateful abuses, the relics of barbarous times."

At first, then, it appeared likely that there would be a recurrence of the events of 1815 and an invasion of France by the Powers ; and this course would have been in accordance with Metternich's "system" of stamping out revolution wherever it raised its head. But Metternich's attitude towards this Revolution of 1830 is an admirable proof that he had no definite system, whether of intervention or of non-intervention. Always he did what he considered was best for Austria and, incidentally, himself. Now in this case, there were obvious reasons why Austria should not interfere with the internal politics of France. The last thing which Metternich wanted was a commotion of any sort, least of all a war. Austrian prestige had suffered to the benefit of Russia during the solution of the Greek Question, and his great desire was to keep the Powers from any course which threatened the general stability. Moreover, Louis Philippe proved to be a ruler whose views were to a great extent identical with those of the Powers ; he was even inclined to curb revolutionary excess, and was anxious to appease everybody, in France and abroad. In any case, Austria had possession of the young Duke of Reichstadt, the son of the great Napoleon, which in itself was a weapon powerful enough to ensure the good behaviour of France, towards Austria at any rate.

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Indeed, Metternich's views on Legitimacy were now so changed that he allowed Gentz to publish an article, asserting that, in fact if not in theory, Legitimacy might exist side by side with the people's supremacy. In the end, therefore, Austria was the first power, with the exception of Great Britain, to recognize the new French Government, to the great delight of Gentz, who was an admirer of Louis Philippe. Metternich contented himself with suggesting a closer union between Austria, Prussia and Russia, with a view to suppressing revolutionary movements within their own boundaries and for rendering themselves secure against any possible danger from France. Metternich, in short—*proh pudor*—had allied himself to the Revolution.

In truth, the danger of the July Revolution lay not so much in its effect on France as in its influence abroad. This influence, though far less than that of the subsequent Revolution of 1848, nevertheless did more than anything else to show how miserably Metternich's system had already broken down. Indeed, the history of the revolutionary outbreaks in Europe after 1830 is merely a series of examples of the decline of Austrian influence. Of Germany, indeed, this is not strictly correct. As will be seen, Metternich was able for some years longer, by his control of the Diet and his influence over Prussia, to stifle German Liberalism, but the mere fact that, in spite of the Carlsbad Decrees and the apparent extinction of Liberal hopes after 1824, opposition was again awakened by the events of 1830 in France, proved that even here Metternich's system was doomed.

But Switzerland, which from its proximity to

Austria, Metternich had always regarded as his peculiar protégé, showed unmistakable signs of awakened Liberalism in many of her Cantons, and was not a whit over-awed when strong representations were made from Vienna that French influences must on no account be permitted to react on the Republic. Eventually, Metternich had to content himself with lending moral support to the reactionary Cantons.

Another portion of Europe, deeply affected by the French Revolution, owing to its proximity to Austria, demanded Metternich's earnest attention. By the Congress of Vienna, Poland had been granted a large measure of independence, and the Czar Alexander had pursued a most liberal policy in regard to that portion of his dominions. It soon became evident, however, that the preponderance in Poland of a class of selfish nobles rendered futile any attempts to benefit the population at large. Alexander became despondent, and gradually the Russian Government had relapsed into the old method of ruling Poland as a conquered and hostile country. When, therefore, at the end of November 1830, a military revolution broke out in Warsaw, encouraged by the hope of French and possibly Austrian aid, Metternich was not surprised. "The kingdom of Poland," he wrote to Trautmansdorff in Berlin, "has appeared to us neither more or less than a powder-magazine; a spark must have reached it sooner or later; therefore, when we heard of the explosion, the one feeling we did not experience was surprise."

The struggle so much resembled a war between two distinct countries rather than a rebellion, that Metternich was for some time doubtful whether his conscience

would not permit him to aid the revolted Poles against their lawful sovereign, contrary to all the principles of the Holy Alliance. "The real question underlying the matter," he wrote to Francis in December, "is the morale of the Russian army." In fact, Metternich was placed in a dilemma similar to that of Queen Elizabeth of England when she was asked to aid the revolted Spanish Netherlands. On the one hand, any movement appealed to him which had the effect of draining the resources of Russia and lowering that prestige which she had gained in Europe to the detriment of Austria. Moreover, the Czech population in the Austrian Empire clamoured for aid to be given to the Poles, while the Magyars longed to prevent the further expansion of Russia. On the other hand, it was entirely contrary to Metternich's ideas to aid rebels against their lawful sovereign. In his perplexity Metternich prepared for all eventualities. "We are arming to the teeth," he wrote in February 1831. But in the end, Austria, like Great Britain and France, remained inactive. Metternich felt that an example of successful revolution so close to the borders of the Austrian Empire might lamentably react upon the Viennese policy of stability. So Russian arms and internal dissensions wore down the Polish resistance, and Metternich was free to employ all the resources of Austria in combating revolutionary outbreaks in Italy.

The revolt of Belgium from Holland, in defiance of the settlement made at the Congress of Vienna which had placed the two countries under one Government, might have been expected to rouse Metternich's intervention. There was every possibility that

France would seize the opportunity to fish in the troubled waters. Moreover, the King of Holland implored the aid of Austria against his rebellious subjects, and it was in accordance with Metternich's avowed policy to support the cause of Legitimacy. In fact he wrote to Esterhazy, the Austrian ambassador in London, that the Emperor "would never admit the principle of non-intervention in face of the persistent activity of the Revolutionary Propaganda."

But at this time, Poland, not to speak of Italy, was occupying Metternich's attention, and the Austrian and Russian Governments had perforce to leave matters in the Netherlands in the hands of Great Britain, aided by Prussia. As early as 1830, Metternich had written to Francis: "For my part, I am convinced that all is lost in the Netherlands. The best, and in fact the only thing to do, is to bring the courts into such relations with the Crown of Holland as will prevent its complete incorporation with France."

With a view to counteracting French designs, Metternich tried to rouse the interest of Russia and Prussia in preventing French aggression; he was convinced that Louis Philippe wished to pose as the Champion of Liberalism, and was delighted to find the Emperor Francis quite anxious to revive the old significance of the Holy Alliance as an antidote to revolutionary principles. The Czar at once returned a favourable answer, but Prussia seemed to have completely changed from her attitude of champion of the old régime. In the summer of 1833, the King of Prussia was residing at Teplitz, and Metternich persuaded Francis to take advantage of this and arrange a meeting with him at Thérésienstadt. It

was also settled that the Czar should travel to Münchengrätz, in Bohemia; with his Minister, Nesselrode, to confer with his brother sovereigns.

It was not only the Belgian imbroglio that Metternich wished to have discussed. Ever since the July Revolution, he had been watching with alarm its effect upon German Liberalism. Most of the smaller Courts of Germany had modified their laws and constitution in a Liberal direction, either from inclination, or, in some cases, to avoid a revolution. Amongst them had been Saxony, Bavaria, Würtemberg and Brunswick, where Metternich's erstwhile protégé, Duke Charles, had made himself intolerable to his people by his reactionary excesses. "Several princes," wrote Metternich in June 1832, "have committed the unpardonable crime of giving their States constitutions copied from that of France."

Metternich's letter of instructions to the Austrian representatives at Stuttgart shows how seriously he viewed the movements. "The issue at stake is the salvation of the first of all goods—property, the right of possession both in a material and moral sense; the contest in reality lies between those who have and those who wish to have." Metternich looked upon Liberalism almost as we look upon Socialistic doctrines!

Already the German booksellers had implored Metternich to restore freedom of the Press to Germany that they might be saved from bankruptcy, and in many districts, as at Hampach and Frankfurt, riotous scenes had taken place in connexion with Liberal meetings. Ardent spirits even went so far as to hatch a sort of miniature Gunpowder Plot against

the Diet. For Metternich still employed the Diet as the instrument of "stability." To counteract the effect of recent events in Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Saxony, he caused the Diet to pass an enactment that no prince might receive a petition for enlarging the Privileges of his Estates, and sent round circulars to the smaller States of Germany begging them to maintain the old order of things. Not the least alarming feature of the political position, in Metternich's eyes, was the desire evinced by a considerable party in Germany to obtain unity by forming a hegemony of German States under the leadership of Prussia.

To the Conference at Teplitz, Metternich was accompanied by his wife. He had married for the third time. The old and ambitious Hungarian family of Zichy had, since 1825, been scheming for a match between Metternich and one of themselves, and partly with this object had used their influence to further the Austrian Chancellor's Hungarian policy. Metternich soon perceived, with his unfailing acuteness, that the Countess Molly Zichy, with whom he was on friendly terms and constantly corresponded, wished him to marry her daughter, Mélanie, a proud, passionate woman, possessed of great spirit and beauty of a rather voluptuous style. When Metternich, perhaps partly with a view to defeating these designs, made his much less imposing marriage with Antonia von Leykam, Mélanie became engaged to Baron Clement Hügel. But when Antonia died, Mélanie promptly broke off her engagement; poor Hügel must perforce drown his grief in foreign travel; and the way was clear for his fickle love to marry

the Chancellor. Great must have been the joy of the designing mother, when, in January 1831, her daughter's wedding was celebrated with great pomp and in the presence of the whole of Viennese society.

Hügel, to his credit be it said, always remained devoted to Mélanie, and after the revolution of 1848 it was in great part owing to his aid that the Chancellor and his wife were able to make their escape safely from Austria.

Now that he again had a wife to assist him in entertaining, the Chancellor entered with renewed zest into Vienna life, and in 1831 and 1832 his mansion was the scene of brilliant soirées, balls and dinner parties, at which he loved as of yore to display the most lavish but refined hospitality. Even from the evidence of her own careful Diary, it is clear that Princess Mélanie thoroughly enjoyed being the Chancellor's wife. She posed as a sort of queen of Viennese society, and this attitude, combined with a want of tact, which on at least one occasion—she made uncomplimentary remarks to the French ambassador about the French Government and then foolishly repeated the conversation to her friends—placed Metternich in a most embarrassing situation, did not enhance her popularity. Metternich himself bitterly remarked that he had omitted to take in hand his wife's education.

There were frequent tiffs between husband and wife over small matters. Mélanie thought Metternich unreasonable because he forbade her to act in some theatricals in aid of a charity, and expressed his distrust of homeopathic doctors. On another occasion, Metternich made his wife promise to take the floor



Photo. Lony

PRINCESS METTERNICH, NÉE COUNTESS MÉLANIE ZICHY

FROM THE PAINTING BY DAFFINGER



at an impending ball. She did not look fifty, he said, and ought to dance. The Princess was equal, however "to this very embarrassing and disagreeable" situation. "I had undertaken," she writes, "to act as chaperone and had on a very heavy dress. I was, therefore, unable to fulfil my promise to Clement to take part at least nominally in the dancing." But on the whole, they understood each other. The great point was that the Princess admired Metternich's abilities. Soon after the honeymoon she wrote: "I breakfasted alone to-day with Clement for the first time since my marriage. . . . I was astounded at my excessive ignorance." And as an organizer of entertainments she was admirable. The following is her account of one given in honour of members of a Conference of German Ministers assembled at Vienna in 1833: "The guests arrived very punctually. I received them in front of the old house, which was covered by a decoration. On the grass a Turkish tent had been set up; on either side were tea tables, and the beautiful dresses made the scene very gay. Two military bands were stationed near the house and played in turns. We waited till 7.30, and then went into the pavilion. In the tent a very pretty theatre had been set up, and here comic scenes were represented. . . . It was very amusing and obtained general applause. In the salon several pieces of music were performed. Buol had arranged a gipsy camp in which the gipsies danced, sang, and carried on all sorts of pastimes. It was lighted up by Bengal fires. On another grass plot were crowds of shepherdesses and shepherds who sang and danced—a very pretty sight. . . . We only lingered for a moment

in the conservatories to look at the pelargoniums, which were just in full bloom. The way through the avenue was lighted up by various coloured lamps. A crowd of warriors, amazons, nymphs and sylphs came to meet us, in the midst of whom appeared Scholz, seated in a small car and dressed as Amor. He presented a bouquet and declaimed some verses. . . . The entertainment closed with some very beautiful fireworks in front of the pavilion, and a charming military dance performed by children."

The first child of the marriage, a daughter, had been born in March 1832 and christened Mélanie, after her mother, and in April of the following year, to Metternich's intense joy, the Princess presented her husband with a son. "I never saw Clement so pleased," wrote the Princess, "it quite did one good to see him." She was more candid than most mothers as to the baby's appearance, and wrote in her Diary: "I do not share in the general opinion that will have it that he is good-looking; to my eyes he is hideous and resembles my poor brother Joseph; to make up for it, Mélanie is prettier than ever." This was hard on "poor brother Joseph." Alas! Metternich's joy was short-lived. In June the baby caught cold, and after a short illness, which did not at first appear serious, died on the 10th of the month.

In July Metternich went to see the Emperor at Baden, whither the Princess accompanied him; later on they paid a visit to Königswart. Metternich showed his wife all the beauties of the Château, which delighted her. In the evening they played draughts. "My poor husband is so happy," wrote the Princess, "and enjoys his little bit of freedom so thoroughly."

The following day the members of the Imperial Chancery came on business and stayed to dinner. The evening again ended with draughts, a game of which Metternich was very fond.

On the 26th the Queen of Würtemberg came to spend the day and was shown round the place.

At Teplitz Metternich and his wife took up their abode in a house belonging to the Prince de Ligny. On the day following their arrival, Metternich met the King of Prussia, "who is become very stout," during a walk in the park, and had a long conversation with him. The actual meeting between the sovereigns took place on August 9th, and on the following day Metternich took his family to visit the battlefield of Kulm, and showed them where he and Prince Schwarzenberg had stood. On September 4th they travelled to Münchengrätz, "a small and very filthy town," where the Czar was to meet the Emperor of Austria and the Crown Prince of Prussia. A small house had been placed at their disposal, "all fairly comfortable, but very cold." They had their meals at the Château, where the Emperor and Empress were lodged. After dinner they usually played billiards, five a side. The Emperor was devoted to the game, but apparently an indifferent performer, for the Princess remarks that one afternoon "Mélanie played on the Emperor's side and lost twice." The Empress told Metternich's wife in private conversation that she wished the Emperor would go out more into society in Vienna, but that Francis always said that he hated all the etiquette necessary in his capital. The Emperor was very attentive to Princess Mélanie, and one day at dinner drew a small lion for her on the

programme of the music, which she said she should hand down as an heirloom. The Czar only arrived on September 10th. On the 12th he came to visit the Princess, when the conversation turned chiefly on French politics. On the 14th the Court went hunting; Metternich remained behind to work. On the 16th there was a great review, and on the following day the Metternichs dined at Court, and had the usual game of billiards afterwards. "I had the Emperor Nicholas for partner," writes the Princess; "we played very well and won three games." Next day the Metternichs started for Vienna, passing through Prague on the way.

The result of the Teplitz and Münchengrätz Conferences in regard to German affairs was the decision to summon a Conference of German Ministers at Vienna to discuss the best method of combating the revolutionary spirit. This meeting took place early in 1834, under Metternich's direction. In a vigorous and eloquent opening speech he bitterly inveighed against "the misguided attempts of factions to supersede the monarchical principle by the modern idea of the sovereignty of the people." "The turbulence of the times," he exclaimed, "has given birth to a party whom repeated concessions, if not actual indulgence of all their demands, have emboldened to an extraordinary degree. Inimical to every kind of authority, because it fancies itself to be the depository of all sovereign power, it maintains, in the midst of general political peace, an internal war; it corrupts the minds and dispositions of the people, corrupts the youth, deludes even those of riper years, introduces trouble and discord into all

the public and private relations of life, deliberately incites the population to cherish a systematic distrust of their rulers, and preaches the destruction and annihilation of all that exists."

The German Ministers were, as usual, subservient. It was agreed to take common action against the alarming spread of Liberal ideas, even if such action involved infringement of the Constitution of any particular State. The Diet was more than ever revealed as the instrument of absolutism, and when in 1837 the King of Hanover suspended his Constitution, that discredited Assembly refused to interfere. To his credit, be it said, that Metternich saw the absurdity of thus robbing the smaller States of the last relics of political independence, and though he maintained that it was done for the best, the real reason was that since the July Revolution Francis had become so suspicious of everybody and everything that he imagined he could only rule through the police. Metternich, yielding to his master's wishes, thought the only way under the circumstances of securing tranquillity was to prevent the masses taking any interest in government by confining politics to the titled and privileged classes.

But Metternich's ascendancy over the Diet was of little use if Prussia herself took up the cause of reform. And the reforming zeal of Frederick William IV. seemed likely to bring this about. Metternich, always prone to alarm where Prussian revolutionary tendencies were concerned, warned the King that his capital was swarming with revolutionary plotters, and begged him not to dream of central representation for Prussia, which would be the signal

for the dissolution of his kingdom. In spite of all warnings, Frederick William, whom Metternich described as "beyond the limits of any system," schemed to unite the Prussian Provincial Diets into a Central Assembly. Metternich, with reason, observed that the provincial deputies would return to their homes as representatives of the Estates of the Realm, and his strenuous opposition, backed up by that of the Czar, eventually induced the Prussian King to give up his Liberal intentions.

But other portions of Germany continued to give trouble. In 1845 revolutionary agitation broke out in Baden. The ringleader was imprisoned by Metternich's orders, but the sedition was not suppressed. In 1847 Würtemberg again proved troublesome. The King had placed a Liberal Ministry in power, who promptly summoned a representative Chamber. In Bavaria the Liberals also proved that their power was not broken. They forced the King to abdicate and induced his son and successor to confirm his father's decree for the summoning of a Parliament. In Hesse Cassel and Darmstadt, Metternich had to combat Liberal movements. It was evident that as a result of Prussia's wandering from the paths of absolutism, Metternich could not as of old instil terror into the ranks of Liberalism. The spell was broken and events in Germany were trending towards the upheaval of 1848, which, finding an echo in the hitherto peaceful Austrian dominions, hurled Metternich himself from the pinnacle on which he had sat for nearly half a century.

So far as the Belgian Question was concerned, the Conferences at Teplitz and Münchengrätz were not,

from Metternich's point of view, a success. Though the Chancellor had many interviews with Ancillon, the Prussian Minister, he could not persuade him to take any vigorous action, and it soon became manifest that it was no use hoping for a vigorous renewal of the policy of the Holy Alliance. Metternich could not even induce Russia and Prussia to join Austria in dispatching a Joint Note to Paris protesting against the encouragement given by Louis Philippe's Government to the Belgian revolutionists. In the end each Power sent separate Notes, which robbed the protest of all effect. Indeed, Austria was the only Power who adopted a haughty tone in the Note which her Ambassador presented to the French Government in November 1833. Louis Philippe was not a whit perturbed, and merely replied that he had no intention of permitting Austrian intervention abroad, either in Belgium or Poland or Piedmont. This was embarrassing for Metternich, in view of the warm terms in which the Austrian Note had been couched. But his conduct admirably illustrated his habitual dislike to encountering opposition; he gracefully withdrew from the contest and henceforth left France in peace, while Louis Philippe, for his part only too glad to be left alone, became something very like a despotic ruler, and gave no further anxiety to the absolutist Powers.

In the end the Belgian Revolution afforded only one more instance of the decay of Metternich's influence. It was left to Great Britain and France, not without much mutual unpleasantness, to hammer out a settlement, and the independence of Belgium was guaranteed by the Powers. Metternich grudg-

ingly gave his support to the new order of things. "The Belgian affair," he wrote to Count Fiquelmont, "is regarded by our august master with the utmost abhorrence. However the truth be disguised, it starts with countenancing a rebellion."

Perhaps one reason why Metternich had failed to preserve a bold front to France was that the Austrians had now lost their most formidable weapon—the Duke of Reichstadt. During his lifetime he had continually been a focus for Bonapartist plots. Metternich had used him as a bugbear wherewith to frighten the "parvenu" ruler of France; it is even probable that secretly he would have liked to place the Duke on the French throne, but was restrained by the cautious counsels of Francis. His policy, therefore, was to listen attentively to the Bonapartists, haggle over their guarantees, express his sympathy with their aims, ferret out their schemes, and do nothing. Metternich, indeed, once explained to a Bonapartist agent, who had been drawing rosy pictures of the reception which all France would accord to the young Duke, if only Austria would let him go, that on the contrary such a course would only launch the youth upon a sea of trouble, and that his grandfather would be guilty of cruel negligence if he supported the claim to the throne of France. Bonapartism could not prevail without Bonaparte—it would merely throw France into confusion. Still the Chancellor never ceased to flirt with the upholders of the Napoleonic idea.

It is perhaps needless to refute the charges which have been brought against Metternich and the Emperor Francis in respect of their conduct towards

Napoleon's son. Little historical truth is contained in Rostand's "L'Aiglon" except that Gentz loved sweetmeats and that the Duke of Reichstadt constructed a "Robinson Crusoe" cave in the gardens of Schönbrunn. Francis was genuinely fond of his grandson, but it was impossible to let him go free for fear of complications with France, and no captivity could be more gilded than that which he endured in the delightful Palace of Schönbrunn. His movements were restricted; that was unavoidable in view of constant Bonapartist intrigues. But he was carefully brought up for a military career. He had a passion for history, which was encouraged, and if his French governesses were early taken away from him, it was because they were spoiling him.

When Francis bade Metternich provide suitable tutors for his grandson he gave special instructions that the young Napoleon should be taught to honour his father's memory, and at the same time to recognize his faults. The sinister motives attributed by Rostand to the tutors whom Metternich appointed to superintend his education were utterly without foundation. Though the Duke was difficult to deal with—he was a cold, reserved child, who nevertheless had a high spirited temper and loved to thwart his superiors in little things—all his tutors, Dietrichstein, Foresti, Oberaus, and Collin exercised the greatest tact and eventually earned his esteem. Indeed, a year before his death, the Duke wrote to Dietrichstein: "My heart's gratitude is as imperishable as the pains you took with my education."

Possessing Napoleon's high spirit and military ardour, he not unnaturally chafed at inactivity. He

was therefore encouraged to go into Society, where his winning personality and good looks made him a general favourite, and he was given the command of a Hungarian cavalry regiment. But all was in vain. His pride and his ambition revolted against a life of splendid unimportance. It is a cruel libel to accuse Metternich of pandering to his vices and encouraging him to excesses. There is little doubt that the young Duke's life was singularly pure. Gentz was Fanny Essler's lover and not the Duke of Reichstadt.

It was consumption that slowly undermined his health, and the sense that in any case his life must be but an empty dream gave him little strength to combat it. He refused to take any care of his health, and the immediate cause of his death was a chill. Metternich visited him just before his death, which took place on July 22nd, 1832. "It was a heart-rending sight," he wrote to Francis. "I never remember to have seen a more mournful picture of decay." Shortly afterwards Metternich received from Marie Louise a washhand-stand which had formerly belonged to Napoleon, and which had been bequeathed by Princess Pauline Borghese to the Duke—as a souvenir of her dead son.

CHAPTER XII

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830 (*continued*)

The effect of the French Revolution in Italy—The influence of French agents in Italy is exaggerated by Metternich to cloak the evils of Austrian rule—The Ancona incident—Growth of national spirit in Italy between 1830 and 1848—Mazzini—The Ticino incident precipitates the revolt of Piedmont, which coincides with the fall of Metternich—Failure of Metternich to bully the smaller States of Italy—Metternich and the question of Mehemet Ali—He uses his influence successfully in the interests of peace—And incidentally breaks down the *entente* between Great Britain and France—Metternich completes twenty-five years' service as Minister—Reflection on the curious mixture of strength and weakness in his policy—The occupation of Cracow by Austrian troops, though an apparent success, was really a blunder—Metternich's diminished prestige in Europe—He fails to induce the Powers to coerce the Greeks who have induced King Otho to grant a Constitution—And is baffled by Palmerston in his attempts to uphold the Sonderbund—Great Britain as a factor in the breakdown of the Metternich System.

AS soon as the news arrived of the revolution in France, Metternich had written to Francis: "The side to which we must turn our attention without delay is Italy. It is thither that the revolutionary impulse will unquestionably tend to spread." The death of Pope Pius VIII. was the occasion of the first outburst in Italy. But it was only in the Papacy and in Parma and Modena, where Austria's authority was less in evidence than in the north, that risings actually occurred.

Metternich's attitude towards Italian revolutions

was rather curious. In themselves he was inclined to underrate their importance as compared with movements in Germany. But he was always haunted, or pretended to be haunted, by the idea that foreign Powers were inciting the Italians to disloyalty. After 1815 it had been the Russian agents. This fear was now removed. But he still maintained that outside influence was at work, and it was towards France, in this case rightly, that his suspicion turned. "Nothing can be viler than the Italian Revolution," he wrote to Count Apponyi in March 1831. "It subsists on the scum of the country, of the Universities, and, above all, the instigation and support of the French propaganda." And again, "There is nothing Italian in the measures by which the revolts have been accomplished. The Italian Revolution is a Bonapartist Revolution, supported by the party of anarchy in France." Metternich, who knew well enough that the real cause of discontent was the repression of Liberal ideas and of Italian individuality, purposely exaggerated the dangers from without. Still, subsequent events proved that France was not unwilling to revive her ancient pretensions beyond the Alps, and there is no doubt that the influence of the July Revolution had its effect on Italy.

As a matter of fact, the Austrian troops, who were sent at the request of the new Pope, Gregory XVI., easily suppressed the risings in the Papal dominions. France gave no aid to the rebels, and the districts ruled directly by Austria did not move. The Pope promised to institute reform and all seemed quiet.

Unfortunately the Pope did not keep his promise, and in March, Princess Mélanie noted in her diary

that "Gentz and Clement are more than ever disturbed at what is going on." There were fresh risings, notably at Ferrara and Bologna. Again the Austrians advanced to restore order and occupied Ferrara. This time the French retaliated by occupying Ancona with a garrison. Everything pointed to a war. Metternich talked to Apponyi of "the inexplicable affair at Ancona," and indignantly complained that "never was a political crime of the most flagrant character committed with greater thoughtlessness."

As a matter of fact, nothing came of this curious revival of Hapsburg and French rivalry in Italy. The two garrisons remained inactive until 1838, when both were withdrawn.

Hitherto there had been no sort of combined and organized rising in Italy against Metternich's System. Spasmodic and isolated revolts in different portions of the Peninsula had been crushed with little difficulty, and furthered not a jot the cause of Italian unity. As yet there was hardly even a coherent idea of nationality in the minds of most Italians, and it seemed most unlikely that a people accustomed to be divided into a number of small and mutually antagonistic States would ever combine to deliver the land from foreign domination.

The years between the two French revolutions are chiefly interesting because during that period Mazzini was gradually supplying the ingredient which was hitherto lacking to all schemes for the discomfiture of Austria. By him national spirit in Italy was evolved, and the Society of Young Italy, which he founded for the furtherance of this object, soon grew

apace and superseded the rough and ready methods of the Carbonari.

Metternich, to do him justice, never underrated the importance of Mazzini's influence. Early in 1834 he wrote to his agents in North Italy warning them of the danger arising from the secret spread of Liberal organization. Spies, acting under his orders, dogged the footsteps of Mazzini wherever he went, and copies of all his publications were procured for the Government at Vienna. A great Calabrian rising, carefully matured in 1844, was only frustrated by the action of Sir James Graham, the British Postmaster-General, who opened some of Mazzini's correspondence, which contained letters from the conspirators. For a time the revolutionaries were cowed by a series of repressive measures, and by the object lesson provided by the summary aid given by Metternich to the Russian Government in quelling the revolution in Poland.

But in 1841 occurred what is known as the "Ticino Incident." It originated in a dispute over the salt trade, the cause of many wars in mediæval Italy. In 1751 Austria had made a Treaty with Sardinia, by which she agreed to grant to Piedmont the right of sending salt destined for Venice by way of Lombardy on condition that Sardinia in return promised to discontinue her trade with the Swiss Cantons. In 1846, however, Charles Albert acceded to a request from the Swiss Cantons to be allowed to send their salt through Piedmont. Metternich was furious. Not only were the Swiss Cantons in general the hereditary enemies of the House of Hapsburg; not only did they represent a republican and democratic

institution situated in the midst of Austria's sphere of influence, but Ticino, whence the salt principally was obtained, was especially odious to Metternich as having afforded a refuge to Mazzini and many other Italian refugees.

Metternich informed Charles Albert that he considered that the Treaty of 1751 had been violated, and expressed his displeasure more practically by increasing the custom duties on wines sent from Piedmont to Lombardy. But Charles Albert was not to be cowed. He merely lowered the wine duties operating between Piedmont and France. Metternich became alarmed and hastily offered to annul the offending measure, provided that Charles Albert would withdraw his concessions to Ticino. But the King refused, and hurried on his preparations for war.

That war broke out after Metternich's fall, in the general confusion that followed the Revolution of 1848; others had to cope with the situation which had been brought about by the tyrannous Italian policy of the Austrian Chancellor.

Charles Albert was not the only ruler nor Piedmont the only country which proved a thorn in the side of Metternich in his dealings with Italy in the years before his fall.

The Papacy was the last quarter from which reform might have been anticipated, and Metternich had once remarked that no Pope could be a Liberal. Yet, in 1846, on the death of Pope Gregory XVI., a staunch upholder of Metternich's System in Italy, Pius IX. gave evidence of such aspirations after reform as to draw down upon him the grave displeasure of the Austrian Chancellor. As it proved,

these reforms were more apparent than real. But Metternich was alarmed. He is thought—but the matter is very doubtful—to have countenanced an unsuccessful plot hatched against the Pope by the Austrian faction at Rome. At any rate, he showed his displeasure more openly by increasing the Austrian garrison at Ferrara as a protest against Papal policy. But here England and France stepped in and sent fleets to the Bay of Naples, while Palmerston announced that the Austrian troops must depart at once. Metternich reluctantly complied, and in December 1847 Ferrara was evacuated. The result of this set-back to Austria was a rising in Naples and the granting of a Constitution to Piedmont by King Charles Albert.

If he failed to coerce the Pope, Metternich was equally unsuccessful in bringing over the Archduke Leopold to his views. This Prince ruled wisely and well over Tuscany, aided by a councillor of very Liberal tendencies, Cosimo Ridolfi. Metternich clamoured for the dismissal of Ridolfi, but Leopold insisted on retaining him.

In the north-east the patriot Manin was inciting his countrymen in Venice to rise against the domination of Austria. It was evident that Italy was ripe for taking advantage of the general upheaval of 1848.

In order to show that, when he liked, Metternich could pursue an honest, firm and undeviating policy, it is interesting to note his attitude towards the quarrel between the Porte and its vassal, Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, a quarrel he described to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris as "that detestable

business, which every reasonable Power ought to be glad to have nothing to do with."

Mehemet Ali had demanded Syria as a reward for his services to the Porte in the Greek War. When the Turkish Government refused, the Pasha sent his son Ibrahim with an army into Syria. The Turkish generals who opposed him were defeated and Constantinople was threatened. Turkey implored the aid of Russia, who, always ready to have a finger in an Ottoman pie, sent ships and troops to her succour.

It was now that the Powers intervened. Metternich, irritated with Russia's success in the last phase of the Near Eastern Question, joined England and France in their representations to Russia. His aim was to lay the bugbear of Russian designs on Turkey without coming to an open break, and the only way of gaining his end appeared to be by arranging peace at any price between the Porte and Egypt. As he wrote to Count Apponyi in Paris, "The existence and preservation of the Ottoman Porte, whatever anomalies it may present in many respects with Christian civilization, are a common benefit for Europe and in especial a political necessity for Austria."

At first Metternich's efforts to turn Mehemet Ali and the Porte into paths of peace seemed likely to be successful, especially when Mehemet agreed to withdraw from the neighbourhood of Constantinople on condition of receiving Syria. It meant the abandonment of Metternich's principle of supporting the integrity of the Ottoman dominions, but it also meant peace. At this time, although suspicious of France, Metternich thought that Great Britain and Russia were sincerely anxious for peace. "We



acquit Russia," he had written to Neumann in London in February 1833, "of any aggressive views in regard to the Ottoman Empire."

But Russia stole a march on him and upset all his calculations. She induced Turkey to sign the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, by which Russia gained a voice in Turkish internal affairs and formed a military alliance with Turkey, and the passage of the Dardanelles was forbidden to foreign ships.

Metternich, England, and France were furious at this clever and successful diplomatic move. But Metternich saw that moderation was essential if a European war was to be avoided, and conceived the idea of posing as the old friend of Russia and offering to mediate between her and the two Western Powers. Metternich arranged a meeting with the Czar at Münchengrätz and simultaneously dispatched Notes to the Governments of England and France.

His diplomacy was successful. England and France suspended their warlike preparations, and Austria and Russia made an agreement guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey. For the time Metternich might plume himself upon his abilities as a peace-maker, though Turkey's refusal to allow the French and English fleets to pass the Dardanelles bid fair to renew the danger.

Nor was it long before Mehemet Ali again revolted. This time he was supported by an extraordinary wave of popular feeling in France, while the Sultan was backed by England and Russia.

Austria was courted by both sides, and the Czar even undertook another journey to Teplitz to try and win over Metternich to his side.

But Metternich's great object was to avoid war, and he steadfastly refused to intervene, though he announced that if war broke out, Austria would willingly mediate. He probably felt that the two Oriental potentates were better left to fight out their quarrel in their own way.

France, the champion of the Pasha of Egypt, also endeavoured to gain Austria's support, but Metternich's only reply was to suggest a Congress at Constantinople, which did not prove acceptable. As early as 1833 Metternich suspected France of designs on Egypt, and wrote to Prokesch at Alexandria, "France looks upon Egypt as a conquest which sooner or later must be hers."

In 1839 three disasters befell the Ottoman Empire ; their fleet was captured, their army was defeated, and the Sultan died ; and the question arose whether Russia would seize the favourable opportunity, invade the Turkish dominions and probably cause a universal war.

So grave seemed the crisis that when he went for his usual autumn visit to Johannisberg, Metternich took with him the whole of the Chancellor's staff. Here he was besieged by the representatives of the contending parties. England sought his aid for the preservation of Turkish integrity. France, still suffering from Egyptomania, urged the rights of her pet Pasha. This was what Metternich loved. He professed neutrality, but it was very evident that he would ultimately declare for the English policy of propping up the Ottoman Empire.

At last, early in 1840, England, Austria, Prussia and Russia agreed to coerce the Pasha of Egypt.

The war fever which raged in France was quenched by threats from the four allied powers, and Metternich, ever eager to be on the winning side, sent an Austrian squadron to join Stopford, the British Admiral who was entrusted with the task of crushing the Egyptian fleet.

The successful co-operation of the Austrian and British squadrons awoke in Metternich quite a cordial, of temporary, affection for Great Britain, of which the outward and visible sign was a warm letter of thanks to Stopford written on behalf of the Austrian Emperor.

The only danger now was the warlike instincts of the Porte, engendered by success and backed up indirectly by Palmerston and the British Government. Seeing this, Metternich, in the interests of peace, supported France in her appeal that Egypt should be saved to Mehemet Ali. This formed the basis of that peaceful settlement which was ultimately made at the end of 1840.

Mehemet Ali acknowledged the suzerainty of the Porte and kept Egypt. Metternich's policy throughout had been singularly free from intrigue, moderate and consistent, and he had succeeded in detaching France from her friendship with England. This had long been the aim of Metternich. He had jealously watched the effect of the rapprochement of the Western Powers, as illustrated by the Belgian Question and the revolutionary movement in Italy. "Everywhere," he had written in 1833, "we find the same boastful spirit, the same inordinate desire on the part of the French Government to engross at whatever cost the leading questions of the day." He had warned the French ambassador at Vienna that Great

Britain was making France a catspaw, and compared their alliance to that of Man and the Horse, and endeavoured, by keeping up a correspondence with Louis Philippe's sister, who had great influence over that king, to maintain a check on French policy.

This aim had been achieved in the solution of the problem of Mehemet Ali. In October 1834 Metternich celebrated the completion of twenty-five years' service as Minister. In spite of the congratulations which were showered upon him and the handsome medal with which his subordinates presented him, did he reflect upon the change which had come over his position in Europe during the last decade, nay, even since the Revolution of 1830? To others, at least, it must have been manifest.

Though still a commanding figure in European politics and a statesman whose advice was frequently sought by the most acute diplomatists, the policy he now pursued was more timid, more elastic, less enterprising. He feared isolation and liked to be on the winning side more and more as years advanced. He trimmed and temporized, always seeking the welfare of Austria and a balance of power in Europe. Though it was manifest to all that in Greece, in Belgium, in Portugal, in Spain and in South America, his system had been flouted and that the power of the Holy Alliance was broken, he was content to yield to the inevitable. Where he was strong in Germany, in Italy, and in Switzerland, he still sought to repress Liberalism with a heavy hand. But already we have seen how Italy and Germany were rousing themselves to shake off the fetters of his system, and ere his own

fall Switzerland was destined, under the ægis of Palmerston, to deal the last shattering blow.

The last years of Metternich's control of Austrian foreign policy are melancholy reading. Already, before the forces of revolution had hurled him from power, he witnessed the triumph of Liberal principles in almost all those portions of Europe where he had combated them most fiercely. He felt in his heart of hearts that his efforts had been in vain, and although in the years previous to 1848 he made a few despairing efforts, which ended in ignominious failure, to gather up the threads of his old policy, for the most part he seemed resigned to the inevitable and contented himself with grumbling criticisms and sinister prophecies of the evils threatening the generation which had grown up around him.

One specious success appeared to attend the last years of his power. In 1846 Austrian troops occupied the free Republic of Cracow. This course had been suggested by the Czar to Metternich at the Conference at Münchengrätz, when it was agreed to occupy Cracow with troops contributed by the three Eastern Powers in 1823 as a means of punishing the inhabitants for their active participation in the Polish Revolution. Then Metternich had hesitated, but later, partly from territorial greed, partly from fear that Russia or Prussia might seize it if Austria did not, he determined to act upon the Czar's suggestion. The opposition of Prussia nearly led to a war between Austria and England, Prussia and France. But Metternich relied on the enmity which had sprung up between France and Great Britain over the Spanish marriages, and calmly retained his acquisition.

Though he had apparently scored a success, it was a great blunder. Not only had Austria, by splitting up the last surviving portion of Poland, the independence of which had been guaranteed at the Congress of Vienna, belied her fidelity to the Holy Alliance, but the traditional policy of Maria Theresa, Kaunitz, and the old Austrian statesmanship, of maintaining an Independent Poland as a buffer-state against Russian aggression had been cast to the winds.

For a moment, in 1843, the Grecian Question rose to prominence when King Otto was forced to grant constitutional government. Metternich, in the hope of reviving Austria's influence at Athens, hopelessly extinguished by the issue of the struggle for independence, strove to procure a Conference of the Powers for the purpose of coercing Greece. But his appeal met with no response; the day of intervention under Austrian leadership was over, and Metternich reluctantly left Grecian affairs to be composed by Russia, Great Britain and France.

Ever since 1830 Switzerland had occupied the attention of the Austrian Chancellor. In 1834 he had written to Count Apponyi: "It is the July Revolution that has made Switzerland what she is; that unhappy country no longer possesses a government, whether central or cantonal; what governs them is the Clubs, and they consist of all the human dregs of Europe." He also compared the combating of revolutionary doctrines in Switzerland with establishing quarantine against an Eastern plague, and talked of drawing "a moral cordon" round Switzerland.

Matters went from bad to worse, and a religious as well as political schism rent the Cantons into two

camps. Practically the Catholic Cantons, headed by Lucerne, identified themselves with the opposition to the Liberal and reforming party, which consisted chiefly of Protestants. For the sake of cohesion these Catholic Cantons formed themselves into a league called the "Sonderbund" for the maintenance of the old feudal forms of government.

Now Metternich in the ordinary course of things would have supported the Catholic Cantons without hesitation. But he had always had a great aversion to the Jesuits as representing an element liable to disturb stability in government by religious fanaticism, and it happened that the first act of the "Sonderbund" had been to recall the Jesuits to Lucerne. At first this was enough to deter Metternich from intervening on behalf of the reactionary party. But when, in 1847, a majority of the Federal Assembly decided to overthrow the "Sonderbund" and expel the Jesuits, Metternich at once endeavoured to put the Concert of the Powers in motion for the coercion of this revolutionary movement and the defence of the reactionary Cantons. Palmerston, who was determined to secure the victory of the Liberals, whom he knew to be the stronger party in Switzerland, created delay after delay by not answering the notes addressed by the Continental Powers to the British Foreign Office, while at the same time he urged the Swiss Liberals to strike.

In the end the Liberal Cantons overwhelmed the reactionaries and expelled the Jesuits, and the Powers, finding that there was no longer any "Sonderbund" to defend, could merely look foolish. Metternich, though he had no sympathy with the Jesuits, was furious at the pernicious example of successful

Liberalism displayed at the very threshold of the Austrian Empire. He strove to induce the Powers to let Austrian troops intervene in Switzerland. Perhaps he might have succeeded, but it was too late. Swiss Liberalism was saved by the Revolution of 1848.

It was, perhaps, fitting that Great Britain, which by her policy under Canning had indirectly done so much to break through the meshes of Metternich's system, should also deliver the final blow. Everywhere Metternich saw disaster overtaking the fabric of Austrian supremacy which he had raised up with so much toil. Russia had to a great extent taken her place in the Councils of Europe. In Germany, Prussia was fast becoming a serious rival to Austrian influence. The Zollverein, or Tariff Union, which she formed almost with the aid of Metternich, had bound her to her smaller neighbours and assured her of faithful supporters in any future struggle. This fact was obvious to all and had its effect in the growth of opposition to the Metternich system in the Diet, in the Universities, and in everyday life. Liberalism took heart; if Austrian diplomacy sustained checks from Liberal statesmen abroad, why should Germany consent to be dictated to from Vienna? Events were more and more tending towards that general uprising of intellectual as well as physical opposition which overwhelmed the system symbolized by the Carlsbad Decrees.

CHAPTER XIII

DOMESTIC POLICY

Nature of the Austrian Constitution—The Council of State and the "Privy Council"—Dependence of the Constitution for its smooth working upon the character of the Emperor—The prevalence of "red tape" and lack of initiative—This condition of affairs was not the result of the Metternich system—Metternich was not the deadly opponent of all reform—His attempts to reform the Council of State—Death of the Emperor Francis—Character of Ferdinand—Metternich's position under the new ruler—His rivalry with Kolowrat causes much anxiety to Archduke Louis, who has to keep the peace—Evil results upon the administration—Creation of the Conference of State—Metternich's attitude towards the Press—The Zollverein—Metternich desires to procure Austria's inclusion in it—Scheme for a Mid-European Tariff Union—Failing in this, Metternich endeavours to reform and assimilate the Tariff systems of the Austrian Empire—But is equally unsuccessful—Explanation of Metternich's apparent indifference to the need of internal reform in Austria—Such efforts as he makes towards reform are balked by opposition in the Council—Reforms are constantly shelved until the eve of the 1848 Revolution—A strong party antagonistic to Metternich is formed at Court—Metternich's relations with the Church—Growing desire in Austria for Metternich's resignation

THE Constitution of Austria until 1848 was Feudal—in origin, in form and in intricacy. There was no Ministry in the modern sense of the word; the work of administration was carried on by a series of Court Officers, that is to say, each department of State, such as Finance or War, and each of the three chief divisions of the Empire, Austria Proper, Hungary and Transylvania, were controlled by separate Councils holding office from the Crown.

For instance, military matters were administered by the famous Aulic Council of War ; Foreign policy and the business of the Imperial Household by the House - Court - and State - Chancellor (Metternich's office) ; while Hungary was ruled by an Aulic Chancellor of its own. All those branches of Government, as well as Police Censorship, Justice and the rest, were entirely separate from each other. At the meetings of the various Councils, measures were in most cases carried by a majority of votes, but the President had power to veto any decision which he deemed inadvisable. 7/10/16

The Empress Maria Theresa, seeing that there was a lack of cohesion and intercommunication between the various Court offices, formed a Council of State, to which she invited representatives from the various departmental Councils for the purpose of giving her advice, associating with them carefully chosen statesmen of experience. So long as the Court offices and Council of State were suffered to perform their original functions, no need was felt of a Ministry in the modern sense of the word. But the Emperor Francis, by enlarging the Council of State, diminished its prestige, and in part superseded it, since he frequently either attended himself to matters referred up from the departments or disposed of them in "Cabinet-Fashion" by handing them over to a Minister or even an ordinary member of the Court. This custom of derogating the Emperor's powers to a few trusty advisers developed a sort of Privy Council, existing side by side with the Council of State and performing much the same functions. Neither satisfied the crying need of the Austrian

Sketch

Constitution for a central and authoritative connecting link between the various departments.

So long as the Emperor Francis lived, the position was tolerable. He was a remarkably capable man of business, and actually succeeded in the formidable task of gathering all the threads of Austrian Administration into his own hands. Still, all depended upon the capacity of the Emperor, and in spite of the industry of Francis, his system was not beneficial to the proper working of the Constitution. The feeling that the whole administration centred in the Emperor engendered a universal desire to shift responsibility, and his constant interference in the minutest details checked individual initiative. No subordinate would move a step without the sanction of his immediate superior, and a remarkably cumbrous system of appeals to the Emperor in cases where one official considered that he had suffered injustice from another caused interminable inquiries and commissions, which sometimes resulted in a trumpery case occupying the time of busy officials for many years without any conclusion being reached.

Moreover, the amount of red tape prevailing in the Court offices would be almost incredible even to the severest critic of the old British War Office. It was an inviolable maxim that every case for which there was no precedent must be referred to the Emperor. One example will suffice. If a conscript, summoned for military service claimed exemption, and his claim, however just, did not exactly conform to those urged and granted in any previous case, the matter must be referred to the Emperor. Yet the duty of determining the total number of recruits to

be annually raised, a number which naturally varied indefinitely year by year, rested entirely in the hands of the Aulic Council of War.

Again, the Emperor's habit of entrusting unofficial personages with the most important affairs of State and requesting their advice, the absence of any definite connexion between the Court offices, the Council of State, and what we may call, for want of a better word, the "Cabinet," and of any definition of their respective spheres of duty, gave rise to an extraordinary amount of jealousy and misunderstanding between the various members of this inimitable bureaucracy.

The result was that an enormous amount of work was accomplished day by day in the various departments of Austrian Government with no tangible result. *Quies non movere* was as much the motto of Francis as it was of Walpole, and it has been well said that under his system "the machinery of Austrian administration ceased to move." No reform, or suggestion of reform, in the Constitution was suffered for a moment. "Let us sleep upon it," is said to have been Francis' favourite reply when a new suggestion was put before him, and sleep was the dominant characteristic of the Austrian Empire.

It is most unfair to call this state of affairs the result of Metternich's system. From first to last, up to the date of Francis' death, it was Francis' system. That Metternich was to blame for not thrusting his views upon the Emperor, and insisting on changes which he knew were necessary, may be asserted with some justice. That was the fault of the Chancellor's yielding nature. The truth is, that Francis, while he

left Metternich a free hand in Foreign policy, practically controlled the Home Department single-handed. He might ask Metternich's advice; he might even entrust him, with the management of some special detail. But, undoubtedly, Francis was responsible in the main for the fact that a "disastrous system of finance founded on a mere delusion—the extinction of the old National Debt—increased annually the burden of interest due by the State, without furnishing by way of compensation any new capital to open fresh sources of national wealth; a bigoted attachment to whatever was established, closed a door against such improvements in the legislative or executive departments as were suitable to the exigencies of the times; and even when a conviction of the necessity of reforms was acknowledged they were delayed, or their effect rendered nugatory, by numerous doubts and by endless discussions as to whether, in place of the alteration proposed, something better might not perhaps be substituted." ¹

In spite of this, Francis never quite lost his popularity; nor in all probability did he ever know that he had even aroused any discontent, although in his later years the example of a more Liberal government in neighbouring countries and the rise of national spirit even in Austria boded ill for the continuance of his system.

If it be taken for granted that the system under which Austria was governed, at any rate up to 1835, was that of the Emperor Francis, and not Metternich's, it will be unnecessary to examine the details of its

¹ Genesis of the Austrian Revolution. Coxe's "House of Austria," Bohn's Library Edition, p. 9.

working except so far as Metternich had a voice in it.

In the interval between the disastrous war of 1809 and the Russian invasion, many useful reforms were carried out in Austria, but it cannot be said that Metternich was the author of them. The reorganization of the Finance, for instance, which was in a deplorable condition, was entrusted to Count Wallis, who performed his task with an unusual display of independence and ability. It is noteworthy that Metternich was at first inclined to oppose Wallis' suggestions, but eventually, finding that they received wide support, warmly espoused them. The reorganization of the Austrian military system was entrusted to Count Bellegarde, a man who, according to Metternich, "understood, as well as I did, the value of letting men talk," and it is to him and not to Metternich that the credit for its successful accomplishment is due. The fact is, that Metternich was much too busy with the affairs of Europe to give adequate attention to domestic questions; and the obvious desire of Francis to be his own Minister for the Interior encouraged him to leave them alone. "Social Questions, therefore," he wrote, "I placed in the background, but in the very first rank I placed the preservation of what remained of the Austrian Empire." And for this purpose it was the foreign relations of Austria, especially with France, that were really important.

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But since it has been frequently asserted that Metternich was the deadly enemy of all reform, it is worth while to demonstrate that he was constantly agitating for a change in the Constitution, and

latterly, even in the Tariff System of the Austrian Empire.

Let it be said once and for all that, however timidly and however unsuccessfully he put his convictions into force, Metternich was thoroughly convinced of the necessity for reform in the Austrian Empire. He was often heard to deplore the fact that the Empire was administered but not governed. The pity of it is that while thoroughly recognizing the need for change, Metternich refused to allow anything to be done by the people; whatever was to be done must be effected for the people by the Government. Moreover his yielding and pliant nature was not proof against opposition, and so long as Francis, or even, as after his death, a strong party at Court opposed all reform Metternich could not harden his heart to carry out what he knew to be right and necessary.

During the first years of his accession to power, Metternich sought to develop the ideas of Kaunitz and make the Council of State a deliberative and advisory body, subordinate only to the Emperor, and acting as a connecting link between the Emperor and the various Court offices and between the Court offices themselves. This would have relieved the Emperor from attending to a mass of details while preserving his superior power, and would have helped to remedy that great defect of the Austrian Constitution—the complete severance of the executive from the legislative power. Also he was continually suggesting to Francis schemes for the improvement of the relations between the central and local governments and the general administration of the various

dependencies of the Austrian Empire. All these schemes were constantly shelved by Francis, and to Metternich's bitter disappointment were never put into force. It must be admitted, however, that he never tried to force Francis to accept his views; that would have belied his characteristic disinclination to sacrifice favour to principles.

We may, then, pass over rapidly that portion of domestic politics which coincides with the reign of Francis; merely emphasizing the fact that to all intents and purposes no change took place in the Constitution, and that every foreign influence which might have aroused discontent in Austria was rigidly excluded by a complicated system of Police, Press Censor, and Protective Tariff.

The Emperor Francis died on March 2nd, 1835. He had only fallen ill on February 25th, but by the 28th it was clear that he was dying. Princess Metternich in her Diary relates how her cook temporarily raised the Chancellor's hopes for the Emperor's recovery in a curious manner. She won 2,800 florins in a lottery after purchasing three tickets bearing the following numbers: 12 (the date of the Emperor's birth was February 12th), 43 (March 1st, the date when the Princess made the entry in her Diary was the 43rd anniversary of his accession), and 67, which was the age of the Emperor. "We look upon this," wrote the Princess, "as a good omen."

But superstition, not for the first time in the world's history, proved a broken reed. On the very day when these words were written in the Princess' Diary the old Emperor passed away. The immediate cause was exhaustion from excessive bleeding by the doctors.

By the death of Francis, Metternich lost a firm friend and a staunch political ally ; it was not absolutely certain whether he would maintain his position under the new régime. To have been deprived of power at this juncture would have been a terrible blow for Metternich. High office had become so much a part of his existence that he could not even imagine himself as a private person. A General on the retired list was one day bemoaning his inactivity in the presence of the Chancellor, who suggested cards and the usual pastimes of the idle. " But," expostulated the General, " what would you do if you were out of power ? " " You are imagining," replied Metternich, " an impossible contingency."

Since his third marriage a marked change had come over the Chancellor. He became a family man in a much truer sense than ever before, spent more time at home, and also worked harder at the Chancellery. Still time had not healed his characteristic fault of self-complacency. He loved to inflict his views on others, on ambassadors who visited him on business, on casual visitors, on Austrian representatives abroad, whom he bombarded with voluminous despatches. Always he sought to impress upon people that his actions were grounded on profound statesmanship, though in reality no statesman ever sacrificed principles more readily to the needs of the moment. Of one fact there is no doubt, and that is, that Metternich regarded himself as indispensable to Austria if not to Europe ; his death or fall would be nothing less than a national disaster. The question was, would the new Emperor hold the same view ?

The Emperor Ferdinand succeeded to the throne



THE EMPEROR FRANCIS I OF AUSTRIA
AFTER THE PAINTING BY SIR THOMAS LAWRENCE



at the age of thirty-six. His constitution was delicate, and at one time his life had been despaired of. He had obtained some previous experience of government, for Francis had taken care that instruction in statecraft should form part of his training. He was weak, kind-hearted, and full of good intentions, but it was obvious from the first that his health would never permit him to take a prominent part in public affairs.

Still it was equally obvious that he intended to retain Metternich in power, and obeying the instructions of his father's will to rely entirely upon Metternich, "my truest servant and best friend," he received him with marked affection when he came to offer his congratulations. "They feel at Court," wrote Princess Metternich joyfully, "how necessary he is to them." Soon afterwards, in a very friendly letter, the new Emperor confirmed the Chancellor in his appointments.

Nevertheless, Metternich's position was in a sense altered. Ferdinand never placed the same complete and peculiar trust in his Chancellor as Metternich had enjoyed under Francis. Moreover, Ferdinand's ill-health prevented him, even if he had had the ability, from gathering into his own hands the reins of Austrian Administration. This meant that there would be a struggle for power amongst the more prominent statesmen, and that the inherent weakness of the Austrian Constitution, the complete separation of the Legislative and Executive, would be enhanced. And here let it be remarked that if only Metternich had been a statesman, and not merely a brilliant diplomatist, he would have chosen this moment for

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the prosecution of reforms. He professes in his Memoirs to have constantly urged Francis in this direction, and to have been invariably thwarted by the Emperor. Why, then, did he not make his influence felt at the accession of a new Emperor, eager to benefit his subjects, eager to secure popularity? True, the reign began with some mild and salutary measures, and the Italian political prisoners confined in the dungeons of Spielberg and Munkacz, for whose release Metternich had often interceded with Francis, were suffered to emigrate to America. But the golden opportunity for remedying the defects of the constitution, and for modifying that system whereby the inhabitants of the Austrian dominions were treated like unreasoning children by a somnolent if patriarchal government, was allowed to slip by. Too acute not to observe what was required, but too weak to do aught beyond state his views, Metternich has laid himself open to the charge of aiding and abetting that effete system which Francis had developed and which was to last until the forces of Revolution overwhelmed it.

The persons with whom Metternich shared the chief power in the State were three in number. There was the famous chief of police, Sedlinitzky, who carried out with admirable precision all those complicated measures designed to protect Austria from the noxious and revolutionary influences of the outside world, and repress such ebullitions of Liberal enthusiasm as threatened the tranquillity of the slumbering nations within. But far more important to Austria were the relations between Metternich and Count Kolowrat, State-and-Conference Minister, who con-

fined himself to the sphere of internal politics. Kolowrat was aristocratic, ambitious, and a keen reformer, eager for the rights of the middle classes and the amelioration of the peasants' lot. Koh

Now Metternich was, as has been observed before, not averse to reform; only he was more cautious than Kolowrat, who was inclined to take risks. The real danger lay in the fact that Metternich regarded Kolowrat as his rival, and sought to undermine his influence. From this time, two parties were formed at Court, supporting Kolowrat and Metternich respectively, and a sordid struggle for predominance began which was fraught with serious consequences for Austria. The balance was held by Archduke Louis, the Emperor's uncle. He held no definite post, but since the accession of Ferdinand had represented the Emperor in the Council of State, and being hard-working and business-like, practically held the supreme position in the State. The late Emperor had placed great confidence in him, and the Archduke endeavoured to follow out his brother's principles in every respect. "No change," was almost a fetish with him, and like his brother he reposed the most implicit trust in Metternich's abilities. Ferdinand's ill-health enhanced the defects of the constitution. There was no responsible head, and in spite of the efforts of Archduke Louis to hold the balance the State was torn by rivalries, which it seemed impossible to heal. The climax came in 1836, when the illness of Ferdinand made it positively necessary to form a central board of control. At this period the party opposed to Metternich was so strong that his fall seemed a probable contingency. Empire

Now was the opportunity for remedying some of the evils of the constitution. It was absurd, for instance, that two Councils, the Council of State and what we have hitherto called the Privy Council, should exist side by side, fulfilling similar and similarly undefined functions, neither forming a link between the Emperor or the Court offices, which was so much needed, especially in the present emergency. The rivalries of Metternich and Kolowrat prevented all chance of any sweeping reform; at the most a compromise might be expected. For Kolowrat was President of the Council of State (though, since the Council worked in sections, his Presidency was only nominal) and wanted to convert this body into a Council of Regency with the view of securing the chief power himself. Metternich, who was President of the Council of Conferences or Privy Council, was equally anxious to enlarge the powers of that body, and was supported by Archduke Louis, who exerted all his efforts in the interests of peace.

Metternich relied upon his support and that of the heir apparent, Archduke Francis Joseph, to establish his predominance permanently and indisputably, and the strife became so bitter that in the autumn of 1836 Kolowrat temporarily gave up politics in disgust and retired to his estates, whence all efforts at conciliation failed to draw him.

At length the tension and confusion became so serious that all parties combined to reconcile the rivals, and chiefly at the earnest request of Archduke Louis, Metternich agreed to Kolowrat's suggestion for the creation of a Supreme Council called the Conference of State, the most prominent members

of which should be Metternich, Kolowrat, the Archdukes Francis and Louis. The latter was appointed President, as representing the Emperor. The Council of State was to remain with Kolowrat as President of that section of it which dealt with Finance and internal affairs. Outwardly everyone seemed satisfied. Kolowrat's suggestions had been accepted, while at the same time Metternich became almost as powerful as he had been in the lifetime of Francis. He obtained a free hand in foreign affairs and, thanks to the cordial support of Archduke Louis, was usually able to make his influence felt in internal affairs as well. But as a matter of fact the new-fangled Conference of State failed to improve the situation; it even made the confusion worse, since there were now three Councils instead of two, and not a whit more cohesion between the various units of administration than before. Nor, which was little less important, did it end the rivalry between Kolowrat and Metternich.

It is curious that nearly every statesman in Austria at this period recognized the need for reform and the numerous anomalies of the constitution; yet none of them dared to take the initiative for fear of jeopardizing their own position. It was almost unfortunate that in the Austrian Empire there seemed no danger of Revolution, which might have spurred Metternich and his colleagues to action. But the system of Francis, which remained in force after his death, was so mild that probably the inhabitants of the Austrian Empire were happier than those of any other portion of the Continent. It must be remembered that the internal policy of the Austrian Govern-

ment was preventive rather than punitive, and when we talk of a rigorous Police system, and a rigorous Press-supervision, we mean that Austria was carefully protected from all outside influence, and not that she was harshly or unreasonably used. Even Sedlinitzky's police measures were preventive rather than aggressive. The people of Austria, happily unconscious of the storms that raged in neighbouring countries, hardly perceived that they were governed at all, and tranquilly busied themselves increasing their material prosperity.

Like Francis, Metternich was averse to anything that encouraged the masses to think or subjected them to outside influences. Thus he forbade Austrian students to visit foreign universities, discouraged the study of history, philosophy and politics, and opposed the influence of the Church, especially in the matter of education.

For the execution of such a policy a strict control of the Press was very necessary, and Metternich often gave proof of his sense of the importance of the Censor. It is true that Metternich used the Censor much more mildly than had been the case in the time of Francis. A great deal of smuggling of literature was allowed, and Metternich himself frequently bought works nominally banned by the Censor, and even lent them to his friends if he admired them for beauty or learning. Although he objected to Austrian authors publishing their books at home, he was quite willing to wink at their publishing them abroad; foreign authors, on the other hand, were always made much of at Vienna, and the Chancellor loved to entertain them and talk over with them literary

and scientific subjects. Indeed, so early as the beginning of 1830, Metternich had conceived the idea of establishing an Academy at Vienna.

But Metternich always considered that control of the Press was one of the first principles of Government. Napoleon had once told him that he would not undertake to govern France for three months with Liberty of the Press, and Metternich endeavoured to act upon these lines in Austria. "A temporary Censorship," he once remarked, "is nonsense," and he affirmed that "no government can pursue a firm and undeviating course when it is exposed daily to the influence of such dissolvent conditions as the Freedom of the Press." Acting on these principles the Chancellor kept a firm hand on the Press; as he had used it during the struggle with Napoleon to counteract the Bulletins of the "Moniteur," so after 1815 he used it to stifle the discussion and dispersion of Liberal views in Austria and in Germany at large. He made his secretary, Pilat, editor of the Austrian Beobachter (Observer) and often wrote articles in it himself; he controlled the Vienna Jahrbucher, and even subjected historical productions to the fatherly supervision of the Censors, of which there were no less than twelve in Vienna. The manner in which every word which savoured, however remotely, of national or Liberal enthusiasm or ideals was deleted by the Censors was sometimes extremely ludicrous. In the case of a work treating of events quite unconnected with the Austrian Empire the expression "heroic champions," was altered to "brave soldiers," while the sentence "a band of youthful heroes who flocked around the glorious standard of their country,"

became, at the direction of the Censor, "a considerable number of young men who voluntarily enlisted themselves for the public service."¹

As has been already remarked, Metternich was not at heart opposed to all Liberal measures. But his nature was the reverse of independent, and while Francis lived he was content to let his views coincide with those of his master—the more readily because he was still haunted continually by the spectre of Revolution.

To understand Metternich's real views we must glance at the period subsequent to Francis' death. After that date a distinct change came over Metternich's attitude towards internal affairs. Not only did he take much more interest in them but he showed himself to be animated by a real desire to benefit Austria. That he failed to accomplish his aim was not altogether his fault, but was due partly to the opposition which he encountered at every turn, and which he dared not face, and partly to the peculiar conditions existing in the Austrian Empire.

That he was by no means indifferent to the domestic requirements of Austria is illustrated by his attitude towards the Reform of the Constitution and the Question of Tariff Reform.

The rise of the Prussian Zollverein² is the most striking instance in history of the power of commercial ties. Recognising how valuable would be the aid of the smaller states of Germany to Prussia in the inevitable struggle with Austria, the Government of Berlin had conceived the idea of gradually absorbing

¹ W. H. Stiles, "Austria 1848-49, London 1852," vol. i. p. 85.

² Tariff-Union.

by a commercial union all those petty States which were accustomed to look, some to Austria, some to Prussia, for guidance in their political transactions.

The growth of the Zollverein had been gradual, quiet and eminently successful, and by 1833 it included, apart from insignificant States, Hesse Darmstadt, Electoral Hesse, Würtemberg, Bavaria and Saxony. At first Metternich was alarmed, and pursued his usual policy in such cases of sending round Notes to the smaller States begging them to withdraw their allegiance to an Organization which seemed to threaten Austrian supremacy in Germany. But he soon desisted, either because he felt he was doing Prussia an injustice in attributing to her political, when she was merely pursuing commercial aims, or because, in view of revolutionary movements, he did not wish to present to Europe the spectacle of a disunited Germany.

Instead he now became bent on securing Austria's admittance to the Zollverein. He saw the advantage of a system curiously similar to that advocated for Great Britain by the supporters of Colonial Preference, whereby Prussia had become the centre of a group of States bound together by the strongest of all ties—material interests; and he feared lest the Austrian Empire, isolated commercially, might in the end be forced against her will to take up a position of political isolation. As a result of Metternich's advocacy of Austria's adhesion to the Zollverein, the scheme was much talked of in official circles in 1834, but apart from numerous objections, which perhaps of themselves would not have deterred Metternich, the Emperor Francis steadfastly refused to discuss the proposition.

The death of Francis gave Metternich a freer hand, and in 1836 he again brought the matter into prominence and opened negotiations with Prussia on the subject of Austria's admittance to the Zollverein. But when ways and means came to be discussed it was seen that many practical difficulties intervened. The conditions of Agriculture and Industry in Austria and Prussia were widely dissimilar, and a system of monopolies prevailed in the former which ensured the opposition of the great manufacturers to any scheme of reform. Also Hungary had different Tariff arrangements to those in other parts of the Austrian Empire. Politically, there was a great aversion in Austrian official circles to adopting an idea originally suggested by Prussia, and the continual dread of the effect which closer commercial relations with the outside world might have upon the Austrian Empire.

In view of these objections, it seemed inexpedient to make any change in the Tariff arrangements of Austria. But the Chancellor never gave up the idea of securing Austria's admission to the Zollverein, for he recognized that, apart from the commercial advantages, it would secure to Austria that preponderance in Germany which Prussia seemed inclined to share. On the conclusion of the Eastern Question, therefore, he returned to the attack. He usually spent the Autumn months on his estate at Johannisberg, and when travelling through Suabia and Bavaria to reach it he was able to observe and appreciate the benefits accruing to those districts from their adhesion to the Zollverein.

Gradually his ideas developed ; he would establish a great Mid-European Zollverein including not only

Austria - Hungary but the Italian States as well under the leadership of Austria. On his return from Johannisberg in November 1841 he placed his views before the Conference of State. They were favourably received by the Archduke Francis and Louis, because they were Metternich's, by Kolowrat, because he recognized that their adoption would benefit Austrian Commerce. Moreover the Chancellor now obtained the support of the great manufacturers and of von Kübeck, the capable and energetic President of the Chamber of Commerce. He received great encouragement from the Press and the Public in general. A commission was appointed by the Vienna Trades Union to report on the Question, and Count von Hartig, formerly governor of Lombardy, was commissioned to examine the commercial conditions existing in the Austrian Empire in detail and after consultation with the various provincial officials and public bodies proffer his advice to the Government.

Acting mainly upon the report of von Hartig, who came to the conclusion that under present conditions Metternich's scheme was impossible, the Government decided not to embark upon it. The real difficulty was Hungary; its Tariff arrangements were quite different to those of Austria proper, and in view of the pronounced national aspirations of the Magyars it was dangerous to make drastic or hasty changes, lest they should result in the total secession of Hungary; and the loss of Hungary was an unthinkable contingency to Austrian statesmen.

Metternich, balked in his grand project, set about clearing the ground for future efforts in the same direction. With the cordial support of Kübeck he

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tried to reform the Austrian Tariff and assimilate the Hungarian Tariff to that of the rest of the Empire, sounding Prussia at intervals as to the feasibility of Austria's inclusion in the Zollverein. By 1843 success seemed certain. But all Metternich's plans were set at nought by a recurrence of the rivalry between him and Kolowrat. The latter, whether unwilling that the Chancellor should score a success, or like Hartig really convinced that the scheme was not feasible, suddenly appeared to lose all his enthusiasm. When the question was discussed by the Conference of State Metternich was unfortunately absent. His ally, von Kübeck, bending to a storm of protests from the rich manufacturers against any modification of the monopoly system, went over to the opposition, and with little difficulty Kolowrat was able to prevent all but a very few unimportant changes in the existing commercial arrangements. Von Kübeck, realizing too late the folly of his conduct, energetically demanded that the question of the removal of the prohibitive system should be shelved until Metternich's return. His efforts were useless, and even the Archduke Louis sacrificed his regard for Metternich's judgment to his fear of change.

Though Metternich, after this reverse, never again came near to obtaining the completion of his darling project, he never ceased to hanker after it, and it is interesting to note, as a justification of his foresight, that twelve years afterwards, in 1853, when he was no longer in power, a measure was carried for assimilating the Austrian to the Prussian Tariff, the credit of which was due chiefly to von Brück.

The Machiavellian impression of Metternich, which

we receive from the history books, inclines us to regard him as the determined opponent of all reform. Moreover, it is an unanswerable charge that, although no machinery of Government in Europe was so rusty, so ponderous and so inert as that of the Austrian Empire, Metternich did practically nothing to alter it.

Two facts explain Metternich's apparent indifference to the need for internal reform in Austria. He was so busy with foreign policy that he simply had no leisure for embarking on ambitious domestic schemes, and was chiefly bent on maintaining quiet within the Austrian Empire in order that he might have freedom to put forth all his powers in the arena of world-politics. But the chief reason was that the Emperor Francis was his own Home Secretary, and it is very clear that to the end of his life he suffered Metternich only the most remote voice in internal affairs.

It is probable that Metternich from the first would have preferred some necessary changes to be made in the constitution of the Austrian Empire. But within Austria, he, the supreme arbiter of European politics, was comparatively a cipher; at any rate he cannot be blamed because the Austrian constitution underwent no repair.

A report which Metternich drew up for Francis on the Central Administration in Austria proves that he perceived defects. "The government as it is at present rests in its daily working too entirely on the principle of centralization. The machine of government goes on because its springs are well put together and well guided, and because there is at the head of the administration a Monarch capable of ruling."

Yet he proposed no drastic remedy, and even stated that "no time is less suited than the present to bring forward in any State reforms in a wide sense of the word." Owing to the composition and variety of the Austrian Empire two courses appeared to him possible. The various nationalities might be fused into one homogeneous race. But this course he lightly dismisses with the remark that Joseph II. had tried the experiment and failed miserably. He did not mention that that unfortunate and well-meaning Emperor had gone about it in such a rash, tactless and overbearing manner as to ensure the ill-success of his schemes.

The other alternative was judiciously to balance the various nationalities under one head, and this practically amounted to maintaining the old régime. Indeed Metternich expressly stated that he considered the old system of circles and provinces was good enough. He professes, indeed, in his Memoirs to have elaborated a scheme for the central representation of the Nation, and complains that it was Francis who continually shelved it until two months before his death, when it was too late. Whether or not we are to believe this, the fact remains that the sole result of Metternich's report was to draw still tighter the strings of centralization. A single high office was created under the name of the United Chancery, to superintend the affairs of the Bohemian, Galician and Austrian provinces, to which now for the first time were added those of Italy and Illyria.

Thus *quieta non movere* is the keynote of Metternich's domestic policy, and whereas in the career of most statesmen much space is allotted to internal problems,

with Metternich this sphere of politics was the least important and also the least interesting. The reason is not hard to find. In Austria all classes were firmly in the grip of the government ; there was at present no danger of the successful promulgation of revolutionary doctrines. Abroad, on the other hand, these revolutionary doctrines were rife. Their example for Austria was bad. They must be extinguished. And apart from the combat to be waged against revolution in Germany and abroad, there was at issue the vast question of the future of Germany. Metternich could afford to leave Austria alone, and having other interests he did practically leave her alone, at any rate up till the date of Francis' death.

Metternich was by no means averse to reform, so long as it came from the Government and not from the demands of the masses. But he looked with alarm at the blatant Liberalism of Frederick William IV., the new King of Prussia, who, full of good intentions, and loving popularity, was bent on giving Prussia a constitution. Accordingly Metternich supported Russia in trying to prevent the Prussian Government throwing themselves into the arms of the Liberals, because he feared the influence of such a policy on the hitherto contented dominions of Austria. He entirely underrated the strength of the Liberal Movement in Austria, and in spite of the growing demand for reform, up till 1847 the only concessions to it were paltry measures of which the shortening of the period of military service is a typical illustration.

Still Metternich had always recognized that if the King of Prussia really gave vent to his Liberal aspira-

tions, Austria, his next door neighbour, must either follow his example or else commence drastic measures against revolutionary tendencies. There could be no question of maintaining things as they were. When therefore in 1847 Prussia was granted a Constitution, Metternich preferring, as befitted his cautious nature, concessions to force, again took up the cause of the reform of the Constitution.

In March 1847 he opened negotiations with Prussia to discuss the possibility of greater freedom of the Press in Germany. Moreover, in the Conference of State, he even gave it as his opinion that Austria ought to have a constitution, and with his customary elaboration laid before his colleagues two separate schemes for broadening the constitutional power of the Provincial Estates; at the same time it was suggested that the Provinces should be asked to send deputies to Vienna to confer with the Finance Department as to the best means of making the income of the State balance the expenditure. This would have been a great step towards constitutional government. But, as usual, Metternich's good intentions were balked by opposition at Court. There was a great deal of talk and mutual discussion of the project; some enthusiasm, much hesitation. Finally the matter was dropped. In a sense Metternich was to be pitied; he recognized the need for reform, and advocated it; a bigoted Court clique opposed it, and Metternich incurred all the obloquy of the Reformers. Yet really he had himself to thank. He was too much swayed by Archduke Louis' opinion; he lacked energy to press his own views on others; wedded to the old régime he caught at the least excuse for its retention,

welcomed the least obstacle to its reform. Perhaps, too, old age had blunted his determination.

So the year 1847 passed and the cause of reform in Austria had not advanced. Again and again Metternich suggested modifications and improvements, but withdrew them at the least sign of opposition. There was endless discussion, no fruition. On the Chancellor's advice a commission was appointed to examine the relations existing between the Central Government and the Provincial Estates, but nothing had been done before the storm of 1848. So it was with everything else. The improvement of prisons and schools, the relaxation of the Censorship, the removal of commercial anomalies were all discussed and all postponed. If the Chancellor had been a strong, convinced and earnest reformer he would have been chagrined and distressed, especially when he saw from the unrest in Italy and the granting of constitutions in many States of Germany that elsewhere Liberalism was triumphing. But his great aim was to maintain existing institutions; he was quite ready to modify them to suit the spirit of the times, but he was not going to risk his popularity or position by doing so, and he was convinced that the Austrian system would weather the coming storm as it had weathered the hurricane of 1830.

His policy, therefore, was to avoid all extremes, and when absolutely necessary to grant concessions. He therefore discouraged reactionary measures in Hesse and dissuaded Frederick William IV. from abolishing the Constitution which he had bestowed upon Prussia. Moreover at the end of 1847 he again brought before the Council the Question of Reform.

The Court was not nearly so obstinate in view of the threatening attitude of the Estates of Hungary, Bohemia and Lower Austria. Only the Archduke Louis could not forget that he had promised Francis on his death-bed never to change anything in Austria at any price, and, as again and again before, Metternich had not the heart to beard his old ally.

Still the need of some concession was manifest, so the Chancellor turned his attention to the Press, gingerly, and with his usual hesitation. The unfortunate result was that the new Press regulations which were published in February 1848, and proved to contain concessions only in name, caused the opposite effect to what was intended, and produced from an angry Opposition complaints that the restrictions on the Press were severer than ever. The authors and publishers of Vienna even presented a petition to the Emperor demanding the withdrawal of the new Regulations.

The occurrence was the more regrettable in that it coincided with the opening of the new Academy at Vienna on February 2nd, and detracted from the magnificence of the ceremony, since many of the most prominent scientists and literary men, such as Ranke and Gervinus, were either uninvited or showed their disapproval of the Government's policy by remaining away.

In spite of his failure to please either the Reformers or the Reactionary party, Metternich still endeavoured to promote the cause of reform in the shape of a constitution in Austria and in the Austrian dominions in Italy. But the opposition was as strenuous as ever and even the Chancellor himself came to the

conclusion that Italy was unfit for constitutional government and contented himself with a few small concessions in Lombardy. In regard to the rest of the Austrian Empire, Metternich succeeded in inducing his colleagues to recognize the soundness of his principles, and was able to go forward with schemes for reform in Bohemia and German Austria. He even induced the Emperor and Archduke Louis to allow deputies from the Provinces to come to Vienna and confer with the Central Government regarding the Finances. But as usual doubts arose at the critical moment; Archduke Louis and the Court Party of Reaction hesitated to abandon their principles; Kolowrat, always jealous of Metternich, threw in his lot with them, and all was still pending when the catastrophe of 1848 overtook the Hapsburg dynasty.

The February Revolution in France had a curious but immediate effect on Metternich. At once he changed from a convinced though feeble champion of reform to a deadly enemy of all concessions. All his old dread of the name "Revolution" came back to him in a flash. He put on his red spectacles and saw in Liberalism Revolution disguised. Fear bereft him of judgment; he suddenly became as reactionary as Archduke Louis, with whom he agreed to grant no further concessions, lest they should appear to be the outcome of fear, and to withdraw such reforms as had already been put into force.

Now was manifested the magnitude of the opposition to Metternich at Court. The hitherto ultra-conservative party veered round with suspicious facility to the cause of Reform, and clamoured for

concessions to Liberalism more far-reaching than any which the Chancellor himself had suggested. Von Kübeck and Kolowrat, who had always been ardent reformers, took the lead. United to them was a strong Church party, which included the greater part of the Court, and which had always opposed Metternich's policy of excluding ultramontane influence from Austria.

It is worth while briefly to sketch the attitude adopted by Metternich towards the Church. Once and for all let it be remarked that Metternich was a good Catholic. Yet, in spite of the influence brought to bear upon him at various periods of his life by his tutor Pilat, by Gentz, and by his successive wives, he was no devotee. He always opposed the emancipation of the Church from the State and the influence of the Church in Politics. Indeed, this was one of the few instances when his views ran counter to those of the Emperor Francis, who, supported by a majority at Court including a large number of influential ladies, was strongly in favour of giving the Church greater powers. Metternich succeeded in maintaining the state of affairs which had existed under Joseph II., and even when, after Francis' death, the Church again made great efforts to get greater freedom he succeeded in preventing all but a few trifling innovations. Very characteristically he attempted to grant just that minimum of the ecclesiastical demands which would save him from unpopularity with the Ultramontane party at Court, with the result that his half-measures merely created misunderstandings and entirely failed in their object.

For, hardly had the first break been effected in

Joseph's ecclesiastical settlement when the Jesuits made a great effort to recover their former influence in Austria. Metternich once remarked that he admired the Jesuits but hated Jesuitism ; and Francis and he had agreed in regarding them as an alien element and therefore to be debarred from influence. But under the weak rule of Ferdinand the Court seemed rather inclined to favour them, and Metternich, never a hankerer after unpopularity, felt it necessary grudgingly to drift with the stream and to grant concessions.

A moving spirit in the opposition to Metternich amongst the Imperial Family was the Archduchess Sophie, who, convinced that the Hapsburgs would suffer the same fate as the Orleans dynasty in France if drastic changes were not enforced, put patriotism before family ties, and wished the Emperor Ferdinand to abdicate in favour of the Archduke Francis Joseph. Then, provided Archduke Louis and Metternich could be induced to resign, a new constitutional monarchy might be set up in an Austria purged and cut loose from all unpopular associations.

In the month of March there were many Family Meetings at the Hofburg to discuss the situation. A majority, including the Archduke John, who showed himself bitterly hostile to Metternich, seemed to wish for the resignation of the Chancellor, who, supported by Archduke Louis, maintained that the danger was not nearly so pressing as it was represented.

Into this atmosphere, rank with intrigue, doubt, mistrust and jealousy, burst the bomb of the March Revolution.

CHAPTER XIV

HUNGARIAN POLICY AND FALL OF METTERNICH

Metternich's policy towards the Eastern portions of the Austrian Empire—The elements of opposition to Austrian rule in Hungary—Feudal character of the Hungarian Constitution—Metternich's early collisions with the Hungarian Diet—Count Stephen Szechenyi forms a constitutional opposition—Metternich at first attempts to bully the Diet—But the seriousness of the opposition causes the Austrian Government to take up a more conciliatory attitude—The arrest of Kossuth provides a fresh cause of dissension—Metternich climbs down and makes considerable concessions—Inflamed by the speeches of Kossuth, the opposition spreads to the non-Magyar inhabitants of the Austrian Empire—The rising in Galicia—Contrast between Metternich's policy towards Liberalism in Hungary with that adopted by him in other parts of Europe—Events inevitably tend towards a general upheaval in Austria—Effect of the February Revolution in France upon Austria—The elements of opposition to Metternich combine—Petitions are presented to the Emperor demanding Metternich's resignation—Divided counsels at Court—The meeting of the Estates of Lower Austria in Vienna forms a nucleus for the Revolution—The mob surround the Hofburg, and are joined by the students and middle classes—A stream of deputations demand the Chancellor's resignation—After considerable hesitation and unedifying wrangles amongst the Imperial Family, Metternich tenders his resignation—The announcement is received with every demonstration of joy by the populace of Vienna

A GLIMPSE at the history of Hungary and the non-German territories of the Austrian Empire in general is necessary to explain the consistency with which Metternich pursued his policy of stability at home and abroad. He never for one moment believed that Liberalism would triumph in Austria)*

proper. But he did feel anxiety for the more remote parts of the Empire, such as Hungary, Bohemia and Transsylvania, and for their sake consistently endeavoured to stifle all bad examples of revolutionary spirit abroad. *

Not that Metternich's treatment of the non-German portions of the Empire was harsh ; on the contrary, his policy towards Hungary especially is an excellent example of the fact that he would never willingly face opposition unless he felt himself irresistibly strong. In Italy he was supreme ; here there were no half-measures. But Hungary, in a sense, had always been the Ireland of Austrian statesmen. True, the Hungarians had displayed great loyalty in the past. They had borne the brunt of the Turkish invasions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ; they had nobly supported the Empress Maria Theresa in her struggle against Frederick the Great. But there always remained the old hostility of the conquered race towards the German conqueror, and Slav and Magyar alike longed for independence and national identity. To this ancient opposition was added, after the Revolution, all the newborn sentiments of Liberalism. As Metternich wrote in 1825 : " In Hungary the Government has to struggle with two oppositions ; one, the natural result of circumstances, is the old Hungarian opposition ; the other represents the spirit of the age." The former, in his opinion, was really loyal to the monarchy, and would ultimately support the Government ; the latter was hopelessly turbulent and anti-monarchical. *

Partly from fear, partly from regard for traditional Hungarian loyalty, the Hapsburgs treated their

Eastern subjects with great consideration. As elsewhere their rule was mild, benevolent and popular. It was not discontent at the way in which they were governed that goaded the races of the Austrian Empire to Revolution in 1848, but the fact that they had no voice in the government. The history of Metternich's dealings with Hungary is, indeed, a history of continuous concessions to the demands of the Opposition, and nowhere is it more apparent that he was far from being the stern and inflexible statesman as which he is sometimes pictured.

The Constitution of Hungary was old-fashioned and anomalous. "Feudal" and "mediæval" are the epithets most commonly applied. For successive rulers of Austria had left intact the old County Assemblies and Local Government and had built upon them a rigid centralized government entirely directed from Vienna. The laws were administered by the County Assemblies, who had power to raise taxes and levy troops; but they had no power to alter anything without the consent of the Diet, formed of representatives from all the Counties. The maintenance of the Constitution was part of the contract by virtue of which the Hapsburgs ruled Hungary, but so far as Hungary was concerned this meant that the nobles and gentry, though powerless against the Government, were locally supreme, while the masses had no voice at all in administration. Undoubtedly the Emperor Francis and Metternich intended that the Hungarian Constitution and the condition of the Hungarian people should remain in that prosperous but somnolent condition which had sufficed for the last century. But circumstances

were against them and almost imperceptibly events between 1823 and 1848 tended towards the final catastrophe.

Though Slav and Magyar had slumbered peacefully through the turmoil of the French Revolution, they had shown that they could be dangerous, when they strenuously resisted the reforms of Joseph II., and not unmindful of this, Francis and Metternich wished to pursue in Hungary that policy of stifling all national aspirations which had been so eminently successful in Italy. In conformity with this principle it became the custom never to summon the Diet. Francis had indeed summoned it just before the final struggle with Napoleon in 1814 in order to impress the popular imagination with the unanimity of the opposition to France but for twelve years afterwards, chiefly acting upon Metternich's advice, the Emperor failed to meet his Hungarian Estates and ruled entirely by Imperial Rescripts.

The first difficulty arose in 1823. Metternich, flushed with his triumphs in Italy and wishing to pursue the same methods in Hungary, sought to raise recruits and levy taxes for military purposes by Imperial Rescript, although according to the Constitution, the consent of the Diet was necessary. So menacing was the opposition that after a vain effort at intimidation, the Chancellor was forced to appease the popular clamour by some timely concessions which included a promise to summon the Diet.

In 1825, accordingly, the Hungarian Estates assembled at Pressburg. Their first business was to assist at the solemn crowning of the Emperor Francis's

third wife as Queen of Hungary, and so enthusiastic was her reception that Metternich was encouraged in his belief that there would be no opposition to his demands.

He was bitterly disappointed. Hardly had he stated his requirements when it became evident that he himself and his methods of government were the objects of considerable hostility.

A constitutional opposition was formed by Count Stephen Szechenyi, a relation of the Chancellor's wife. Metternich had long been endeavouring to attract the young nobility of Hungary to Vienna with the object of distracting them from domestic politics. Szechenyi was one of the few who had remained behind and was bent on making himself a thorn in the side of the Austrian Government. "I have known this young man," wrote Metternich in December 1825, "from the beginning of his career and I have done a great deal for him. He has quick parts, but, like most of our young people, no solid knowledge—a want which he makes up for by a kind of cultivated instinct. His ambition is boundless: he is not frivolous, but a sort of political spitfire, although he can be deep enough sometimes."

Szechenyi was a large landowner with ample means; he had studied English institutions and had warmly encouraged Western institutions in Hungary. Consequently the aspirations of the opponents of Metternich's policy in the Hungarian Diet tended towards two objects, the assertion of Magyar nationality and the remodelling of the Constitution on Western lines.

Metternich had a conversation with Szechenyi in which he thought he had convinced his youthful

opponent of the error of his ways. But if Szechenyi was convinced, it was not for long, and in a letter to Metternich shortly afterwards he showed his obvious distrust of the Austrian Government. Still, Metternich had learnt from his interview that the Opposition were divided amongst themselves. Indeed the very objects which they were striving for ensured a lack of unanimity. For the very fact of asserting the claims of Magyar nationality entailed the bitter hostility of the other, and not less deserving, nationalities of which the Austrian dominions were composed. Liberalism in a word was bound up with the Magyarization of Hungary. Moreover the attempt to remodel the constitution on Western lines involved the inevitable alienation of the majority of privileged and locally powerful nobles, who had no wish to see their authority curtailed. All Metternich had to do, then, was to separate, if possible, what he called the old opposition from the new; in other words, to sow discord between the traditional hostility of the Hungarians to a foreign sway and the new-born Liberal antipathy to the centralized bureaucratic system of government from Vienna.

Amongst other topics of discussion the Diet of 1825 marks the advent into practical politics of that perpetual thorn in the side of Austrian statesmen—the Language Question, for there was a clamorous demand on the part of the Opposition that Magyar should be substituted for Latin as the official language of debate. Metternich, for the time, evaded this demand, and at first, exasperated by the opposition which he had encountered, wished to ride the high horse, and, relying on the disunion of his opponents,

peremptorily dismiss the Diet. In January 1826 he wrote : " The affairs of the Diet of Hungary will soon be terminated. We have gained every point, and those who formerly fought against the Court are now fighting amongst themselves. This is just an example of the fact that when kings know when to say ' no ' they gain their cause."

Happily it was recognized, even in Vienna, that the Hungarian Diet in its present mood might prove less amenable to drastic methods than had the English Parliament under the Stuarts, and the advent of a new Chancellor of Hungary, Rewitzki, in succession to Count Kohary, who had died, coincided with a change of policy. Rewitzki boldly informed Francis that he was going the wrong way to work and that by acting unconstitutionally he was merely giving the Opposition a justification for complaint. Let Francis gain the confidence of the people of Hungary by proving himself the " First Hungarian."

Whatever Metternich's secret sentiments may have been, he followed that advice. The Diet voluntarily dispersed in 1827, having obtained a confirmation of the traditional Constitution of Hungary and a promise that in future it should be summoned every three years in accordance with that Constitution.

Metternich was full of apprehension when the Diet of 1830 assembled, in view of the contagious example displayed so near home by the Polish revolution, not to speak of the recent upheaval in France. The Emperor Francis, who felt that he had not long to live, had expressed a wish that his heir, the Archduke Ferdinand, should be crowned King of Hungary before his death, and Metternich cleverly took advan-

tage of this coronation ceremony, as he had done in a similar case in 1825, to encourage loyal demonstrations in favour of the Hapsburg monarchy.

He was not successful in allaying opposition in the Diet. Much sympathy was expressed for the revolted Poles, and in reply to the Government's demands for recruits a request amongst others was made that Hungarian officers shall invariably command Hungarian troops. In short it became apparent that the forces of opposition had immensely developed since the dissolution of the last Diet. In 1825 Metternich had written thus to Gentz: "Hungary is a real Boeotia in which wiseacres and students raise themselves up on states of the realm, and scholastic councillors represent the Government. Danger there is none, for ideas do not rise to that." Yet now he was so alarmed at the danger that he summarily dismissed the Diet without granting its demands.

But this was Metternich's last attempt to impose upon Hungary that system of force majeure which proved so successful in Italy. The Diet was recalled in 1832, and from this date the increasing demands and strength of the Opposition were met by a series of unheard of concessions from the Government, which grudgingly and tardily granted, merely made manifest the weakness of the Government, and did nothing to stem off the evil results of mutual mistrust and misunderstanding. There existed, indeed, in Austria a considerable party who accused Metternich, of all people, of betraying conservative interests and undoing the work of a century of Hapsburg rule. They predicted the secession of Hungary from the Austrian Empire, and asserted that the only way to

deal with Hungary was the way that Russia dealt with the Poles.

To a large extent the struggle in Hungary was between the Austrian Government, who received the support of the peasants and endeavoured to maintain it by numerous concessions, and the nobles and privileged classes, who under the cloak of Liberalism sought to further their selfish ambition.

The accession of Ferdinand to the Imperial throne in 1832 was marked by some reform in the direction of ameliorating the condition of the peasants, which did nothing to appease the growing appetite of the Liberal Opposition. The Diet of 1836, like that of 1832, saw the granting of numerous concessions, and the advent of Kossuth gave even greater impetus to the wave of constitutional aspirations. Kossuth began publishing the Debates of the Diet—an unheard-of innovation. Metternich foolishly had him and other editors arrested. Consequently, when at the Diet of 1839 the Chancellor demanded thirty-eight thousand recruits and four million florins, the Diet refused even to discuss the proposal until the victims of absolutism were released. Metternich had to yield, and although the men and money which he required were at once voted, it was at the cost of fresh concessions. It was settled that for the future all debates of the Diet should be published in the Hungarian papers and that the Magyar language alone should be used in official documents. Metternich even had to remit the peasants' due imposed by the Emperor in 1836. Nor did it end here. Between 1843 and 1844 the possession of land and eligibility

to office was extended to those not of noble blood. The Government even talked of instituting reforms on its own initiative, and the Emperor opened a meeting of the Diet in the Magyar tongue.

Kossuth had asserted that he only wrote against the Government in order to obtain a wide circle of readers, and Metternich, with a view to conciliating him, made him in 1841 editor of the widely circulated "Pesti Híslap." The result was not encouraging, for Kossuth merely began to attack the Government and especially the Tariff System more violently than ever, and his demands increased with every concession. Now he sought nothing less than freedom of the Press and a responsible ministry, the union of Hungary and Transsylvania, equality in taxation and equality before the Law ; not to speak of triennial elections and an alteration in the Law enforcing compulsory labour of peasants.

On the conclusion of the stormy Diet of 1844, a large party in Austria considered that the time had arrived for a bold *coup d'état* by the Government and the establishment of absolute government in Hungary. But Metternich refused to acquiesce and preferred to exhaust every method of conciliation. Indeed his policy of concessions in Hungary during this period entirely belies the reactionary reputation which historians have awarded him. Besides granting concession after concession, the Chancellor opened up communications for the benefit of Hungarian trade, and did all in his power to further the material prosperity of Hungary. Indeed shortly before the meeting of the Diet of 1847 the Government opened negotiations with the Magyar Young Conservative Party and

prepared some very far-reaching reforms for submission to the Diet. Metternich even proposed the abolition of the Tariff between Hungary and Austria—a measure which would have facilitated his darling project of procuring Austria's adhesion to the Zollverein. But before these designs bore fruit, the Chancellor had fallen.

The opposition to the Government had not been confined to Hungary, and Metternich's embarrassment was increased by the entrance of the Non-Magyar peoples into the struggle. This was the inevitable result of the Magyar attempt to impose their language and predominance on all the Eastern dominions of the Austrian Empire. As the Magyars strove against German domination, so the Serbs, Croats, Slavs and Dalmatians strove against the Magyars. The Czech mania in Bohemia was as rife as the Magyar mania in Hungary. Originating in an opposition carried on chiefly by pamphlets and newspapers with the object of reviving the Czech language and literature, it ultimately resulted in the assertion of their rights by the Estates and the granting of considerable concessions by the Government. The South Slavs commenced a movement known as Illyrism. In the Tyrol and Lower Austria Metternich was sure of his position and was inclined to repress constitutional aspirations with a heavy hand. The Estates of Lower Austria, which met in Vienna, had begun to agitate as early as 1842. Even then Metternich had granted a demand for more frequent sittings, and gradually, finding that intimidation was useless, he relapsed into that policy of concessions, which was demonstrating the innate weakness of the Government

elsewhere, and merely served to whet the appetite of the opposition.

The one thing needed to secure the success of the revolutionary schemes was the adhesion of the peasants, who hitherto had supported the Austrian Government. It was indeed the support of the peasants that enabled the Government to suppress a rising in Galicia in 1848 following upon a Polish conspiracy. The Austrians were caught napping; they suffered some severe reverses, but the hatred of the downtrodden peasants for their overlords led them to turn the scale in favour of Austria. Elated with victory, they proceeded to an indiscriminate massacre of nobles and rebels alike. The Austrian Government, helpless at the moment, either did not interfere or half encouraged this nineteenth century Jacquerie, and thereby placed themselves in difficulties. The peasants demanded as the price of their loyalty the abolition of feudal dues. The Emperor partially acceded to the demand. Immediately arose a cry of horror throughout his dominions at this official condonement of the recent atrocities. The Government yielded to the clamour. The clock was again put back. The peasants, as badly off as before, saw that their only chance of redress lay in constitutional opposition to Austria, and henceforward were found on the side of the revolutionists. The doom of Metternich's "stability" system was sealed.

It is impossible to refrain from contrasting Metternich's policy in the Austrian Empire with his policy towards Liberalism in other parts of Europe. He knew that he was treading on dangerous ground and that the friendship of Hungary was a cornerstone of

the House of Hapsburg. All his efforts were directed towards temporizing at all cost, and he was prepared to make some concessions. But scanty concessions merely aroused a desire for more. All the elements of opposition were aroused against him. A few tactless measures filled the cup to overflowing. Metternich replaced the popular Count Mailath as Chancellor of Hungary by Count Apponyi and ordered him to supersede the Court of Assemblies. This act, falling upon a soil already prepared, did much to bring on the final outburst, for Northern and Southern Austria, nay even the middle portions of the Empire, where Metternich felt safest, were ripe for revolution. Nevertheless, apart from agrarian troubles, which afforded a material as well as a theoretical cause for discontent, it was the French Revolution which roused even the German portion of the Austrian Empire into open revolt against the old system. The inhabitants of Austria proper had indeed changed vastly in their opinions during the last few years. People were beginning to see the weakness of the Austrian system of government. Perhaps it was partly due to the colourless character of the Emperor Ferdinand. Francis had been genuinely loved by his people. Though no great ruler, he had, like George III. in England, shared with his people the vicissitudes of the struggle against Napoleon, and gained thereby a similar popularity, which served to obscure the defects of the Government over which he presided.

Under Ferdinand, weak, kindly and incompetent, the evils of that Government became apparent. Protection in every walk of life amounting practically to isolation in trade, in literature, in culture, and progress

of every description, had been borne patiently and almost unconsciously too long. Financial troubles caused the first symptoms of unrest in German Austria. The fact that no accounts were published by the Government intensified a panic which occurred early in 1848, and which involved the usual rush on the banks. In any case a political outbreak would probably have followed, for the Viennese, kept ignorant too long of constitutional means of obtaining reform, were more likely than a more revolutionary community to rush to violent extremes. Although, as has been observed, Metternich had long been aware of the evils of what is unjustly termed his system, and had perhaps faint-heartedly but at least persistently endeavoured to remedy some of its defects, it was natural that he, who had for so long been identified with it, should be the first to suffer from the concentrated and unreasoning indignation of the awakened masses.

The first news of the February Revolution in France reached Metternich on the evening of February 28th. He received it calmly, in the belief that it merely signified the abdication of Louis Philippe in favour of the Duke of Orléans. When on the following day a courier announced that France was a Republic, the effect was far different. The Chancellor turned deadly pale and for some minutes sat silent and motionless in his chair.

Metternich, it is true, had always disliked Louis Philippe, and had tolerated him merely as a political necessity. But the word " Republic " when connected with France had for him a horrid significance ; it was the continual bugbear of his foreign policy. And now the worst had occurred ! For a few days he waited expectantly for a counter-revolution. He

shook his head when he read the names of the members of the provisional French Government and laughed at Lamartine's Manifesto to Europe. Yet he was determined not to intervene unless it was absolutely necessary, unless French armies crossed the boundaries of France. He restrained the war fever which for a time excited the Austrian Court, and which was echoed by the desire of Prussia and Russia for a coalition against France, for he knew well that what he had to fear was the effect of the French Revolution on Austrian internal politics.

Nor were his forebodings belied. When the news of the Revolution in France arrived, the Hungarian Diet at Pressburg were discussing schemes of reform. The effect was immediate. On March 4th Kossuth, who regarded Metternich in much the same light as Metternich had formerly regarded Napoleon, delivered his famous speech in favour of Liberty, asserting that the freedom of the part could only be obtained by the freedom of the whole, and advocating that an address urging reform should be presented to the Emperor. This speech had a far-reaching effect. In Bohemia the young Czechs met and resolved to send a petition to the Emperor demanding instant reform, and in Vienna itself, where already placards had appeared announcing the downfall of the Chancellor, negotiations were opened by the Liberal leaders with the Estates of Lower Austria who were about to meet in the capital.

Henceforward the interest of the drama centres in Vienna ; though already the flame of revolution was spreading contagiously through every portion of the Austrian dominions. The meeting of the Lower

Austrian Estates was fixed for March 13th, and the members were in constant communication not only with the leaders of Liberalism in Vienna but also with that influential and numerous Court party, which had long been working for the displacement of the Chancellor. As early as March 6th delegates of the Trades Union, supported by the Archduke Roland and the Archduchess Sophie, had presented an address to the Emperor expressing mistrust in the Government. The fact that Metternich's name was not mentioned did not conceal its true significance. The Archduke Francis, to whom the address was handed, received it so graciously that the impression gained ground that the Court was against Metternich. The Chancellor might have noticed that lacqueys seemed less obsequious, that dependents became less obtrusive, that the circle of his friends imperceptibly lessened, and read with alarm these portents of imminent disaster. Curiously enough he alone seemed unconscious that anything was amiss, and from his splendid residence in the Ballplatz¹ viewed with indifference the evidence of coming trouble.

On March 12th another demonstration was organized by the Trades Union, supported by the extreme Court Party, the Lower Austrian Estates, and the University. Making the University their base, crowds of agitators filled the streets, and the students prepared a petition demanding amongst other concessions from the Government the resignation of Metternich.

Two professors made their way to the Hofburg and handed the address to Archduke Louis, who received

¹ The Chancellor's official residence (Ballhaus Platz 19), which is now the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

it most ungraciously and dismissed the deputation without comment. The Archduke summoned a Council at noon and announced that the Emperor would not dismiss an old and faithful servant on the strength of a petition. Metternich declared his willingness to resign if the Emperor wished it ; he was too old to be ambitious, had never sought popularity, and would have resigned before if he had not been afraid of incurring a charge of ingratitude. It was, however, quite evident that the Chancellor did not wish to resign unless compelled. Accordingly some of the Court Party admitted some students into the Emperor's apartments that evening with the idea of convincing him of the reality of the popular aversion to Metternich. But Ferdinand was much too good-natured to sacrifice Metternich behind his back, and the scheme was balked.

On his return home that evening Metternich, who was observed to be in deep thought, suddenly decided to grant all the demands of the petition presented in the morning, with the exception of his own resignation. He accordingly arranged for the necessary draft to be made up with a view to its presentation to the Estates of Lower Austria when they met on the following day.

Early on the morning of March 13th the State Conference assembled in the Hofburg awaiting events. In a neighbouring room were gathered the whole of the Imperial Family. News had arrived that the streets were already almost full of people, and that the students, using the Estates of Lower Austria as their instrument, were not going to be denied a second time. In view of the meeting of the Estates the Archduke Louis and



K-K. GEHEIME HANS HOF UND STAATSKANSLER
(METTERNICH'S OFFICIAL RESIDENCE) IN THE
BALLHAUS PLATZ



Metternich were prepared for some disturbance, and were determined to overawe any opposition. Accordingly strong patrols of troops were held in readiness at various points in the city, and detachments were now ordered to disperse the gathering crowds. Neither Louis nor Metternich imagined for a moment that there would be bloodshed.

The crowd before the Landhaus where the Estates were in session, excited by the fiery language of the students, spread over the Freyung,¹ the Ballplatz, and the Hofe² with shouts of "pereat Metternich" and clamorous demands for a constitution, freedom of the Press, and a National Guard. The reading of Kossuth's famous speech fanned the flame, and the troops, finding themselves compelled, in self-defence, to fire a few volleys, which resulted in several casualties, goaded the mob to fury.

Meantime in the Palace a most unedifying altercation was taking place between the party for concession, headed by the Archduke John and the Archduchess Sophie, and the party of resistance, headed by Metternich and the Archduke Louis. Each sought to incline the Emperor to their views, and with angry arguments reproduced within the Palace the tumult which was raging without.

They were unpleasantly interrupted by the appearance of a Deputation of the Estates, who had ill received Metternich's concessions and now came to voice the

¹ A district in old Vienna, so-called because persons seeking sanctuary there were free. This was owing to the place being under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which lasted till the time of Maria Theresa.

² One of the oldest portions of Vienna, where formerly the Court used to reside, and with which many famous historical events are connected.

popular demands. The Archduke Louis received them calmly and dismissed them with the assurance that a Committee should examine the proposals and advise the Emperor. The result of a perusal of the contents of the petition was that Metternich formed a Committee to report on the question of a Constitution for Austria and of Reform in general.

Having accomplished this, the Chancellor returned to his residence, beneath the windows of which a Pole was delivering an impassioned harangue against the Government, which drew forth repeated cries of "Down with Metternich" from the excited mob. Metternich rushed to a window and listened. Even now he could not believe that he had to deal with anything more than a street riot. This curious delusion resulted from the fact that for many years the Chancellor had lived almost entirely in a little world of his own, surrounded by a small circle of admirers who never told him anything that was likely to displease him. There is little doubt that he knew less about the state of public opinion in Austria than the humblest official in the Chancellor's department.

When Metternich returned from the Ballplatz to the Hofburg he heard that a revolution was really in progress. An extraordinary scene of confusion met his eyes. The Imperial family was still engaged in a wordy warfare as to whether or not orders should be given to clear the Palace of unauthorized persons. A miscellaneous crowd, under pretence of being members of a deputation, had contrived to enter the Hofburg, and through the doors of the Council Chamber penetrated their clamorous demands for admission.

No sooner did Metternich appear than the members

of the Imperial Family who were hostile to him begged him earnestly to resign and thus obviate all further danger. It was indeed perfectly obvious that his downfall was now the one aim of the mob.

Metternich was not inclined to come to a hasty decision. But no one spoke on his behalf; the Emperor and even those on whose support he was wont to rely remained silent; for the first time and in a flash it was brought home to him that the incredible was happening, nay had happened, that the hour of his downfall had come.

With an effort he preserved his composure, though his heightened colour showed the stress under which he was labouring, and walked quickly into the adjoining room where the State Conference was sitting. Within and without the Hofburg matters had now reached a climax. The corridors and state apartments swarmed with intruders or authorized members of deputations, for a continuous stream of deputations kept demanding admission. Outside the mob, excited by bloodshed, returned the volleys of the troops with stones and even with firearms, and the babel of raucous catchwords, musketry, shrieks, and extemporary orations became every moment more intolerable.

At length Archduke Louis ordered the Deputations to be admitted. Received by Count Hartig they demanded Metternich's resignation, freedom of the Press, and a cessation of hostilities. Otherwise they would not be responsible for what might happen during the night. Count Hartig pointed out that it was impossible for the Emperor to sacrifice a faithful Minister to the demands of a mob, and Archduke Louis, too proud to yield, gave an equally discouraging

reply. Nevertheless, he proceeded to the meeting-place of the Conference of State and asked Metternich whether he would like to address the Deputation. The Chancellor replied that he would, and entered the Audience Chamber, closely followed by the Arch-dukes Louis, Albert, and Maximilian. Most of the other members of the Imperial Family gathered round in great trepidation.

The Deputation consisted of Municipal Officers. The Chancellor, tapping one of them on the shoulder, said: "You are burgesses; the burgesses of Vienna have on all occasions distinguished themselves; you ought to join the troops in quelling an émeute." The men replied that it was not an émeute but a revolution in which all classes were taking part, and when Metternich refused to admit this and asserted that the mob had been led away by foreign agitators, Italians, Poles, and Swiss, they drew the Chancellor's attention to the thousands of signatures—noble and humble—appended to the petition, which proved the spontaneous and national character of the movement. Let Metternich merely cast his eyes upon the streets and he would be disillusioned. No, the burghers would not throw in their lot with the troops. Metternich dismissed the Deputation without an answer, but would not allow them to leave the Palace for fear that the news of their failure should further infuriate the mob.

Now recommenced a series of angry debates and mutual recriminations in the Audience Chamber and even in the Emperor's room, where the whole Court was promiscuously assembled. The howls of the mob, shouting for a National Guard, freedom of the Press,

and Metternich's resignation, filtered in through the windows. By a coincidence the Vienna papers of March 13th contained a Royal Order which had been issued a few days before by the Prussian Government announcing some reforms, chiefly connected with the Press. From this the mob took their cue.

It was now obvious to all, even to Metternich, that concessions must be made, and the Chancellor hurried off to his study to draw up for the Emperor's approval a scheme of reforms in the spirit of recent Prussian enactments. No sooner was he gone than practically the whole Court united in begging the Emperor to induce Metternich to avert immediate danger to the dynasty by resigning. The Archduke John was entrusted with the task of breaking the news to Metternich and performed it none too kindly. Leaving his desk, Metternich followed the Archduke into the Audience Chamber, pale, stern, and with an ironical smile. He found the members of the Deputation uproariously demanding to see the Emperor in order to impress upon him the necessity for Metternich's dismissal.

Perfectly calm and collected Metternich walked down the Audience Chamber and confronted the leaders of the Deputation. "Gentlemen," he said, "if you think that by my resignation I shall be doing a necessary service to the State, I will resign gladly." The Deputation hastened to explain that although they had no complaint against him personally, they objected to his system and they must accept his resignation with pleasure. Metternich rejoined that "the task of his life had been to work for the welfare of the Monarchy in the position which he occupied ;

but if it appeared to any that his continuing in the same would imperil the Monarchy, he would consider it no sacrifice to retire from his post." Then turning to Archduke Louis, he said: "I place my resignation in the hands of the Emperor; I wish him good luck with the new régime; I wish Austria good luck!"

This announcement was received with loud shouts of triumph from the throng of intruders who had crowded in behind the Deputation, and with cries of "Long live the Emperor." Metternich alone preserved his dignity throughout the unedifying scene which ensued. For a moment he quietly surveyed the crowd, then, turning without haste and without embarrassment, walked up the room and disappeared into the background.

The news of Metternich's resignation, which had spread through the immediate vicinity of the Hofburg almost coincidentally with the event, did not reach the suburbs until the morning of the 14th. Consequently the mob in these portions of the city spent the night in rioting and would have wrecked Metternich's villa on the Rennweg, had not the students intervened to save it from destruction. In Vienna the Chancellor's fall was celebrated with every outward manifestation of joy customary on these occasions, bonfires, fireworks, and the breaking of street lamps.

After the scene in the Audience Chamber, the Chancellor left the Hofburg at once without any further converse with the Emperor or the Court. He smiled bitterly as he observed the significant disappearance as he approached them of formerly obsequious attendants, and walked straight to his house



METTERNICH'S SUMMER PALACE IN THE
RENNWEG-GASSE NO. 546



on the Ballplatz ; there his wife was anxiously awaiting news. Metternich was wonderfully self-possessed and unresentful and calmly related the events of the day ; in the evening some friends came to see him, and later on came news of the riots in the suburbs and the attack on his villa. The Chancellor expressed his belief that all would be well on the morrow, but nevertheless consented to spend the night at the house of Count Louis Taaffe. On the morning of the 14th all his hopes were dashed to the ground, for there appeared in the papers the official announcement of his resignation. It had been previously arranged that his wife and family should leave Vienna and reside for a time on the Bohemian estates. Now the Princess begged her husband to accompany her. Metternich consented. But it was brought home to the ex-Chancellor how his friends were slipping away from him when he applied to the Treasury, as usual, for the means to undertake the journey and was refused.

Two faithful friends were eventually found, who conducted Metternich and his wife over the barricades to the Palace of Prince Liechtenstein, where they remained till dusk. At length a cabman was induced to take them out of Vienna ; the party was suffered to pass the limits of the city without questions and took refuge with friends in a house just outside. Here another carriage was found to take them safely out of the lines of Vienna to a country mansion at Feldsberg.

CHAPTER XV

EXILE AND LAST YEARS

Metternich decides to seek safety with his family in the fortress of Olmütz—Being refused admittance, he resolves to travel to England—Holland is reached after considerable discomfort and anxiety—Thence the family cross to England and take up their residence in London—Life in London—Friendly offices of the Duke of Wellington—Visits to Brighton and Strathfieldsaye—Residence at the Old Palace, Richmond—Metternich's health requires a change of climate—The family accordingly move to Brussels—Negotiations for a return to Austria—The family leave Brussels for Johannisberg—And thence make their entry into Vienna—Cordial reception by the Emperor and Court—Metternich's position is, nevertheless, completely changed, and his importance is merely historical—Entire reversal of his policy galled him—His last years, death and funeral.

FROM March 17th-21st the family remained at Feldsberg in the greatest anxiety. On the 22nd news came that the Council had decreed that Metternich must take his departure within twenty-four hours. The only question that remained was the choice of a refuge. The fortified town of Olmütz, where the Commandant and the Archbishop were well-disposed, was eventually selected as the most promising refuge. Thither accordingly the Prince and Princess prepared to go, leaving behind their daughter and two younger sons. Richard alone of the family accompanied them when they commenced their journey at six o'clock on the evening of the 22nd.

Olmütz was reached partly by driving and partly

by railway ; during the latter portion of the journey the carriage was placed on the top of a truck and so conveyed to its destination without any inconvenience to the occupants. But the confidence which Metternich had placed in the loyalty of his friends in the city proved vain. The authorities protested that they would not be responsible for the safety of the fugitive, and insisted that the journey must be continued. Since it was evident that no one in Austria could be trusted, Metternich at length decided to make for England, the recognized home of political refugees. In accordance with this decision the family at once started for Prague. To ensure secrecy, their coach was placed upon a truck attached to an ordinary goods train, and the blinds were drawn to give the impression that it was unoccupied. To the inmates the journey seemed interminable, and at one station where the train remained in a siding for seventeen hours, Metternich, overcome with thirst, lost patience and called out to the guard for a glass of water. The guard nearly betrayed them in his astonishment at finding the coach occupied, but was successfully bribed, and soon afterwards gave the signal for the train to continue its journey. Just before reaching Prague the family left the train and completed the journey in their coach.

At Prague they were much indebted to the kindness of a police superintendent, who provided them with national cocades, and procured passes made out in the name of an English family. As the Metternichs invariably talked French to each other during the journey, this choice of nationality did not serve to allay suspicion at their various halting places.

From Prague they made their way gradually to the Dutch frontier, passing through Teplitz where they were recognized but, to their surprise, treated with respect, Dresden, where they obtained fresh passes made out in the name of Herr and Frau von Mattheux, Leipsic, Hanover, and Osnabrück. They endured considerable discomfort. The Princess especially was obsessed by a haunting dread of anybody who looked like a student and raised false alarms on more than one occasion. At Frankfurt, where they spent a day, Metternich unexpectedly encountered an Austrian colonel who recognized him and collected a hostile crowd, which appeared inclined to mob the ex-Chancellor. Metternich, however, judiciously slipped through the backdoor of a house belonging to one of the Rothschilds, whither his pursuers did not follow.

Throughout the journey across Germany the jolting of the carriage caused Metternich much distress, while the arrangements at many of the less frequented inns at which they stopped left much to be desired. Moreover, Metternich had some difficulty in raising a loan for the expenses of the journey.

At length, however, they crossed the Dutch frontier at Oldenzart and thence travelled to Arnheim. They were much struck with the cleanliness and neatness of everything in Holland, the well-kept roads with well-wooded country on either side "like an English park," as Metternich expressed it.

Metternich had intended only to remain in Holland a day or two before crossing over to England. But on his arrival he had written to the Queen of Holland informing her of his arrival, and the answer had been

such a pressing invitation from the Queen and Prince Regent to remain longer that he decided to do so. On the 5th of April the Metternichs left Arnheim for Amsterdam in order that the Chancellor, who had contracted a fever, might consult a physician. Thence they continued their journey to the Hague, where the Princess of Orange had invited them to visit her. As her husband was still too unwell to move, Princess Metternich went to see the Princess of Orange alone. After a very friendly interview, the Prince of Orange, who accompanied her to the door on her departure, went out of his way to express a hope that all Europe would hear of the hearty welcome accorded to the refugees in Holland.

The Metternichs remained at the Hague until the 19th, when they travelled to Rotterdam, whence their steamer started for England. The crossing, though brief, was uncomfortable. The sea was calm enough, and only some of the servants were ill. But the cabins were dirty, there was a considerable cargo of sheep and cattle on board, and while steaming up the Thames in the early morning there was a collision with a sailing-ship, which happily was more alarming than serious.

They landed at Blackwall on April 20th at 10 A.M., and by one o'clock they were established at their hotel—the Brunswick, in Hanover Street. Here they were at once visited by numerous friends, and amongst the first was the Duke of Wellington, who had been anxiously awaiting the arrival of his old friend.

There is little need to dwell at length on the period of Metternich's residence on English soil. Mélanie and Richard joined their parents on May 16th, by

which date the family was established at No. 44 Eaton Square, which Metternich rented for four months from Lord Denbigh.

Metternich at this time was far from well. The unexpectedness of the blow and the strain of the hurried flight from the country in which he had held the leading place for nearly fifty years had undermined his health, already impaired by the weight of advancing years. To the great distress of the Princess he became subject to fits of melancholy, and felt deeply the contrast between his present inactivity and comparative unimportance and his former position as a dominant figure in the politics of Europe. For the first few months of his residence in London he rarely walked beyond the boundaries of Eaton Square, and throughout the remainder of his sojourn he was always under the care of doctors.

According to his own account, he spent his mornings in reading or writing, took a short stroll in the afternoon, and afterwards passed the time in conversation with friends. The evenings were devoted to whist. The only public function in which he took a leading part was on the occasion of a deputation from the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, headed by their respective Chancellors, the Duke of Wellington and the Prince Consort, to offer condolences to the Queen on the death of her aunt, Princess Sophie. Metternich accompanied the deputation as a Doctor of Civil Law at Oxford, and remarks that he had held his degree, which dated from 1814, longer than almost anybody present.

The feeling of security, however, now that he had found a resting-place on British soil, contrasting so

sharply with the discomforts and even perils which he and his family had experienced in Austria, caused him to regard all that he saw of England in a very favourable light—a point of view which was altogether out of keeping with his sentiments at other periods of his career. While the Princess was bewildered at the large size of London and the grandeur of Westminster Abbey, Metternich was loud in his praises of the order and quiet maintained in the great city. The smallest incidents of London life pleased him—the volume of traffic and the prosperity it implied, the hospitality shown him by people whom he hardly knew, the mass of shipping passing to and fro on the Thames, when he was well enough to walk as far as London Bridge, and, standing upon it, watch the endless procession glide past. He was much interested in the Chartist movement, and on the occasion of the famous march of 20,000 Chartists through London, Richard, who, with Mélanie and the faithful Baron Hugel had come over to join his parents, was enrolled as a special constable, not altogether with Metternich's approval.

During their residence in London, the Metternichs naturally became acquainted with all the most notable figures in English Society, and did a considerable amount of entertaining themselves at the house in Eaton Square. The Duke of Wellington was naturally their most frequent visitor. He placed an officer of the Guards at Metternich's disposal during the whole of his stay in England, and used to pay the Chancellor a visit nearly every morning and often again in the evening. The Duke and Duchess of Cambridge also showed them great kindness, and the Queen-Mother entertained them one afternoon at

her villa at Bushey. Amongst foreigners the Metternichs saw most of Neumann, the Austrian ambassador in London, and the Russian Prince Lieven and his wife. At the latter's house Princess Metternich met Macaulay, who rather startled her by some of his statements in regard to certain historical events. Members of both political parties were frequent visitors, and it is probable that Metternich occasionally was inclined to take somewhat too keen an interest in British politics, with a decided bias towards the Conservative side. At least one speech of Disraeli's was said to have been suggested by him. Indeed Metternich deeply felt his inactivity and consequent ineffectiveness; he never ceased to take a keen interest in European politics and to follow events with the closest attention. What perhaps annoyed him most was that he no longer received notices of the meetings of the Order of Maria Theresa, of which honourable body he was Chancellor. He prized this dignity more than any other, and was deeply hurt at being forgotten. In fact his last words to his wife as they were leaving Vienna were to the effect that the one dignity which he would yield to no one while life remained, was that of Chancellor of the Order of Maria Theresa.

His restless and chafing spirit found vent in a series of memoranda which he drew up treating of current affairs, and in a succession of highly injudicious letters written to persons in Austria, giving his views and advice on Austrian policy.

Since the Chancellor's health continued unsatisfactory, the Metternichs left London in September for Brighton, where they took up their abode until

April 1849. Princess Lieven, one of Metternich's most intimate lady friends, was also at Brighton with Guizot, the French ex-Minister, and gave him a hearty welcome. She describes Princess Metternich as big and common, but kind-hearted, genuine, and with charming manners, while the Ex-Chancellor was "uncommonly talkative," but very deaf and very tedious when talking of his own misfortunes, though very interesting in his account of the past, and especially of Napoleon.

In December they paid a brief visit to the Duke of Wellington at Strathfieldsaye, where a family party, with the addition of some Austrians, had been invited to meet them. This was Metternich's first experience of English country-house life, and he expresses amusement at the manner in which the day was portioned out into periods, each set apart for some particular ploy. The custom of the ladies all retiring to bed at the same time especially struck him, together with the formality of dinner, and the dullness of the interval between that meal and tea.

For some months the Princess occupied herself with looking out for a suitable house in the suburbs or at least in the neighbourhood of London, where the family could spend the summer months. After considerable difficulty, a suitable house was discovered in the Old Palace at Richmond, the scene of the decease of Queen Elizabeth. The family took up their quarters there on April 17th, after a brief stay in London at Mivart's Hotel, the modern Claridge's. They remained at Richmond until October.

During the Richmond period of the exiles' sojourn in England the Chancellor's health grew worse and gave

the greatest anxiety to his family, particularly in the months of June and July. He became subject to frequent and alarming fainting fits, which were the more painful to his family from the fact that he bitterly resented all efforts to help him to his feet, being under the delusion that he had merely slipped from his chair. As he lost his physical strength, he became more and more querulous and sensitive of his country's ingratitude. He was constantly attended by his family physician, Dr Weber, for the Princess refused to trust him to English doctors, although the Duke of Wellington sent his own doctor, Fergusson, to offer his assistance.

In view of the grave state of Metternich's health, it became necessary to look out for some residence in a climate where the severity of the English winter could be avoided, and incidentally in a country where living was less expensive. Metternich's inclination to return to the Continent was strengthened by a very gracious letter which he received in August from the Emperor Francis Joseph, inquiring after his health and asking for news of him and his family, and, what was more significant, expressing hope of a possibility of the Chancellor's return to Austria. The town which eventually commended itself to the Metternichs was Brussels. Before deciding definitely, the Prince wrote to King Leopold, asking whether his presence in Belgium would be acceptable, and was gratified to receive a favourable reply, stating that all countries were not ungrateful, and that Belgium, mindful of Metternich's former services to her, would be only too glad to welcome him and his family.

When Brussels had finally been decided upon,

Richard was dispatched thither in advance to engage a house. The Prince and Princess travelled to London on October 7th, and stayed three nights at Mivart's Hotel. On the 9th the Duke of Wellington came from Strathfieldsaye and the Duke of Cambridge from Kew to say farewell.

On the 10th they started for the Continent in almost regal state. A royal carriage conveyed them to Dover, and they were accompanied by the Duke of Mecklenburg, Lord Brougham, Colleredo, and other distinguished persons. Metternich was in high spirits, and talked more vivaciously than for months previously. They embarked at Dover, after playing a game of whist, and reached Ostend without incident. The children who were to have followed almost immediately were delayed at Dover for five days by a storm.

After spending a couple of hours at Ostend, the Prince and Princess travelled to Brussels, taking up their quarters in an hotel. Here Richard met them with the unwelcome news that he had been unable to secure them a house.

It was indeed with the greatest difficulty that the Princess was able to find a house both cheap and reasonably suitable. As she plaintively remarked, every householder in Brussels seemed bent on obtaining the poor remnants of the Metternich fortune.

At length a house belonging to a certain Beriot, a violinist, was taken, which was fairly comfortable, save that the dining-room, having no windows, was lighted solely from the roof, and had been used by the owner as a theatre.

The time passed pleasantly enough at Brussels. Old friends as well as friends recently made in England

were constantly passing through on their way to or from Austria or England. The Chancellor paid a visit to the King at Laeken. Thiers also visited Brussels, and horrified Princess Mélanie by arriving at a banquet given by the Court in his honour late, and wearing a black tie and grey trousers.

Financial troubles still continued to press upon the family, and at this time the sale was discussed of the two Metternich properties on the Rhine, as, apart from the need of money, there was the possibility of their confiscation. Richard was dispatched to look after his father's interests in Bohemia, whence he reported that peasants and gentry alike entertained feelings of the warmest affection for the Chancellor. In December Richard started his diplomatic career.

In March 1850, Metternich, who at the beginning of the year had suffered from a recurrence of his fainting fits, began to meditate a return to Austria. He felt that he had not long to live, and desired to end his days at home. He accordingly determined to use the good offices of his old friend Schwarzenberg, now all-powerful in Austria, to secure his return, with such success that in April he received a letter from Schwarzenberg, assuring him that no objection would be made to his return, and with a message from the Emperor himself confirming this assurance. Metternich at once resolved to move to Johannisberg, with the idea of ultimately returning to Vienna.

In June 1851, accordingly, the Metternichs left Brussels in a royal carriage provided by King Leopold. They drove by way of Liége and Cologne to Bonn, where they took ship, and landing at Oestrich-Winkel, drove to Johannisberg, which they were both over-

joyed to see again. Here they were overwhelmed with visitors, old friends hastening to greet them, political trimmers wishing to be on the right side, and Johannisberg again became the rendezvous of Ministers, Diplomats, and Princes. The King of Prussia visited Johannisberg on his way to Frankfurt and was given a glass of the famous wine, which he drank in a bumper to celebrate the Emperor of Austria's birthday, which happened to fall on that day. It was not long before Metternich was relieved from all doubts as to the advisability of his return to Vienna, and in September, after paying a visit to the King of Wurtemberg at Stuttgart, the family started for the Austrian capital by easy stages, visiting Dresden, and spending a short time at their Bohemian possessions at Königswart. They performed the latter part of the journey from Lintz by boat.

They disembarked at Nussdorf at half-past four on the evening of September 7th, and thence drove to Vienna. A great crowd had collected to greet them. On arriving at the villa, the Princess was delighted to find everything unchanged. Old friends, old servants were there to greet them, and to the Princess even the flowers seemed to nod recognition. Metternich arrived wearing an English suit of clothes, and this is said to have started the fashion of wearing English attire, which continued throughout the century.

The only unpleasant incident was caused by some newspapers hostile to the ex-Chancellor, who suddenly announced that Metternich in order to celebrate his return, had promised to redeem all pawn-tickets under the value of 20 gulden. Deceived by this announcement, crowds of those possessed of pawn-tickets

surrounded the villa. The porter in vain protested that there was no truth in the rumour, and that even if there was Metternich would not have transacted the business at his private mansion. Eventually the crowd had to be dispersed by the police.

On the day of the return the Emperor was at Ischl, but Schwarzenberg came to call as his representative. On the following day, however, the Emperor returned and immediately visited the old statesman and had a long interview with him, hearing his views and receiving his advice on current political issues.

But if the aged statesman believed that his return to Vienna signified his return to power he was grievously mistaken. Outwardly indeed it might seem that he had come to his own again. His son, Richard, had been made a gentleman of the bed-chamber. On October 5th, the Prince and his wife, who had now taken up their residence in the villa on the Reunweg, appeared at Court for the first time since their return. Thenceforth they attended all public functions and were received with honour by every one. It was sometimes painful, for the Princess especially, to attend entertainments given by the Schwarzenbergs in the very rooms where she had formerly presided as hostess.

It is possible that Metternich's influence on Austrian foreign policy at this period has been underrated, for undoubtedly the Emperor often sought his advice ; but in other departments of State it may be said with little exaggeration that his advice was always asked, never taken. It is pathetic to read of this mock homage rendered to the conceit of a once great statesman. When Count Buol succeeded Schwarzenberg

as Chancellor, he at once visited Metternich to ask his advice before taking up his new duties, and up to the very last months of his life Metternich used to overwhelm Buol with voluminous treatises on current political questions.

The fact remained that Metternich's whole policy had been reversed; his belief in the impossibility of revolution in the Austrian Empire had been rudely shattered, and out of chaos Austria had emerged as a constitutional monarchy. She had become indebted to Russia, who had aided her to crush the revolution, and Metternich saw his lifelong policy of curbing the ambition of Russia thrown aside in favour of close friendship between the two Eastern Powers. On the other hand his efforts to preserve friendship between Austria and Prussia were being set at naught by the new-fangled Austrian diplomacy. The breach was widening, and already events were trending towards the struggle of 1866. As to Austria's relations with France, here again traditional Hapsburg policy was going to ruin over the disputes with the French government in regard to Italy, which were so soon to be decided by war.

Apart from the reversal of his policy, Metternich's period of government had left singularly little impression upon Austria. He was not personally unpopular, and even the unpopularity of his system had been forgotten. A new Austria had arisen, which knew him not. It is a curious fact that to the inhabitants of Austria in general, Metternich was, after his return from exile, merely an interesting historical relic.

Occasionally his impotence was brought home to the ex-Minister himself. On one occasion a Minister

brought to him the draft of a plan for Reform which he was about to lay before the Council. After Metternich had spent many hours perusing it, he discovered that the document would have to be placed before the Council so soon that there would be no time to include such amendments as he was prepared to suggest.

There is indeed no need to linger over this last and inglorious period of Metternich's career. The decease of most of his dearest friends and relations showed that his own time must be drawing nigh. The Duke of Wellington, Count Apponyi, and the Duke of Leuchtenberg had all died in 1852, and the saddest blow of all came when Princess Mélanie passed away on March 27th, 1854. From the date of her death he failed rapidly, and his constant anxiety in regard to affairs abroad wore away his health.

During the greater part of the year Metternich lived at his beautiful villa on the Landstrasse. Surrounded by a fine park and grounds, beautified by masses of flowers and by every device of landscape gardening, and containing numerous and valuable treasures of art, this residence was worthy of its illustrious inhabitant. Great state was observed within its precincts, and a guest entering for the first time was apt to be somewhat overwhelmed.

Yet Metternich's private apartments were remarkable for taste and simplicity rather than for magnificence, and he himself was usually dressed in a sober and dark costume.

Now, as ever, the ex-Chancellor looked his part. His hair, though snow-white, was still plentiful, and his facial characteristics—thin-cut mouth and red lips,

pale tint, noble brow, and large clear blue eyes, still combined to give him that refined and majestic air for which he had ever been distinguished. Undoubtedly, however, his mind and memory were failing, and he had grown so deaf that it was necessary to carry on a conversation by shouting into his ear. Not that he was by any means averse to conversation. He was more accessible at this period of his life than ever before, for he had more leisure.

Any foreigner passing through Vienna would nearly always visit him, and his aid was often invoked by people who were writing histories of the period during which he had been in power. Thiers, amongst others, came to hear his version of his famous interview with Napoleon in the Marcolini Palace at Dresden, although Metternich complained afterwards that Thiers had not written down what he had told him.

On the occasion of these visits Metternich delighted in talking about himself and defending his policy. Especially did he resent being regarded as a stumbling-block to liberty. He denied that he was an absolutist. He had, indeed, no sympathy for the modern and, in his eyes, decadent rage for constitutional systems. They were, he thought, unfitted for practical statesmanship, since the strife of parties counteracted the benefits of a union of sovereign and people and must end in constant bickerings. Even a republic was preferable to constitutional government. The example of England was wholly irrelevant, since her history and the social characteristics of her people were different to those of Europe. Besides, in his opinion, England was ruled by an oligarchy. Equally pronounced was his opinion that France could not

possibly maintain a stable existence under its present government.

On May 15th 1859, he celebrated his 86th birthday. It was noticed on that occasion that he was extremely vivacious and full of conversation at table, but that at the same time there was a change for the worse in his appearance. Alexander von Hübner,¹ who was staying with Metternich shortly before his death, gives the following account of his last interview with the ex-Chancellor: "On the evening of the 25th I was due to start for Naples. I spent the whole morning with him. We took a short stroll in the garden, during which he leant on my arm. It grieved me to feel how light the burden seemed. Then I followed him into his cabinet. Our conversation was keen and animated. As I was saying good-bye he said to me, over and over again, with emphasis, 'I was a bulwark of Order' ('ein Fels der Ordnung'). I had already closed the door behind me when I softly opened it again to take one more look at the great statesman. There he sat at his writing-desk, pen in hand, meditatively gazing upwards, bolt upright, cold, haughty, distinguished, as I had so often seen him formerly in the Chancellor's Office, when in the full blaze of his power. The shadow of coming death, which on the previous day I thought I remarked, was gone from his visage. A sunbeam lighted up the room, and the reflected light illuminated the noble features. After some time he noticed me between the folding-doors, fixed upon me a long look of the greatest goodwill, and turning, said, half-aloud, half to himself, 'un rocher d'ordre.'"

From this time Metternich gradually sank. The

¹ Austrian ambassador to France.

war against Napoleon III. in Italy was being fought, and anxiety for the fate of the Austrian arms and regarding the general course of events worried him and wore down his strength. He maintained his mental capacities to the end, and on the very evening before his death read the papers with avidity. The news from Italy, now swarming with French invaders, and the alarming spectre of a new, conquering Napoleon, re-acted fatally upon his health.

On June 10th he was carried into the garden in a bath-chair. Paul Esterhazy, the friend of his youth and formerly ambassador in London, was constantly at his side. Next morning he fainted while dressing. Old Dr Jäger, the family physician, put him to bed, and summoned those of the family who were in Vienna, Princess Hermione, Countess Mélanie Zichy with her husband, Lothar, his youngest son, and some old friends. About mid-day the dying statesman received the Sacrament, making the sign of the Cross, since he was now speechless, and then after a feeble motion of the hand, intended for his sons Richard and Paul, who were absent in Italy at the seat of war, quietly passed away, almost at the very hour when the French made their entry into Milan.

It is mournful to reflect how differently the news of Metternich's death would have been received by Austria and by Europe twelve years before. Then it would have caused a stir in every cabinet, consternation to every absolutist monarch, joy to every Liberal. Now it was the removal of an interesting historical relic. It is almost inconceivable how little impression Metternich's period of greatness had left, and how entirely he had become to all intents and purposes a private person.

Not that the pomp and solemnity of his funeral left anything to be desired. On June 15th, at the Metternichs' Palace, where the body had been lying in state, assembled as illustrious a company of mourners as ever graced a great statesman's funeral. All the Archdukes, the Ministers, the Diplomatic Corps, the Knights of the Order of Maria Theresa, numerous military officers and civil servants, Bishops and representatives of every religious order, not to mention a great number of artists and learned men, joined in paying their last tribute to the dead statesman.

A procession was formed to the Parish Church of St Borromeo ; in front of the coffin, which rested on a hearse ornamented with the Metternich arms, walked Franciscan monks ; beside it a long row of link-bearers. Behind the coffin walked the nearest relations, the friends and servants of the house, and a great concourse of courtiers and statesmen of every rank and denomination. On four black satin cushions placed upon the coffin were displayed the numerous orders, including most of the very highest in Europe, which had been bestowed upon the deceased by almost every country with the exception of England.

At the door of the church the parish priest, accompanied by his subordinates and to the strains of funeral music, received the coffin and conducted it to the steps of the High Altar for consecration. The presbytery of the Church was draped in black and adorned with the arms of the deceased. Altar and pews were hung with black ; numerous tapers and wax candles, burning on the altars and along the aisles, illuminated that motley company assembled together to pay honour to the last representative of Austria of the olden time.

As soon as the consecration was over, the corpse was placed in an ordinary luggage cart and conveyed to the Northern Railway Station. Hence it was taken to the family burial place at Plass in Bohemia. There in the Chapel lies Metternich, surrounded by some of the most beautiful scenery in Bohemia. Over the entrance to the sepulchre is carved the simple inscription *Pax Vobis*.

Of Metternich's three surviving sons, Richard, the eldest, was at the time of his father's death Austrian ambassador at Dresden, and afterwards was Austrian plenipotentiary in Paris for the drawing up of the Peace of Villafranca. Prince Paul was a captain in the Austrian cavalry, while Lothar was still completing his education.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCLUSION

Metternich's personal appearance and health—His character—Conceit—Lax morals—Extravagance—Social charm—Conversational powers—A great reader—Originality—Not a sportsman—Love of gardening and science—A good Catholic—A patron of art—His calmness and callousness—Affection for his children—His early dislike of Great Britain—After his exile his views in this respect become modified—His views on certain British statesmen—His character as a statesman—His sinister reputation in history is undeserved—The circumstances of his birth and early years of office must be considered if we are to understand his policy—The character of the Emperor Francis—Metternich's conviction that Stability was a necessity for Austria—His place as a European statesman—The real defects of his policy—Timidity—Desire to convey an impression of strength—Inconsistency—A brilliant diplomatist but a moderate statesman—Successful up to the fall of Napoleon—Afterwards he failed to supply the needs of the Age—He did not even remain consistently opportunist—Summing up

ALL the portraits of Metternich, whether in youth or in later life, testify to his good looks, and strangers on first making his acquaintance were always struck by the nobility of his features and the stateliness of his bearing.

His health, on the whole, was good. At one period his eyesight gave him trouble, and in later life he became exceedingly deaf. He was also subject to rheumatism, and spent a portion of each Autumn taking the baths and water at Ischl, Baden, Carlsbad or some other watering-place. It often took the form of feverish attacks which, coming upon him without

warning, would confine him to his bed for several days. But he suffered from the worry and anxiety resulting from some political crisis more frequently than from real illness.

Metternich's personal character had one glaring defect—inordinate conceit. It appeared in a variety of forms, and coloured every sphere of his activities. It caused him to believe himself the most versatile of men. He used to assert that had he chosen he might have become a distinguished Professor of Chemistry. He also imagined that he was a born military genius, although, in spite of his intimacy with famous generals, and his acquaintance with battlefields, his knowledge of strategy was contemptible.

Another form of conceit was never to admit himself in the wrong, and to regard as the truth what he wished to be true. In his Memoirs he constantly takes credit for prophesying political events, months, nay years, before they occurred, and he obviously revised his Papers in later years lest evidence of mistaken views of faulty policy should mar his reputation in the eyes of posterity. It is not surprising that he was open to flattery, and that towards the end of his political life he confined himself to a narrow circle of admirers, who only told him what was calculated to please him, with the result that he was really ignorant of the storm which was hovering over him. Again Metternich's conceit is manifested in the long-winded and turgid style of his "Memoirs" and especially of his official despatches. Examples selected at random are his Report to the Emperor Francis on the condition of France during his residence in Paris in 1809, his Memorandum on the general

political situation arising from the Belgian-Dutch question in 1833, or his instructions to Count Esterhazy regarding the London Conference on the Eastern question in 1822. All these documents are exhaustive, lengthy, and elaborately worded. In 1828 Count Zichy in acknowledging the receipt of one of Metternich's Memorandums plaintively refers to it as "the voluminous communication which your highness addressed to me—the mere reading of which was a work of several consecutive days for me."

Instances of Metternich's self-satisfaction abound in his Autobiography and in his private letters. Here are a few: "I judge of the Revolution more truly than most men who have been in the midst of it;" "I have to meet the German Ministers . . . they expect me as a Messiah;" "The public journals, which do not usually pass me over, follow me step by step;" "Fain's Memoirs of the year 1813 are worth reading—they contain my history as well as Napoleon's;" or again, in a letter to Gentz in 1825, "As an instance of how right, as such, is acknowledged by the majority of the people, I may mention the thorough confidence shown in me by all parties."

Not less pleasing is a sentence which occurs in a letter describing his daughter Hermione: "She is very like my mother, possesses therefore some of my charm."

In justice to Metternich it must be admitted that he had something to be conceited about. Conceit was not Metternich's only defect. Perhaps it is hardly fair to accuse a typical eighteenth century statesman of immorality. Metternich was born into an age of lax morals. To expect him to be a thoroughly faithful



PRINCE METTERNICH
FROM THE PAINTING BY FRANÇOIS GÉRARD

Photo. Levy



husband, or entirely free from the influence of women, is to expect what was not demanded of any English statesman of the period, and was fulfilled by few except the Pitts. Further, it must be remembered that his first and third marriages were marriages of convenience, and that his second wife, with whom he was really in love, only survived one year of wedded life. Though capable of temporary passion, and, as in his relations with Caroline Bonaparte and Princess Bagration, of considerable constancy, Metternich with his cold and calculating temperament was frequently actuated in his love affairs by political motives as much as by his genuine taste for women's society.

Metternich had no idea of the value of money, a defect which he inherited from his father. Although he obtained a considerable revenue from his vineyards at Johannisberg and from the mineral springs which he owned at Königswart, his income never equalled his expenditure. On each of his estates he was constantly building or renovating houses, constructing roads or laying out parks and gardens. At Vienna and in the country he loved to entertain lavishly, and the maintenance of a princely establishment flattered his pride as it emptied his purse.

If he saw anything he coveted, from a statue by Canova to a ruined castle, he would buy it regardless of the expense. Lack of time and inclination prevented him from properly administering his possessions. Everything was left to agents, who, in many cases took advantage of his long absences to feather their own nests. Metternich's third wife bitterly complained of this in her Diary, and she seems to have taken a great deal of the management of her husband's

estates into her own hands. "It will be difficult to bring things into order," she writes, "but I hope at least to put some stop to the mismanagement."

Conceit, extravagance and a moral standard not above that of the century in which he was born—these are the less pleasing traits of Metternich's private character.

Otherwise there is little to urge against him. His social charm was great. He was the sort of man that nowadays would be equally a favourite with the ladies in the drawing-room and with the men in the smoking-room. The former he would probably have delighted with descriptions of the dresses worn at the Court of Napoleon in 1809 and at the Congress of Vienna in 1815; the latter with anecdotes of Napoleon and perhaps a vivid account of the famous interview in the Marcolini Palace. For Metternich was a great conversationalist; his innate self-satisfaction led him sometimes, especially in later years, to monopolize the conversation, but he had seen so much and had so much of interest to recount that his audience was not often wearied. On Napoleon and the period before 1815 he loved to discourse.

Metternich was essentially a social man. He loved to be in the centre of life, to be amused, occupied, surrounded by a crowd. "I am not made for loneliness," he once wrote, "I need life about me . . . I do not trust anchorites; they are mostly tiresome or tired out, and, what is worse, they are often wicked men;" and again, "man is not intended to be alone, and those who assert the contrary are unhealthy either in mind or heart." Consequently his friends were always either interesting or quaint or lively.

He did not love dullards or unoriginal men. His women friends were all remarkable for something—beauty, immorality, wit, or singing. It mattered little which, so long as they were in some way different from the common herd. Similarly he liked Gentz for his outlandish foppery, his queer remarks and his love of sweetmeats, Marmont for his enthusiasm about science, Orloff, the Russian diplomatist, because he was “merry and full of fun.” He was always looking out for something original, always had wide interests, curiously like the men of the Renaissance period—a Maximilian or a Lorenzo de Medici.

He devoured the newspapers greedily, even to those parts containing merely literary and theatrical critiques, up to the day of his death, and to the end maintained his ready wit and freshness of memory, though latterly his one topic of conversation was himself. Of the diversity of his interests endless examples might be given.

He was not a sportsman in the modern sense ; he rarely hunted or shot. Billiards and draughts were his favourite games. In his youth he was an enthusiastic dancer, but in 1834 Princess Mélanie expresses surprise at his sudden determination to attend a Charity Ball at Vienna. He had grown to regard dancing as irksome.

Though the greater part of his life was spent in towns, Metternich was no despiser of country pursuits. He took great interest in his vineyards at Johannisberg, as well as in the making of the wine, while on his estates at Plass and Königswart he not only planted a large number of trees but took great pains to improve the plantations already existing. He loved flowers.

"They are worth more than politics," he once said, and Princess Mélanie records in her Diary his pleasure at observing a red rhododendron blooming in February. He was very proud of his gardens, on which he spent large sums. "All the neighbourhood come to see my garden, which is the wonder of travellers," he wrote from Johannisberg in 1826. Gentz shared Metternich's passion for flowers, and the latter when travelling in Italy in 1819 sent him a consignment of seeds.

Any form of science interested Metternich. He liked arranging dinner-parties of savants, however uncouth and unconventional, of all nationalities, and Princess Melanie amusingly describes in her Diary the difficulty she sometimes found in entertaining these celebrities and conducting the conversation in sufficiently learned channels. Any new invention, any philosophical or scientific speculation, however grotesque, roused Metternich's curiosity. He would be equally interested in reading an article in an English Review on the property possessed by the American ash of paralysing the vital powers and stupefying rattlesnakes, in visiting a steam engine recently brought over from England, or in discussing with the Austrian representative at Leipsic the theory of a distinction of sex in clouds.

Whatever his opinions may have been of the position of the Church in the State, Metternich was a good Catholic and something of a theologian. His private relations with the Papacy were always friendly, and on two occasions at least he received a gift of relics for his private chapels from the occupant of the Papal Chair. Metternich used to have theological discussions with Pozzo di Borgo, his old schoolfellow.

His great hero was St Paul, whose epistles he frequently read. So great was the Chancellor's admiration for this Apostle that he named one of his sons after him, contrary to the wishes of his wife.

Metternich was genuinely delighted to hear of the emancipation of the Catholics in Great Britain, and described it as "an affair which will add a fresh flower to the glory of the reign."

Metternich had a preference for serious literature dealing with history or science, and he usually made a point of reading Memoirs or Biographies dealing with his own contemporaries. Novels he seldom read, unless they were or seemed likely to become classics. He was well-versed in the poetical literature of all countries, and is said to have been able to recite from memory the whole of the fourth Canto of "Childe Harold." Of music and art he was an enthusiastic patron. He was instrumental in securing an Italian Opera Company for Vienna. He constantly bought pictures and sculptures, and these, added to the numerous presents which he was given by foreign Sovereigns, formed a veritable museum. He also had a good collection of prints. He was always ready to aid painters and sculptors who lacked recognition. He had one young painter of humble birth, Fulnich, educated at his own expense. He encouraged Blasius Hofer, the first woodcutter in Austria, to found his school at Wiener Neustadt. The landscape painter, Friedrich Gauermann, finding that his efforts to paint nature as he saw it only excited ridicule, begged Metternich to aid him. The Chancellor, recognizing his merit, insisted that the authorities should admit his pictures to the Academy. "The Academy," he

wrote, "is not an institution for labour, which can forbid the teacher or pupil to obey his own genius."

Metternich, as a rule, cannot be accused of being emotional or sentimental. Calmness in great crises—after the escape of Napoleon from Elba, or during the Vienna revolution of 1848—was his characteristic. He was incapable of really deep feeling. He could not hate, which implies weakness, but it at least meant that he never bore a grudge and he would often go out of his way to heap coals of fire upon a vindictive opponent. Though he never forgot a kindness and was not ungrateful, his lack of deep affection rendered him sometimes very cold-blooded to his dearest friends. During his residence at Vienna, after his return from exile, his old flame, Princess Bagration, feeling that her end was near, paid a visit to Vienna from Paris in order to see the ex-Chancellor before she died. The Metternich family did their utmost to render pleasant the stay of this erstwhile beauty, who, though she looked like a mummy, adorned herself with roses as if she were a girl in her teens. Metternich had shown her every attention, and she went home quite happy at having seen her old love for what she knew would be the last time. Shortly afterwards she died. Metternich's family feared the effect which the news would have on the ex-Chancellor. But when someone broke it to him, his only remark was, "It is really wonderful to me that she has lived so long."

Only towards his children did Metternich show a deep-seated affection. Like most parents he considered them far superior to anybody else's children. "Victor is much liked here," he wrote from Vienna in 1823, "he is thought extremely well-bred, which is a

great satisfaction to me. Certainly his good carriage and pleasant manners strike one in comparing him with the other young men here ;” and in 1826 he described Leontine as “ very tall and very pretty,” and prophesied that she would soon be “ the belle of society.” But Metternich was not only proud of his children. He was really fond of them, and enjoyed taking them to theatres, to dances, or for walks in the Prater. He used to regret that he rarely saw his family except at breakfast and dinner. Playing with his children formed a relaxation from the worries of office, and Princess Melanie describes her amusement at watching the Chancellor blowing soap bubbles with Gentz for the delectation of the little Richard. On the birthdays of their parents, the Metternich children always celebrated the occasion by reciting appropriate speeches in French or Italian. In his relations with his children Metternich allowed himself to unbend, as he rarely did to the world in general, though even here his bliss was clouded by the death of so many of his children in early youth, partly owing to hereditary weakness of the lungs, partly to unhealthy conditions at the Vienna mansion.

In respect to the largeness of Metternich’s family—by his three wives he had in all fourteen children—it is interesting to note that fertility was a characteristic of the Metternichs. Several of the Chancellor’s ancestors had as many as twenty children, and early in the eighteenth century a certain Anna Metternich had a family of twenty-five, including twelve sons.

For England, and for most Englishmen and English institutions, Metternich had the utmost contempt. To him England and France were to some extent

similar. "France and England may be considered as having no government. The Ministers in these two countries only exist from day to day, and I share the opinion of all calm observers when I assert that neither of these administrations can maintain themselves." And again, "In London we find a movement and friction in intellectual life such as is found in few other great cities. In Paris one side is chiefly prominent, the more or less frivolous ; there they take everything lightly as if nothing were of importance ; the wind blows everything away." He comes to the conclusion that as a nation the English were inclined to lunacy : "What vexes me with these English is that they are all slightly mad ; this is an evil which must be patiently endured without noticing too much the ludicrous side of it."

Of course there were exceptions. The real old-fashioned Tories were men after his own heart. Of Lord Hertford, for instance, whom he had met in Paris originally, he said, "I had not for many years met so independent, thoughtful and clever an Englishman. His words were like echoes of the past. . . . I feel sure that he was as pleased with me as I with him." Wellington was his favourite. "I am very much pleased with Wellington," he wrote in 1824, "he is an excellent man. He has a true eye for affairs and puts full trust and confidence in one." Castlereagh also fell in with his views, and his death had been a great blow.

He recognized that as a rule the peculiarity of the British Constitution provided an excuse for the vagaries of the British Government. He saw that allowance must be made "for the parliamentary exigencies of the British Cabinet." But the Whigs were Metter-

nich's bugbear. The English newspapers goaded him to fury. "Never will we give in to the theories of the 'Times,'" he once remarked. Princess Melanie relates how she had read out to her husband some despatches from London, which contained cuttings from the "Times," and "Globe," containing "most insolent articles against Austria and the Emperor, which made Clement very angry."

Metternich's aversion for Palmerston and his Cabinet was almost equally great. In a letter to Count Apponyi about the Belgian question in 1823, he wrote, "I know of none worse than those who compose the English Administration. Presumption and *naïveté*, audacity and hesitation, form the distinctive features of Lord Palmerston. Lord Grey is feeble and carries no weight. The rest of the Cabinet consists of Liberal politicians more or less incapable of seizing or following out a sound political idea. . . . And it is with an England in this state that Europe is compelled to act." Palmerston was well aware that Metternich did not approve of him. He wrote to Lord Strangford, the English ambassador in Vienna, in November 1834, announcing his resignation thus: "We are out! The Whigs have made way for their opponents, and the Duke of Wellington is entrusted with the formation of a Cabinet. Show this note at once to Prince Metternich, who will never have heard a better piece of news in his life than that he has got rid of me."

After his residence as an exile in England, Metternich, whether from gratitude or conviction, became less critical of the country which had provided him with a refuge.

Canning was Metternich's pet aversion. Metternich always maintained that England's interests were identical with those of Austria, but that Canning by his policy of isolation ruined all efforts at a good understanding. After the Nauplia incident, he wrote to Gentz, "England has received a good lesson as the consequence of her system of isolation." No word was too bad for Canning, "the scourge of the world." Commenting on Canning's great speech of April 14th, 1823, he wrote, "I really begin to lose the very small portion of respect I had obtained for the man. A fine century for this sort of man—for fools who pass for intellectual but are empty; for moral weaklings who are always ready to threaten with their fists from a distance when the opportunity is good." By 1826 he had given up Canning as quite hopeless—"Canning flies; I walk; he rises to a region where men dwell not, while I remain on the level of all things human."

It is not surprising that British statesmen failed to find favour with Metternich. Although, during the struggle with Napoleon, Great Britain had proved a staunch ally of Austria, British policy after the Congress of Vienna nearly always ran counter to that of Austria, and it was the policy of Canning and of Palmerston which, to a great extent, brought about the failure of Metternich's endeavours to maintain the *status quo* in European politics.

We may now pass on to examine Metternich's position as a statesman.

Somehow Metternich has gone down to posterity as the practical exponent of Machiavellian principles in European politics. Was he not the author of the Carlsbad Decrees, which inaugurated an iniquitous

Police System in Germany by which Liberalism was stifled for nearly twenty years? Did he not deliberately strive to blunt the national spirit of Italy, fill the dungeons of the Spielberg with Italian political prisoners, earn the bitter hostility of Mazzini, and call forth that poem of injured innocence, "Il Mio Prigione"? Did he not, moreover, during the long period of his predominance, use his influence and his power in support of that old régime of eighteenth century absolutism, which was every day becoming more obsolete and more undesirable in view of the growth of a popular and healthy desire for constitutional government?

Although much of this is true, Metternich does not deserve his sinister reputation. He has undoubtedly suffered from a lack of impartial biographers, and indeed of any English biographers at all. For, failing them, the facts of his career must be picked out from a History of Europe or a History of Austria. Hence the results or rather the landmarks of his policy are known, while the motives or circumstances which influenced his conduct and the details of the policy itself are usually passed by. Thus, he is held up to obloquy as the author of the Carlsbad Decrees, the opponent of Canning, and the foe of Italian patriotism, and the usual epithets applied to himself and his policy are "cynical," "malign" or "sinister."

There are faults enough to be found in Metternich's character and policy, but to brand him a "blood and iron" statesman bent on promoting by fair means or foul the cause of reaction is utterly absurd.

In order adequately to comprehend what Metternich's policy was, and why he was prompted to pursue it,

it is necessary briefly to examine the circumstances of his birth and first years of office. For circumstances moulded Metternich's career perhaps more than that of any other statesman.

First, let us remember that he was born in the eighteenth century, and that his parents were typical representatives of that age of absolutism, caste-worship, and artificiality. His family had gained wealth and position by holding posts under the Austrian Government. His father looked for his livelihood to the Emperor's favour and continuance in office. Metternich was, so to speak, born a courtier; it was necessary for his very existence that he should enter the service of the State and remain in it.

It was inevitable, then, that Metternich, whether occupying a subordinate or a responsible post, should tend to cautious conservatism. He had been born into the old régime, and his position depended upon its maintenance. He would not be inclined to bold measures or to any measure that might raise opposition; nor would he ever run counter to the wishes of his superiors.

Thus the character of Francis had an important bearing upon Metternich's career. Metternich's early accession to high office and dependence upon the Emperor's favour for its tenure increased those instincts of the courtier which were innate in his character. In short, there is no doubt whatever that during his first years of power Metternich was the mouthpiece of Francis.

It is true that towards the end of his reign Francis relied more and more upon Metternich, and that practically from 1815 he left foreign affairs entirely

in his Minister's hands. It was Metternich who was entrusted with the task of lecturing the Archdukes Ferdinand and Francis Charles on the principles of politics and diplomacy in January and February 1825. The brevity of Francis' answers to Metternich's dispatches and Memorandums show how thorough was the trust which he placed in his Chancellor.

While Metternich's effusions were never brief and usually voluminous, typical replies from Francis are "Placet" or "Approved," perhaps with some such comment appended as "God grant that it may be according to your wishes." In fact, Metternich had become a necessity, and in November 1835, in a letter inquiring after the Minister's health, the Emperor expresses the hope that Metternich may be preserved to him, "for without you I do not know how to undertake anything."

Metternich's Memoirs, too, would lead us to believe that Francis was merely a kindly, conscientious, easy-going monarch, guided solely by a desire for the prosperity of his subjects and by the advice of his Chancellor. Now there is no doubt that Francis was kind-hearted. There is the story of his seeing a poor man being carried to burial, accompanied only by a priest and the coffin-bearers, and promptly joining in the procession with his adjutant and throwing the first handfuls of earth over his remains. In short, Francis was a benevolent monarch and was undoubtedly regarded with affection by his people. But he was benevolent in the sense of the "benevolent despots" of the eighteenth century. Like Louis XIV. of France, he was the State, and in his own eyes the interests of Austria were bound up with his. What was done for

the people must not be done by the people, but by him. Really Francis was a stern autocrat, as bigoted and as deeply steeped in the principle of Divine Right as any Tudor or Stuart. He therefore set himself against all change and determined that his dominions should be ruled as they had been ruled for centuries before. He was, consequently, imbued with a profound horror of the Revolution, and whenever, as in Italy, revolutionary movements had to be combated showed himself positively ruthless.

Metternich's views so nearly coincided with those of Francis that it is unlikely that, even if he had been a man of strong and independent spirit, he would have come into conflict with his master. As it was, his weak and pliant nature yielded partly from conviction and partly from policy to the Emperor's wishes. He was content to imbibe the ideas of Francis and shape his policy on those lines.

The chief effect of Francis' influence on Metternich was to infuse caution into Austrian foreign policy, to discourage attempts at internal reform and to enforce rigorous measures against Liberalism.

If the Emperor Francis and Metternich were by temperament averse to change in domestic or foreign policy, the condition of the Austrian Empire seemed to afford ample justification for their view. The loose conglomeration of nations forming that Empire could only be held together by means of a strong centralized government, by a stern boycott of revolutionary influences from without, and by the avoidance of all sudden change. The sovereign might make innovations for the good of the people, but everything must be done for the people, not by the people. " Political

repose," wrote Metternich in reference to some reforms instituted in Prussia in 1818, "rests on the fraternization between monarchs and on the principle of maintaining that which is." Any shifting of political forces was dangerous, in the eyes of Metternich and his master, to the very existence of Austria, and, lest revolution in foreign countries should set a bad example to the Austrian dominions, Metternich put into force that principle of "Intervention" by means of the Holy Alliance, which ultimately received its death-blow from Canning.

For the sake of Austria stability must be maintained, not only in Germany but in Europe at large. Foreign nations must not be suffered to set Austria a bad revolutionary example. As Metternich declared, "The principle of conservatism forms the basis of the internal and external policy of Austria."

Having ascertained that the keynote of Metternich's policy was "stability," and that the adoption of that policy was due to natural conviction, the influence of Francis, and the apparent needs of Austria, we may now proceed to estimate Metternich's position as a statesman and the success or failure of his policy.

It has been already remarked that the popular conception of Metternich does him injustice. The charge of cruelty, and the view that Metternich was a rabid reactionary, may be dismissed at once. His one aim was to preserve stability in European as well as in German politics, and he only came into violent collision with Liberalism because he mistook it for Revolution, which he had spent his best years in combating. The Liberals naturally came to loathe him, and exaggerated the severity of his methods, for

in many cases the measures which he took to stifle Liberalism proved irritating rather than harsh in their working.

But Metternich was far from being the Machiavellian statesman which he has been depicted. He hated to see or cause suffering, and it is said that if he saw a fly drowning he would always rescue it. He constantly interceded with Francis for the Italian political prisoners confined in Austrian dungeons, and his police measures, even in Germany, though outwardly rigorous and unjust, in reality fell lightly upon the people compared with the exaggeration of his opponents.

As for the inhabitants of the Austrian Empire, they were happier and more prosperous under Metternich's régime than ever before. Debarred from outside intercourse, they solaced themselves with the quiet acquisition of wealth, and even the Ruthenian peasants enjoyed a prosperity not great indeed but hitherto unparalleled. Metternich was capable of a broad-minded tolerance. When in 1825 Francis asked his advice as to the treatment of some Jesuits who, expelled from Italy, had taken refuge in Galicia and had been informed by the local authorities that they could not remain unless they modified their Statutes, Metternich, who loathed Jesuits as a class, replied that it would be best to leave them unmolested so long as they behaved themselves, since to modify their Statutes would merely destroy whatever value as an organization they might have.

Thrusting aside the false Machiavellian portrait of Metternich, we come to the real defects of his policy.

Metternich was no strong-minded statesman pushing forward a policy in spite of all obstacles. He was

essentially timid. He hated and feared opposition ; he never took the bull by the horns, and the least hindrance to a scheme caused him either to abandon it, or seek to attain his object another way. Hence his failure to carry out any reforms in Austria, even his darling project for the re-arrangement of the tariff ; hence his ill-success in inducing Francis to consent to a more lenient policy in Italy. Similarly, it was his hatred of strife and desire for peace at any price, which resulted in the crumbling of his system before the resolute opposition of Canning.

Metternich avoided all decisive measures ; he was lavish of promises, but slow to fulfil them, and if to gain his end it was necessary to conceal the truth he did so without a qualm. No man of great talents has ever been less sensible of his strength.

Like most weak natures Metternich wished to convey an impression of strength. He gradually confined himself to a narrow circle of admirers, who agreed with all his views and flattered his vanity. He used his *Memoirs* to cloak his weakness in the eyes of posterity. Hence his otherwise inexplicable tendency to profess to have foretold events in cases where all the evidence goes to prove that at the time he took an opposite view ; hence, too, his not infrequent distortion of facts. He is always talking of principles and laughing at timid statesmen, oblivious of the fact that no one was less hampered by principles or fonder of the happy medium than himself.

For partly owing to his inherent weakness of character Metternich was singularly inconsistent. He has often been accused of opportunism ; and an opportunist he was. In a sense it is absurd to talk of a

"Metternich System," for Metternich constantly shifted his policy to suit the needs of the moment. His timidity and opportunism were not uncriticized by his contemporaries. Napoleon said of him on one occasion that he mistook intrigue for statesmanship, and on another, "he approaches being a statesman, he lies very well"; while Talleyrand, of all people, called him a politician *de semaine*.

The truth is—and perhaps Napoleon and Talleyrand saw it—that Metternich was a very brilliant diplomatist and a very moderate statesman. Even Fouché allowed that he possessed insight into character and knowledge of men, and his use of intrigue of every description was typical of eighteenth century diplomacy, which he represented. His knowledge of men enabled him to cajole the Czar at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, and to maintain amicable relations with Napoleon, even when Austria and France were at war. The personal attractions, love of entertaining, and success in society, which gained him universal popularity, were essentially the attributes of a diplomatist.

If he could judge character, he was also capable of summing up a situation. His reports and memorandums, though conceited and voluminous, were always exhaustive and penetrating. He could judge the character of nations as well as of men. "The French play with Liberty," he once wrote; "it is a more serious matter when the Germans add to enthusiasm perseverance."

It is wrong to say that between 1815 and 1848, Metternich was the practical dictator of Europe, the successor of Napoleon. He never ruled the Cabinets;

he cajoled them; he was an adviser, an arbitrator. As he once told Capefigue in his conceited way, "I am to a certain extent the Confessor of all the Cabinets. I give absolution to those who have committed the fewest sins and I thus maintain peace in their souls."

It was by cajolery that he induced the Powers to agree to the Carlsbad Decrees. He made the German Diet subservient to his will by manipulation not by force of character. It is noticeable that where he felt himself strong, as in Italy or Switzerland, he was firm in pushing forward his policy; where he felt himself weak, as in Hungary, he yielded to opposition and ungracefully granted extraordinary concessions.

His successes were the successes of a diplomatist. The Austrian Marriage Alliance with France was but a temporary expedient to give Austria time to recuperate; it initiated no settled policy, and Prince Schwarzenberg not unjustly exclaimed to the Duke of Bassano, who had been enlarging on the happy results to be expected from the marriage, "Ah, le mariage, le mariage! La politique l'a fait, mais. . ."

Perhaps Metternich's greatest achievement was steering Austria triumphantly through the period of 1813-14. This taxed his abilities to the utmost and gave him an opportunity of displaying to the full his knowledge of men, his quick appreciation of situations, and his aptitude for intrigue. But his policy during those years was a hand-to-mouth policy, and although he at length threw Austria into the scales against Napoleon with whole-hearted decision, it was only when he felt that there was no danger of failure. His achievements at the Congress of Vienna and at the Congresses which succeeded it were diplomatic achieve-

ments. By threats and by persuasion he won over the Cabinets of Europe to his views, he was, so to speak, the Ambassador of Austria, and he served her ably.

But beyond the limits of the consummate diplomatist Metternich did not go. So long as the struggle with Napoleon continued, even while the settlement of Europe was being effected, his limitations were not apparent. He was almost uniformly successful up till the fall of Napoleon, and it was in great part due to his cautious, selfish, shifty policy, that that fall was brought about.

But after the discomfiture of Napoleon there was need of statesmen and not of diplomatists. A new era had arisen, an era of Liberty and of Nationality. Democracy had aided Monarchy to overthrow the Revolution, and demanded her reward, free speech, free Press, and a voice in affairs. Metternich granted none of these demands. Placed in a commanding position, with power to achieve whatever he wished, he entirely mistook the spirit of the new age in which it was his fate to live. Imbued with a deadly hatred of the French Revolution, he mistook agitation for what are now regarded as the rights of the people for Revolution and strenuously combated it. He condemned the Liberal enthusiasm which was inextricably mingled with the patriotic spirit which inspired the war of Liberation in Germany. Bent on the preservation of the Austrian Empire, and not less on his own maintenance in office, and encouraged in this aim by the autocratic pride of Francis, he sought everywhere to keep things as they were. The people must be governed and not govern. "If civil liberty is

necessary to all, political liberty is only desirable for a few," he once remarked. He thought he was some Horatius defending the bridge of eighteenth century political régime against the overwhelming forces of new-fangled Liberalism, a heroic champion of all that was traditional and venerable and good. Really he was an obstacle to progress, hopelessly out of date. His one aim was stability, when movement was a keynote of the age. Sometimes he felt the pathos of his position. "If I had been fifty years old fifty years ago," he once said, "I should have been a more imposing figure than I am now."

Even if he had been consistently opportunist as in the days of the Napoleonic struggle, all might have been well; but he was not. He unconsciously moulded temporary measures for combating the more harmful attributes of Liberalism in Germany and elsewhere, into a repressive system. Even when he clearly saw the necessity for reform he suffered himself to be overruled, and yet yielded as in Hungary when he felt that he was weak. He is, therefore, open to blame, sometimes for his weakness, sometimes for unreasonable severity. What was needed after 1815 was a man like Bismarck, who would lead public opinion and fearlessly voice public aspirations. Sudden innovations, rash reforms, revolutionary uprooting of old traditions were not required. A very little would have sufficed to satisfy the demands of that Liberal and patriotic spirit which had helped so largely to free Europe from Napoleon, and which was not in itself disloyal to Monarchy. But a statesman was required who could comprehend the tendency of the age; and Metternich failed to supply the want. He

was too much of a courtier to sacrifice himself to a great idea, too little of a statesman ever to form one.

The result was that in his misguided efforts to save the absolutist system, Metternich merely brought it into collision with that Liberalism, which represented all that was best of intellectual Europe. If he had been correct in regarding himself as the one prop of a system which alone could save the nations of Europe from hopeless decadence, his policy would have been admirable. For he did succeed in stifling Liberalism in Germany and in the Austrian Empire during the period of his predominance. He made Vienna the hub of European politics. He preserved the unity of Austria at a time of unrest and upheaval, and it has been remarked, not without reason, that "when Austria shall have survived half a century of constitutional experiment under the Dual Monarchy, it will be time for Austrians to condemn him."

But the fact remains that he was so aloof from the personalities and ideas of his time, that he made no lasting impression on them. It might have been expected that during the thirty years of his power he would have trained a school of politicians in Austria who would have carried on his ideas and his work. Yet after his fall his successors threw his policy to the winds. He failed to stamp his will on his contemporaries. Not unlike Wolsey, he was content with showy diplomatic triumphs, which momentarily raised the prestige of himself and his country. But that was all. He left nothing behind him, and after his fall that which has falsely been called his "system" dissolved, leaving no trace.

Somehow Metternich leaves a bad taste in the mouth.

Attractive, talented, and always socially successful, he nevertheless gives the impression of always posing for effect or pleasing for an object. He was painfully self-complacent. He was a strange mixture of domestic affection and domestic infidelity, of apparent strength and real weakness, of firm principle and gross inconsistency. He is, in fact, an admirable illustration of what is meant when it is said that the eighteenth century was the age of artificiality. To the end, Metternich was a type of the eighteenth century, when love, complexions, wigs, politics, diplomacy, and war were essentially artificial. He intermingled politics with pleasure, concerts with conferences, women with work. Metternich came first, the Hapsburg Dynasty next, the Austrian Empire last.

If his private character, though in its details often attractive, on the whole repels us, so does his political career. No one disputes his abilities as a diplomatist ; if he had died in 1816, there would be little but praise to bestow upon him. But, born a diplomatist and living on into a period when statesmen above all were wanted, he refused to be a statesman. He never sought to feel the pulse of universal tendencies. Instead of seeking to adapt the Constitution of Austria to modern needs, he sought only by isolation to prop up the Hapsburg Dynasty, on which depended the fortunes of the Metternich family. Though he dimly saw the necessity that Austria should lead German public opinion, his policy separated her from it, and paved the way for that political schism in 1866 which gave to Prussia the predominance in Germany.

PRINCE CLEMENT METTERNICH'S FAMILY

*Children by Princess Eleonora Kaunitz, married September 27th,
1795, died March 19th, 1825*

- (1) Marie, b. 1797, m. Count Joseph Esterhazy, d. 1820.
- (2) Francis, b. 1798, d. 1799.
- (3) Clement, b. 1799, d. 1799.
- (4) Victor, b. 1803, d. 1828.
- (5) Clementine, b. 1804, d. 1820.
- (6) Leontine, b. 1811, m. Count John Sandor, d. 1861.
- (7) Joseph, b. 1814, d. 182- (?).
- (8) Hermione, b. 1815, d. 1890.

Children by Maria Antonia Leykam, married November 5th, 1827

- (9) Richard, b. 1829, m. Countess Pauline Sandor 1856,
d. 1895.

Children by Countess Mélanie Zichy Ferraris, January 30th, 1831

- (10) Mélanie, b. 1832, m. Count Joseph Zichy 1853.
- (11) Clement, b. 1838, d. 1838.
- (12) Paul, b. 1834, m. Countess Mélanie Zichy Ferraris, d. 1906.
- (13) Marie, b. 1836, d. 1836.
- (14) Lothar, b. 1837, m. Caroline Reuter, d. 1904.

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